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Introduction
This article is the study of how a constitutional democracy can
undermine itself from within, despite legal, constitutional and
procedural safeguards designed to ensure self-perpetuation. The
internal or voluntary road to destruction is only one of many paths
that can lead to a democracy's demise. It is also the least visible
process, and sheds light on the self-destructive tendencies embedded
in the very structures of democracy.
The focal point of this study is France's Vichy r6gime, the pro-
fascist government of France from 1940 to 1944, named after the spa
town of Vichy in which it acquired its legal existence through
democratic means. Vichy was the seat of the new French government
until 1944. I dwell in particular on Vichy France's antisemitic
legislation and policy, as Vichy's antisemitism constitutes a dramatic
example of policies and laws that appeared to invert, subvert and
transform into their very opposites almost two centuries of
constitutional guarantees and egalitarian principles.1 Even in the
1. Throughout this piece, I call France a "constitutional democracy" in reference to
attributes of law and justice that were official national traditions, and part of the French
body politic and population's self-understanding since 1789. See ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, L'ANCIEN REGIME ET LA RtVoLUTION 317 (1967; originally published in
1856). The term is justified in that it conveys to common law readers an approximation of
fundamental systemic attributes which they will associate with constitutional principles,
and which were a part of pre-Vichy France. The role of the Constitution in American
social and legal consciousness is, however, dissimilar in many ways from the French
experience. Much of what we associate with the Constitution in terms of the fundamentals
of our system, the French associate with their Civil Code. They have changed
constitutions twelve times, but still have the same (albeit amended) code that went into
effect in 1804. For excellent discussions of this issue, see Pierre Legrand, Strange Power of
Words: Codification Situated, 9 TuL. EUR. & CIV. L. FORUM 1 (1994); Pierre Legrand,
Civil Codes and the Case of Quebec: Semiotic Musings Around an Accent Aigu, in
SEMIOTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, 195, 202 (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1995) ("civil
codes help to delineate a... national identity"); Martin A. Rogoff, A Comparison of
Constitutionalism in France and the United States, 49 ME. L. REv. 21 (1997); Martin A.
Rogoff, The French (R)evolution of 1958-1998, 3COL. J. EUR. L. 453 (1997-98); and Pierre
Legrand, Comparer, 2 REVUE INT. DE DROIT COMPARt 279 (1996). France's republican
existence also was interspersed with monarchies and empires emerging and reemerging
before the advent of the Third Republic, the government in power before the Vichy
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enactment and implementation of legalized racism, however,
precisely where Vichy appeared to break most radically with France's
past legal tradition, Vichy constructed itself from the nation's past as
much as it broke with it.
Just as many of Vichy's roots lay in France's republican past,
many of modem France's roots lie in its Vichy past. Coming to grips
with Vichy involves connecting numerous, mutually incompatible
tendencies that have defined France's various cultural communities,
and that also coexisted within individuals. The point of such an
exercise is not merely to conclude that complexity and contradictions
abound, but to reveal how and why dominant political and legal
patterns can shift so dramatically that eventually they undermine
themselves.
France's institutional mechanisms for perpetuating democracy
proved unequal to the task in the face of combined internal and
external pressures. Contemporary issues in the United States,
discussed under such rubrics as welfare reform, immigration reform, a
growing wealth gap, homosexual rights, public school funding, and
publicly funded vouchers for private school attendance, create similar
potentials for constructing hierarchies and categories of excluded
people, of others with lesser rights. The processes by which an
excluded other is created can be unobtrusive, and disguised through a
rhetoric that extols the very democratic principles and ideals which it
serves to erode, or even through procedures originally designed to
ensure fairness and egalitarianism.
In the coming years, increasingly vocal, diverse communities
inevitably will raise still more issues of belongingness, exclusion,
sovereignty and statehood, challenging democracy with implosion and
explosion, in both the United States and the emerging Europe of the
next millennium. 2 The study of Vichy France may be useful, as it
encapsulates similar issues in another time, and illuminates the
vulnerable and transformable propensities of legal and political
theory in periods of crises.
I. Historical, Biographical and Theoretical Overview
France became a constitutional democracy pursuant to the
French Revolution of 1789.3 In July of 1940, within weeks of France's
defeat by the German army, democracy in France ended by a vote of
democratically elected members of Parliament. As more fully
regime.
2. For an exceptionally thoughtful analysis of these issues in the context of the
European Union, see J.H.H. Weiler, Does Europe Need a Constitution? Reflections on
Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision, 1 EUR. L.J. 219 (1995).
3. See generally DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1.
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discussed below, it was a voluntary act of self-destruction, as France's
Parliament by an overwhelming majority of 569 out of 649 legislators,
committed institutional suicide by voting itself out of existence and
creating a dictatorship, all in careful compliance with the French
Third Republic's legal procedure. 4
I do not mean to underestimate the importance of Germany's
military triumph over France, or of its looming influence as the
imminently probable ruler of all of Europe. I mean, rather, to focus
on the "Franco-French" nature of Vichy inasmuch as Vichy (1)
entered into existence as the choice of autonomous political delegates
proceeding under the French law of the Third Republic, not the law
of Nazi Germany; and (2) legislated for a time under its own name,
independently of the dictates of Nazi Germany.5 Many, if not most,
French people may have perceived the country to have had no
alternative to a collaborationist government.6 That too is part of
4. More specifically, the initial July 10, 1940 vote gave Marshal P~tain the power to
create a new constitution. A new constitutional act two days later gave Ptain all
governmental and legislative powers.
5. Indeed, in certain legislative matters, such as the definition of who was a Jew, the
Vichy French laws were harsher than Nazi German equivalents, causing a delighted
Dannecker, chief of the Gestapo's Judenreferat in Paris, to decree in the Occupied Zone
that in doubtful cases, the Germans would follow the more inclusive Vichy definition
rather than the narrower German Nuremberg law. For a fuller discussion of the Vichy
French definition of who was a Jew, see infra note 77. On the Nazis' reasons for adopting
a less inclusive stance in Germany itself, see NATHAN STOLTZFUS, RESISTANCE OF THE
HEART: INTERMARRIAGE AND THE ROSENSTRABE PROTEST IN NAZI GERMANY (1996).
At least one scholar, Weil-Curiel, has suggested that French law was harsher for half-Jews
than its German counterpart because Raphael Alibert, who drafted the French legislation,
harbored bitter hatred for a man who was a half-Jew. See Denis Broussolle, L'6laboration
du statut des juifs de 1940, in LE DROIT ANTISIMITE DE VICHY, 115, 125 (Maurice
Olender ed., 1996) (hereinafter LE DROIT ANTIStMITE). For similarly personal and petty
motivations in Germany, among German politicians who unwittingly enabled Hitler to
gain a stranglehold on power, see HENRY ASHBY TURNER JR., HITLER'S THIRTY DAYS
TO POWER JANUARY 1933 (1996). More generally, for a fascinating if sobering account of
the role of chance and mistakes in the formation and development of law, see Alan
Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 335 (1996); on the role of
chance in history, see EDUARD MEYER, ZUR THEORIE UND METHODIK DER
GESCHICHTE 3-11 (1902), cited in FRITZ RINGER, MAX WEBER'S METHODOLOGY: THE
UNIFICATION OF THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 25 (1997).
6. The theory that France had no alternative but to collaborate may have been
widespread among the French population as a motivation for embracing or accepting
Vichy, but it was not necessarily the primary motivation of the Vichy r6gime itself.
Throughout his prison journals, former Prime Minister tdouard for one insists that Pdtain
and his cohorts delivered France to the Germans, not because of France's military defeat
or other necessity, but in order to destroy the Republic. See tDOUARD DALADIER,
PRISON JOURNAL, 1940-1945, especially at 89,113 (Arthur D. Greenspan trans., Westview
Press 1995) (1991). Robert Paxton, the eminent Vichy historian, largely concurs with this
conclusion: "Vichy's internal project-replacing the cosmopolitan and libertarian
Republic by an authoritarian, homogeneous state-was revenge against the Popular Front
[Vol. soHASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
French self-understanding, for when the French adopted P6tain's btat
franqais in the absence of any German dictate, they were alone
among the peoples of the western democracies overrun by the Nazis
to make the choice of capitulating from within. 7
By July of 1940, as the French democracy's Parliament was
meeting for the last time, to legislate itself out of existence, my
grandfather was one of thousands of refugees interned in French
camps for enemy aliens. The son of a German judge who had been
born Jewish but converted to Protestantism, my grandfather had
started his professional life in the early 1900s as the owner of a bank
in Berlin.8 In 1933, shortly after Hitler came to power, a servant
denounced him to the Gestapo for criticizing the new r6gime. The
ensuing Gestapo interrogation persuaded my grandfather to leave
Germany. He emigrated to Paris in 1933, where prior business
contacts enabled him to lead an active professional life, and to raise
his family. In 1939, however, France declared war on Nazi Germany,
and adult males from Germany were interned in camps as potential
Nazi spies.
My grandfather experienced Vichy France from four French
camps: Francillon, Cpoy, les Miles and Gurs. His letters to my
mother and the rest of his family are one of my sources for an
individual's and a cultural community's experience of Vichy. The
letters reflect his sense of France as a unified, harmonious entity,
whose national identity was coterminous with the French
Revolution's Declaration of the Rights of Man. Vichy in his eyes
simply was not France. His numerous letters contain not a single
more than accommodation to some Nazi blueprint." ROBERT 0. PAXTON, VICHY
FRANCE: OLD GUARD AND NEW ORDER 1940-1944, at xii (1982 ed.) (1972). See also id.
("It was P~tain who wanted collaboration; Hitler wanted only booty."). Accord PAUL
REYNAUD, CARNETS DE cAyrVirrt: 1941-1945, at 106 (1997) (Vichy-approved Action
frangalse glorification of French military leaders who opposed the Republic with far more
vehemence than they had opposed the nation's enemy). See also id. at 166 for the
statement by Vichy Minister of Justice Barthdlemy that Vichy's legal enactments, as of
April 15, 1942, were not the result of external, Ie., German, pressure ("Nous n'avons subi
aucune pression... de l'extgrieur .... ).
7. The examination of Vichy's "Franco-French" aspects continues to discomfit and
dismay. A new publication by Henri Amouroux, well-established French historian of the
Occupation, reacts against the recent surge in French self-examination by seeking to
reinstate German guilt as the focal point for analyzing Vichy. Significantly, Amouroux
seems also to hope to close the discussion by presenting his new book as the last word on
Vichy. The book is titled Pour en finir avec Vichy; loosely translated, To Close the
Discussion About Vichy. See HENRI AMOUROUX, POUR EN FINIR AVEC VICHY: LES
OUBLIS DE LA MfMOIRE (1997). Cf. France's Minister of War's statement after Captain
Dreyfus had been pardoned, but not yet rehabilitated: "L'incident est clos" ("The incident
is closed").
8. For a detailed account of my grandfather's pre-war life, see ROBERT RONALD,
LAsT TRAIN TO FREEDOM (1997).
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reference to the fact that Vichy was voted into existence freely by
democratically elected French legislators.
I do not mean to belittle my grandfather's fervent belief in a one,
true France. Many of his contemporaries shared it, including General
de Gaulle, whose immutable vision of a unified France impelled him
to carry on the military and political fight against Nazi Germany after
most of his compatriots had abandoned the struggle.9
Indeed, the theme of the true France ("la vraie France")
abounded in France during and after the Vichy period, with widely
varying meanings depending on the categories and associations
prevailing in each cultural community. I discuss various experiences,
ideas and ideals of the "true Frances," based, inter alia, on
contemporaneous journals and memoirs, the letters my grandfather
wrote from French camps, and the many accounts my parents and
other relatives and acquaintances gave of their lives in Vichy
France.10 I hope to offer a pluralistic vision of the Frances that
coexisted under Vichy. I focus on rival attempts to manipulate
rhetoric so as to control meaning, and on the consequent post-war
fraying of the threads of memory. I suggest the need to allow
memory to be guided by the contexts of the times, and the
concomitant need to discover and challenge some of the entrenched,
obfuscatory categorizations into which the post-war world has
furcated the history of Vichy.
The attempt to define and redefine France and Frenchness in
terms of a unified whole has been itself a unifying factor in French
history, and continues today. It is one of the unstated purposes of the
contemporary French trials of accused Vichy collaborators. The
efforts of each successive French regime to project national harmony
and unity have involved shifting categorizations, and exclusions of
rejected discourses. National identity and self-representation are
more vulnerable to dramatic transformations and subversions,
9. De Gaulle's exquisitely written war memoirs begin with the following disarmingly
and deceptively simple words, "All my life, I have had a certain idea of France." ("Toute
ma vie, je me suis fait une certaine idde de la France.") CHARLES DE GAULLE, MtMOIRES
DE GUERRE: L'APPEL: 1940-1942, 1 (1954). Literally translated, the sentence would be
"all my life I have made for myself a certain idea of France." The French language does
not necessitate his use of the reflexive verb, which connotes fabrication and construction
of the idea of France for himself, connotations which are psychologically revealing. For
further discussion of de Gaulle's conception and construction of the idea of France, see
infra, notes 148 and 199-204, and accompanying text.
10. My mother grew up in France, fleeing the unoccupied zone with her family in
August, 1941, at the age of seventeen. My father was studying in France when the war
broke out. He fled from Paris to Montpellier on foot, a few hours ahead of the German
troops, and left France about a year later, at the age of 29.
11. See infra notes 250 to 330, and surrounding text for an analysis of the trial of
Maurice Papon.
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however, to the extent they deny or discredit others' truths.
In July of 1940, the lAtat frangais, a repressive, racist state,
replaced the Third Republic under the dictatorship of Marshal
Philippe P6tain, France's acclaimed World War I military hero,
revered throughout the country as "le vainqueur de Verdun", the
victor of Verdun. Once in power, he swiftly enacted laws that, among
others, defined and progressively ostracized Jews, leading to the
eventual deportation of an estimated 75,000 Jews from France, a
figure which is both conservative and does not take into account the
several thousands who died on French soil from starvation, disease
and mistreatment in France's camps.' 2 Of those deported from
France, only 3% survived. Among the 75,000 deportees were 6,000
children under the age of twelve who did not return, including 2,000
under the age of six at the time of their deportation.13
Vichy buttressed its claim to legitimacy with curious and
paradoxical sets of discourses that blended a rhetoric of continuity
with the past with a rhetoric of rupture from the past through the
creation of a much-touted "New Order" or "National Revolution.' 4
Vichy's rhetorical imagery of revolution involved further antinomy, at
once implicitly evoking the 1789 French Revolution, while disavowing
the Revolution as part of an allegedly corrupting liberal-Jewish
influence that had introduced egalitarianism and individualism into
French culture-influences P6tain's New Order sought to counter by
rehabilitating purportedly pre-revolutionary Christian ideals of
community ("corporatisme"), family, work and religion.15 Thus, the
12. See, e.g., SERGE KLARSFELD, FRENCH CHILDREN OF THE HOLOCAUST: A
MEMORIAL viii (1996) (giving the number of deportees as 76,000); JOSEPH BILLIG, LE
COMMISSARIAT GONPRAL AUX QUESTIONS JUIVES (1941-1944), at 13 (1955) (calculating
that 74,000 Jews had been deported from France by March 6, 1943, before the
deportations had begun from the southern zone). Nora Levin estimates a total of 80,000
Jews were deported from France and subsequently killed. See NORA LEVIN, THE
HOLOCAUST: THE DESTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN JEWRY 1933-1945, at 458 (1968). Lucy
Dawidowicz gives an estimate of 90,000. LUCY S. DAWIDOWICZ, THE WAR AGAINST
THE JEWS 1933-1945, at 363 (1975).
13. PIERRE LABORJE, L'OPINION FRANCAISE SouS VICHY 278 n.3 (1990).
14. Equally interesting issues of continuity and rupture arise with respect to
Naploeon's relation to the French Revolution. Cf. PIERRE-BLOCH, JUSQU'AU DERNIER
jouR, 18 (1983) ('e le dens [Bonaparte] pour le continuateur des idgaux de la Rgvolution
franqaise"); ROBERT GILDEA, THE PAST IN FRENCH HISTORY (1994). Both pro- and
anti-revolutionaries evoked Bonaparte as their inspiration. See also JOSEPH
BARTH LEMY, MINISTRE DE LA JUSTICE: VICHY 1941-1943, MEMOIRES, 629 (1989) (text
of Vichy Minister of Justice's speech to Conseil d'Atat on August 19, 1941, with approving
comparison of Pdtain to Bonaparte).
15. On the essentially feudal nature of the French ideal of corporatisme, see MARC
BLOCH, FRENCH RURAL HISTORY: AN ESSAY ON ITS BASIC CHARACTERISTICS (Janet
Sondheimer trans., Univ. of Calif. Press 1996); JOHN MARKOFF, THE ABOLITION OF
FEUDALISM: PEASANTS, LORDS AND LEGISLATORS IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
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shift away from individual rights proceeded under a fagade of
communalism.
The Third Republic's attention to its law and legal procedure in
effecting its own demise in and of itself connotes continuity between
the r6gime which signed its own death warrant and the one it
spawned. The intermingling of symbols and rhetorics of continuity
and rupture marked levels of both substance and form in Vichy, and
allowed for Vichy's repressive and antisemitic measures to be
accepted with less public discontent than a rhetoric solely of rupture
with the past could have achieved.
The profusion of laws passed during the Vichy r6gime's shift
towards hierarchy and exclusion also highlights the prodigious role of
law and legal rhetoric in legitimizing, normalizing and sometimes
disguising the most fundamental violations of traditional
constitutional principles. 16 Legal discourse itself provided apparent
continuity because of the familiarity of the traditional language and
linguistic structures of law. A fundamental shift in legal significances
developed, but the novelty was less evident because of the
appearance and form of continuity in the familiar contours of legal
language, including the discourses of statutory language and scholarly
commentary. 17 Vichy thus poses the challenges of delineating form
from substance, legality from legitimacy, and penetrating the
labyrinthine effects of legal categorization on many levels.
Vichy's legal recategorizations eliminated France's Jewish
minority from those who qualified as members of the new French
body politic. Vichy officials and legal scholars argued that French law
continued to preserve the fundamental, constitutional rights of full-
fledged French citizens. According to this line of reasoning,
fundamental constitutional protections had not changed. Rather,
those entitled to them merely had been restricted to exclude people
whose allegedly exploitative and destructive past conduct had marked
them as alien in their essential natures from the French nation and
people.18 This was one of Vichy's representations of continuity with
(1996); and Rogoff, A Comparison of Constitutionalism in France and the United States,
supra note 1, at 46, 58.
16. See Richard Weisberg's groundbreaking work in this area. RICHARD H.
WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE (1996) (hereinafter VICHY
LAW); Legal Rhetoric Under Stress: The Example of Vichy, in RICHARD WEISBERG,
POETHICS: AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE, 143-182 (1992)
(hereinafter POETHICS).
17. See VICHY LAW, supra note 16. See also PAUL DE MAN, BLINDNESS AND
INSIGHT: ESSAYS IN THE RHETORIC OF CONTEMPORARY CRITICISM 11 (1983 ed.) (1971)
("It is the distinctive privilege of language to be able to hide meaning behind a misleading
sign.").
18. See infra notes 19 and 76-84, and accompanying text.
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France's Republican past.19
Thus, the r6gime sought to erase the new, fundamental violation
of constitutional protections by keeping the old, constitutional
constructs intact on the surface, merely changing the less structurally
apparent extent of the familiar, entrenched protections. The official
position, sanctioned by many constitutional law scholars, that nothing
fundamental in the law had changed, was calculated to make
palatable the new antisemitic laws, but completely ignored the logical
imperative linking the quantity of individuals protected by
constitutional rights to the substantive quality of the constitutional
protections. 20
It is interesting to note, however, that initially, when it enacted
the first of its antisemitic statutes, the October 1940 statut des juifs,
the Vichy rgime was too cautious even to argue that it had
transformed Jews into an unprotected class. At that early stage,
Vichy took particular pains to declare that Jewish persons and
property remained fully protected by the new State, and that the
purpose of singling out and defining Jews statutorily merely was to
prevent continued Jewish exploitation of the French people. Thus,
the regime stated that Jews would be eliminated or greatly restricted
only from playing a role in the public sphere, and elsewhere where
they allegedly represented a pernicious and dangerous influence.21
19. For the contrary effort by the 1789 French revolutionaries to exaggerate the
Revolution's apparent break with the past, see Tocqueville, supra note 1, at 43 ("The
French in 1789 made the greatest effort to which any people has ever dedicated itself, to so
to speak cut in two their destiny, and to separate by an abyss what they had been
heretofore from what they wanted to be henceforth. In this objective, they took all sorts
of precautions to bring nothing from the past into their new condition; they imposed all
sorts of constraints upon themselves so as to fashion themselves differently from their
fathers; in short, they omitted nothing to render themselves unrecognizable. I have always
thought that they succeeded far less in this singular enterprise than it generally has been
believed.").
20. The extent to which United States law differentiates between legal immigranits'
and citizens' constitutional protections raises some similar concerns. More generally, see
J. M. Balkin, Constitution of Status, 106 YALE LJ. 2313, 2314 (1997) (discussing social
stratification as creating "democracy in a profoundly undemocratic society"). See also
Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in ANTONIN ScALiA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION,
95, 113 (1997) ("Tyranny, as Tocqueville warned, need not announce itself with guns and
trumpets. It may come softly-so softly that we will barely notice when we become one of
those countries where there are no citizens but only subjects."). In addition to restricting
the scope of existing constitutional protections, Pdtain also enacted new constitutional
measures, such as l'Acte constitutionnel no 7, promulgated January 7, 1941, pursuant to
which Pdtain was empowered to investigate former cabinet ministers and other dignitaries,
and to impose such criminal penalties as he deemed just, without the accused standing
trial. See REYNAUD, supra note 6, at 31.
21. The following official French government press release appeared on the day
before the statut des juifs was published: "The entire Government, in absolute sincerity,
has refrained from taking any reprisals. It respects the physical persons and the property
November 1998]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
In fact, however, the statut des juifs of October 1940 was only a
prelude to other laws which were to abrogate all legal protection of
Jewish persons and property, eventually and progressively subjecting
every Jewish person on French soil to possible legal internment in
camps, and delivery to the Germans for deportation and death. With
respect to their property, Jews soon were subject to complete
dispossession through the forced "aryanization" of virtually any
property they owned, from bank accounts to chattels to businesses.22
The official governmental and scholarly justification for the
"aryanization" of Jewish property was to eliminate Jews from
affecting French economic life, and was rationalized by the allegation
that this was necessary to protect France's economy, as their past
influence had proven to be destructive to the French economy.23
Vichy presents vividly the increasing momentum of a process
that incorporated racist measures and ideologies in a society whose
legal system purportedly had immunized it from the legal exclusion of
minorities. France's capitulation was the dissolution of a
constitutional democracy within the very legal framework designed to
perpetuate it, and by a process that indisputably adhered to the
procedural requirements of the very system targeting itself for
destruction. This phenomenon was an extraordinary event, and bears
on numerous contemporary issues of increasing interest, as our world
becomes ever more attuned to the challenges diverse communities
pose to constitutional democracies and to law's capacity for
effectively protecting and inclusing diverse constituencies.
Vichy France illustrates that the insidious potential for auto-
destruction and for the legalization of racism is embedded within the
very structures and institutions of constitutional democracy. This
potential came to fruition in Vichy without a violent usurpation of
authority, for the Vichy regime did not result from a military coup
of the Jews. It solely is preventing them from attaining certain public functions, of
authority, managerial in nature, and of intelligence formation, experience having proven
to it [Le., to the government], as it has to all impartial observers, that the Jews exercised
those [functions, in the past] with a tendency to be individualistic to the point of anarchy."
Reprinted in BILLIG, supra note 12, at 32. On Vichy's "economic rationalization of
racism," see Broussolle, supra note 5, at 123. Claude Singer analyzes the reaction to racist
legislation as uneasy, and notes a defensive quality in its apologists. See CLAUDE SINGER,
VICHY, L'UNIVERsrr ET LES JUIFS (1992); accord, Daniale Lochak, Acrire, se taire...
Rdflexions sur l'attitude de la doctrine frangaise, in LE DROIT ANTIStMITE, supra note 5, at
433. For more general remarks on semantic reversions in totalitarian discourse, see
HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1951); JEAN-PIERRE FAYE,
LANGAGES TOTALITAIRES (1973).
22. "Aryanization" refers to the forcible transfer of legal title to non-Jews of Jewish
assets and businesses. The principal "aryanization" legislation enacted by Vichy is
reprinted in Appendix 4 of LE DROIT ANTIStMITE, supra note 5, at 590.
23. See infra notes 79 to 83 and accompanying text.
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d'tat, nor was it imposed by Nazi Germany. Indeed, France was the
only western democracy subject to Nazi occupation in the wake of
military defeat that had an official, indigenous government dedicated
to collaborating with the occupier.24
Vichy's example is of particular interest from a comparative
perspective in that its exclusionary process was at once rapid and
highly visible, displaying mechanisms of corrosion that are latent in
most constitutional democracies, either lying dormant or functioning
at lower levels of intensity, fluctuating from embryonic states to mere
potentials, invisible but capable of surfacing should the necessary
circumstances arise.25
It is not my purpose to suggest that we can extract from a study
of Vichy immutable, permanent laws that govern society, law, politics,
or history. The complications, combinations and sheer number of
phenomena comprising major societal shifts preclude reliable
predictive generalizations in any permanent or absolute sense.
Indeed, Vichy France, like Nazi Germany, stands at the heart of the
twentieth century's refutation of Enlightenment faith that scientific
laws govern the course of human events.
Rather, if we can learn from the example of Vichy, it necessarily
will be an instruction of more modest proportions, shaped by the
inquiry we undertake, and limited and defined by the inevitably
contemporary perspectives, interests and concerns we bring to our
study. Vichy allows us to observe how a constitutional democracy can
contain within itself seeds of transformative shifts so potent as to
metastasize and invert official national traditions of legal, social,
political and human values.
Both Vichy and post-war French governments employed a
technique of erasure to deal with events they did not acknowledge.
They implemented this strategy through categorizations and
recategorizations, rhetoric and silence. Recursive themes took on
new meanings under each successive r6gime, as elements of prior
categories were reshuffled into new categories, shifting associations
unobtrusively but generating deep, underlying changes in
significance. Thus, Vichy did not abrogate fundamental,
24. Cf. RAYMOND ARON, MtMOIRES: 50 ANS DE REFLEXION POLITIQUE 706 (1983)
("alone among all the governments of the occupied countries, [Vichy] maintained that it
was legal to the very end").
25. See Balkin, supra note 20, for a discussion of the tensions and paradoxes
structurally inherent in constitutional democracies. For the necessity of the comparative
perspective, see Pierre Vidal-Naquet, The Shoah's Challenge to History, in THE JEWS:
HISTORY, MEMORY AND THE PRESENT 144 (David Ames Curtis trans. & ed., Columbia
Univ. Press 1996) (1991) ("all history is comparative history, even when one does not
think so"). For a discussion of varying understandings of the concept of democracy, see
Allan Ides, The American Democracy and Judicial Review, 33 ARIz. L. REv. 1 (1991).
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constitutional Third Republic guarantees openly; rather, Vichy
recategorized the population in France that henceforth was entitled
to constitutional protections, so as to exclude France's minority
Jewish population.
Similarly, both in his war-time conflation of himself with the
nation of France, and in his post-war position that Vichy was null and
void, de Gaulle attempted to erase Vichy from the national record,
proclaiming that France only existed when it was a Republic, and,
thus, that France from 1940 to 1944 had been embodied only by the
Free French and the enemies of collaboration. De Gaulle
recategorized Frenchness to exclude his Vichyite opponents, so that
France became defined as a nation of Resisters, Vichy became
synonymous with Germany, and the French body politic and
population consequently could claim to have been blameless during
the holocaust.
Similar reshuffling and recategorization are occurring today, as
the trial of accused Vichy collaborator Maurice Papon has evidenced.
The courts of France have assumed the task of constructing historical
memory and national identity, a task which by their nature they are
not equipped to accomplish. France's courts have been adjudicating
historical, ethical and political issues. De Tocqueville famously wrote
that in the United States political questions end up in the courts. 26 He
contrasted this peculiarity to French practice.27 Where Vichy is
concerned, however, France has forced its judiciary to grapple with
issues contorted and disguised in order to be deemed legally
cognizable. France's courts have redefined the concept of the "crime
against humanity" multiple times in an effort to immunize the Vichy
government from judicial judgment.28 The result has been frustration
at judicial decisions inadequate because they are unresponsive to the
unarticulated, underlying issues concerning Vichy that continue to
weigh on French society. This article analyzes the Papon trial in
terms of the inability of legal categorizations to memorialize and
convey the role of Vichy in the holocaust. It also highlights the more
general inability of judicial proceedings to convey historical truths,
because judicial proceedings inevitably are processes of meaning
creation.29
Like the silence of its victims, in the post-war period Vichy
became a presence all the more disquieting for its official absence. It
became a palimpsest, a smothered subtext that has influenced the
26. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1994), especially
Judicial Power in the United States and Its Influence on Political Society, at 98-105.
27. See id.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 270-282.
29. See infra notes 277-330 and accompanying text.
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texts and textures of France's social, political and legal evolution for
over half a century, even as superimposed layers sought to keep it
unobtrusively beneath the surface. Vichy's unique aspects offer a rich
interweaving of threads in the great tapestry of French legal, political
and social history, while its derivation from a democratic ancestry
suggests patterns of interest for the evolution and devolution of
constitutional democracies.
Nazi Germany itself provides less of an opportunity than Vichy
France to examine the role of a constitutional democracy's law and
legal culture in its own demise, although numerous areas of similarity
invite comparison between France's Third Republic and Germany's
Weimar Republic. Weimar's democratic traditions were, however,
more tenuous and of much more recent vintage than France's, and
Weimar's transition to Nazism, unlike the French experience, did not
result from a democratic process, but, rather, followed an alternative
route to demise for democracies, through (1) President Hindenburg's
increasing rule by emergency power;30 and (2) Hitler's acts of
violence, manipulative deception and illegality, consciously calculated
to enable him to destroy Weimar.31
The contemporary fascination with Vichy France relates, I
believe, to a desire to find an antidote against recurrent cataclysmic
failures of democracy. Less clear, however, is the extent to which
understanding can correlate with mastering events and controlling the
30. One can interpret the emergency powers in different ways. As part of Weimar,
legal under the "authoritarian gap" of the Weimar constitution, they can be interpreted as
comparable to Vichy's emergence pursuant to compliance with the Third Republic's legal
procedure. On the other hand, they reveal that Weimar was not a truly parliamentary
state, because of the power of the President to select the Chancellor and to dissolve the
legislature. See PETER GAY, WEIMAR CULTURE: THE OUTSIDER AS INSIDER 151 (1970);
TURNER, supra note 5. Weimar's authoritarian gap introduces a lacuna between
democratic government and dictatorship that is absent in the French model. For a
discussion of Weimar's authoritarian gap, see Otto Kirchheimer, Legality and Legitimacy,
in THE RULE OF LAW UNDER SIEGE: SELECTED ESSAYS OF FRANZ L. NEUMANN AND
OrO KIRCHHEIMER 44-63 (William E. Scheuerman, ed. 1996) (hereinafter THE RULE OF
LAW). For an English translation of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, granting the
President emergency powers, see THE RULE OF LAW, supra, at 60-61 n.6.
31. Cf. Karl-Dietrich Bracher, The Technique of the National Socialist Seizure of
Power, in THE PATH TO DICTATORSHIP, 1918-1933: TEN ESSAYS BY GERMAN SCHOLARS
118-119 (John Conway trans., 1966), quoted in GAY, supra note 30, at 163: "Stressing
legality, Hitler made his way into the government not as the leader of a working,
parliamentary majority coalition (as misleading apologists still suggest) but through the
authoritarian gap in the Weimar Constitution, and immediately set about destroying the
Constitution he had just taken an oath to defend." As Peter Gay puts it, Weimar's death
was "part murder, part wasting sickness, part suicide." Gay, supra note 28, at xiii. Accord,
Franz L. Neumann, The Decay of German Democracy, in THE RULE OF LAW, supra note
30, at 41 ("German democracy committed suicide and was murdered at one and the same
time. A democracy without democrats found its end.").
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future. 32 My study of Vichy France and of Nazi Germany has
persuaded me that the perpetuation of constitutional democracies
cannot be correlated satisfactorily with having in place particular
laws, constitutional or other, or with judicial methodologies or
philosophies.
In this article, I discuss some of the paradoxical arguments that
post-war critics have levelled against the French and German
judiciaries under Nazi hegemony. I argue, contrary to post-war
criticism, that judicial methodology and philosophy were neither the
problem, nor the potential solution, in either France or Germany to
the rabid injustice of the courts during the years of Nazi terror.
Rather, both countries' judiciaries were forces of oppression largely
because, in keeping with the rest of their institutional cultures, they
lacked a pre-existing ethical commitment to inclusiveness, a lack
more pronounced in Germany than in France, and one which both
predated and postdated Hitler's r~gime.33
Although it inevitably eludes precise definition and is subject to
interpretive variation, a pre-existing individual and institutional
ethical commitment to values of inclusiveness and non-discrimination
32. Cf EUGEN WEBER, MY FRANCE: POLITIcs, CULTURE, MYTH 297 (1991)
("explanation is also advanced at times as if it could help to prevent similar tragedies in
the future. And it may be the last question one might wish to consider-whether that is
not a form of naivetd"); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, CULTURE AND VALUE 3e (G.H. von
Wright ed., Peter Winch trans., 1984) ("When we think of the world's future, we always
mean the destination it will reach if it keeps going in the direction we can see it going in
now; it does not occur to us that its path is not a straight line but a curve, constantly
changing direction."); FRITZ RINGER, MAX WEBER'S METHODOLOGY: THE
UNIFICATION OF THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 4 (1997) (historians engage in
heuristic projections of rationality and consistency onto past); JURGEN HABERMAS, Can
We Learn From History, in A BERLIN REPUBLIC: WRITINGS ON GERMANY [DIE
NORMALITrT EINER BERLINER REPUBLIK] 5-13, and 43 (Steven Rendall trans., 1997)
("we can learn only from history seen as a critical authority. History as 'teacher' is an
ancient topos; but the positive ways of reading this topos lead into the wilderness-we
might have learned at least that much from our frequent misuse of history.") This article
is, nevertheless, an attempt to "think with history," as Carl Schorske defines the concept,
despite Schorske's association of modernism with ahistoricity. See CARL E. SCHORSKE,
THINKING WITH HISTORY: EXPLORATIONS IN THE PASSAGE TO MODERNISM (1998).
33. For a superb analysis and overview of Germany's judiciary from the 1920s to the
present, see INGO MOLLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH
(Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1991). See also Otto Kirchheimer,
State Structure and Law in the Third Reich, in THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 30, at 142-
71; Otto Kirchheimer, Legality and Legitimacy, in id. at 44-63. For an excellent discussion,
see also Mark Osiel, Dialogue With Dictators: Judicial Resistance in Argentina and Brazil,
20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 481, 489 (1995) (lack of causal connection between legal
philosophy and case outcomes); accord BERND RUTHERS, DIE UNBEGRENZTE
AUSLEGUNG: ZUM WANDEL DER PRIVATSRECHTSORDNUNG IM
NATIONALSOZIALISMUS 99 (1968); MARC LINDER, SUPREME LABOR COURT IN NAZI
GERMANY: A JURISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS 3 (1987).
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is the single strongest correlate for the existence and perpetuation of
constitutional protections.34 Widespread popular commitment to
inclusiveness is necessary for the implementation through
governmental institutions of an ethics or philosophy of
inclusiveness. 35 As Ernst Cassirer wrote in 1945, referring to Plato's
transformation of the Socratic ideal of "eudaimonia" into the sphere
of political life,
[t]he self-preservation of the state cannot be secured by its material
prosperity nor can it be guaranteed by the maintenance of certain
constitutional laws. Written constitutions or legal charters have no
real binding force, if they are not the expression of a constitution
that is written in the citizens' minds. Without this moral support
the very strength of a state becomes its inherent danger. 3
6
The history of Vichy France suggests the extent to which the all-
important constitutions "written in the citizens' minds" are subject to
flux and erosion.
H. Prologue to Suicide: The July, 1940 National Assembly
Debates
Vichy France was a system of polysemic symbols created both
constructively and destructively from the system of symbols of its
predecessor, the Third Republic. Vichy elicited a new orthodoxy with
new disciples, yet its relation with its Republican past was
characterized at rhetorical and substantive levels by a complex
interplay oscillating between continuity and rupture with the past.
No less significant is the rhetoric, at once pompous and moving,
elegant and elegiacal, of the last Parliament as it consciously sang its
34. On the importance of preexisting beliefs to the perpetuation of states, see JEAN-
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Du CONTRAT SOCIAL (1762).
35. See Christopher T. Wonnell, Problems in the Application of Political Philosophy to
Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 123, 145 (1987) (discussing the importance of "securing a stable
commitment to a philosophy (or its results) from the majority, since without their reliable
assent the philosophy cannot be implemented through legitimate institutions") (emphasis
in original), and criticizing Rawls and Nozick for overlooking the problem of difference
and even mutual incompatibility between (1) small-scale individual or group acceptance of
some philosophical positions and (2) wide-scale societal acceptance of them).
36. ERNST CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE, 76 (1946). Cf. John Dewey, Logical
Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 20 (1924) ("the relative fixity of concepts affords
men with a specious sense of protection, of assurance against the troublesome flux of
events"). In this context, an amusing but telling anecdote about the world-famous
mathematician Gbdel is apposite. Before his U.S. citizenship hearing, G6del, a refugee
from Nazism, had read the U.S. Constitution with a mathematician's searching precision.
At his hearing, G~idel had to be restrained by well-wishing friends from explaining to the
presiding judge how "according to the Constitution, the very axioms of democracy, the
United States could legally be turned into a dictatorship." BRUCE SCHECHTER, MY
BRAIN IS OPEN: THE MATHEMATICAL JOURNEYS OF PAUL ERD6s 114 (1998).
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swan song, in tune with the complex, vibrant roles language
historically has played in French public life and tradition.37 As more
fully discussed below, France's Parliament in 1940 participated in a
tradition centuries old by proclaiming the very principles and goals it
was in the process of destroying.
The last parliamentary debates are uniquely well-situated to
illustrate the process of democracy's demise.3 8 Parliament followed
the democratic processes by which a democracy, abiding by its own
internal procedure, can abdicate and extinguish itself. It also
formulated mutually incompatible conceptions of Vichy's future
identity, involving, among other elements, both repudiating and
embracing Nazi domination, and both repudiating and embracing
France's Republican (and therefore, implicitly, Revolutionary) ideals
and traditions. The debates illuminate the subversion of
representative government through political subterfuge and chicanery
designed to manipulate public opinion by (re)constructing for
posterity a fictitious version of events even as they were occurring.
Finally, the debates illustrate and foreshadow the use of rhetoric in
creating shifting systems of classification.
Parliament's conduct not only influenced, but also reflected in
microcosm, the country's widespread initial responses to the
unexpected and bewildering twin traumas of France's military defeat
and Germany's invasion, responses of capitulation tinged with hope
and shame, and marked by a residual national exhaustion from
France's massive losses of the first World War. The contradictions
and paradoxes which emerged in the French National Assembly's
final, suicidal debates contained many seeds which were to germinate
37. See PIERRE NORA, 1 REALMS OF MEMORY xvi (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
Columbia Univ. Press 1996) (1992) (discussing the relation in France between language
and national identity); GEORGE STEINER, ERRATA, AN EXAMINED LIFE 31 (1997)
(describing French secondary education as conveying "[t]he sovereignty of language" and
describing the French language as "even in its lyricism, a public medium").
38. Although in my opinion a tremendously rich and revealing source for studying
Vichy, the parliamentary debates have not elicited much analysis or interest to date.
Typical is the following disparaging comment by Marcel Prd1ot, an honorary rector, law
professor, Vice President of the Commission of Constitutional Laws of the French Senate,
and member of the Assemblies of the Council of Europe and of the Union of Western
Europe, in what generally has been considered a seminal treatise on French political
institutions and constitutional law: "the National Assembly session [of July 10, 1940] was
more or less of no interest." MARCEL PRtLOT, INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES ET DROIT
CONSTITUTIONNEL 492 (1969). Pr6lot summarized the debates as follows: "In the first
part, only procedure was discussed; in the second.., the report of Boivin-Champeaux was
heard, then, rapidly and without debate, the vote was reached with the huge majority of
596 votes against 80." Id. The 1969 edition to which I cite was the book's fourth edition,
published by Dalloz, one of France's two principal legal publishers. As of this writing, the
book has undergone an eleventh edition.
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both during and after the Vichy period, as Vichy sought to establish
an identity based on inherently incompatible themes. Vichy
proclaimed rupture with the past in the form of a new, revolutionary
society and government. It simultaneously proclaimed continuity
with the past; cooperation and partnership with a Nazi Germany
represented as friend and savior; and yet also protection of France
from a Nazi Germany represented as an enemy and conqueror.39
Aiming to achieve a smooth and unobjectionable transition of
power, Pierre Laval appeared at the last parliamentary debates of
France's Third Republic. Trained as a lawyer, Laval was P6tain's
representative in Parliament, and would soon become his second in
command. P6tain had formed a new government as Prime Minister
under the wgis of the Third Republic the previous month, on June 16,
1940, when Prime Minister Paul Reynaud resigned.40 Thus, when the
French Parliament met in July of 1940, it was to create a P6tain
dictatorship, not to install him as head of the existing governmental
structure.
Both Laval and P6tain hoped to confer legitimacy on the new
Vichy r6gime by attending to procedural legality, and impressing the
population with the outgoing Parliament's appearance of unity.
Several novel procedural issues arose, due to the exceptional nature
of the times and of the proposals on the table. The first problem
involved how to tabulate the parliamentary vote. Article 8 of the
soon-to-be-defunct Constitution of 1875 required a majority vote for
any constitutional amendments:
The two Chambers shall have the right, by separate deliberations,
taken in each by a vote of absolute majority, either spontaneously,
or on the demand of the President of the Republic, to declare that
there is cause to amend constitutional laws.
After each of the two Chambers has so resolved, they will
39. In keeping with these paradoxes, later Vichy pronouncements would vilify the
leaders of France's Third Republic both for having entered the war against Germany, and
for having lost it. See REYNAUD, supra note 6, at 65-66 (Vichy radio propaganda
attacking Reynaud for having gotten France into a war that served only England's
interests, causing French soldiers to die at Churchill's behest); DALADIER, supra note 6, at
89 (Daladier blamed for causing France to enter the war); id at 109 (Daladier blamed for
causing France to lose the war).
40. The new government's first act was to negotiate an armistice with the invading
Germans and to take France out of the war. After Pdtain became dictator in the Vichy
r6gime, he took the position that Vichy was the government of all of France, although the
German military occupied about three-fifths of France. After the war, the opposite claim
was heard: namely, that Germany had governed all of France. In November of 1942, the
German army invaded the formerly unoccupied region, thereafter occupying all of France.
Pdtain remained the head of the continuing Vichy rdgime until the Liberation of France in
August of 1944. It should be noted that when Pdtain was asked to form a government in
June, 1940, he was not even a member of Parliament, and therefore had no electoral
mandate whatsoever.
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meet in the National Assembly to proceed to revise.
41
The Constitutional requirement of an absolute majority could be
interpreted to mean a majority based on members present at the time
of the vote, or it might require a majority of all those entitled to vote,
whether present or absent. If the votes of the absent members were
counted in the denominator of the formula, then the democratic
passage to dictatorship might be undermined by, at the very least, a
vote of approval that nevertheless was too small to establish the
impression of overwhelming agreement and solidarity. Laval and
P6tain sought to manipulate the vote to be as close to unanimous as
could be achieved.
The issue of absent members was acute because numerous
members of Parliament had been unable to reach Vichy for various
reasons. Those reasons included the terrible difficulties of travel after
the German invasion and the consequent massive, road-clogging,
invasion-triggered southward exodus of nine million people, hoping
to escape the occupying forces; 42 the fact that some members at the
time were prisoners of war of the Germans; and, finally, that a group
of some twenty to thirty members of Parliament was in North Africa,
as part of what was known as the Massilia expedition.
Boivin-Champeaux, a member of Parliament who agreed with
Laval in favoring a tabulation of the majority based only on those
actually present, stated that "the drafters of the 1875 constitution
could not have imagined that we would be meeting under
41. Article 8, Para. 1 and 2, Constitutional Law of 25 February 1875. ("Les Chambres
auront le droit, par dglibrations sparges, prises dans chacune d la majorit absolue des
voix, soit spontaniment, soit sur la demande du president de la Ripublique, de dclarer qu'il
y a lieu de reviser les lois constitutionnelles. Apres que chacune des deux Chambres aura
pris cette rdsolution, elles se rduniront en Assemble nationale pour procder d la revision. ")
42. There are innumerable accounts of the mass exodus from north to south. See, e.g.,
HENRI AMOROUX, LA VIE DES FRANCAIS sOUS L'OcCUPATION 9-16 (1961); SIMONE DE
BEAUVOIR, LA FORCE DE L'AGE II, at 505 (1960). Among the unpublished accounts is
one by my father, who, like millions of others, fled south on foot. He wrote day-by-day
accounts of his journey from Paris to Montpellier, under the strafing of the Luftwaffe,
amid the chaos and clutter of a country of instant refugees, and through the beauty of the
French countryside, to which he never tired of returning in later years. Based on
circulating rumors and misinterpretation of overhead plane activity, his letters reflect hope
in the possibility of continued French military resistance at a time when, for all practical
purposes, it already was over. Also included are diverting and sometimes stimulating
intellectual conversations about wide-ranging subjects when chance put him in proximity
with another scholar in flight. My father's entries were written on whatever scraps of
paper he could find, in the form of letters to reassure his worried parents in Bucharest.
My grandfather had these letters typed into a little book. In 1952, my grandparents were
able to emigrate to the United States. Among the few possessions they were able to bring
with them was my father's war-time account. The manuscript is in French, but copies can
be made available.
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circumstances so tragic."43 Many applauded his motion to discount
the absent.44 Indeed, some of his colleagues in the National Assembly
who agreed with him urged that the absent members of Parliament on
the Massilia expedition had forgone the right to be counted. They
discussed the Massilia group as though it consisted of traitors who
had deserted France. That group included Georges Mandel, former
Prime Minister tIdouard Daladier, and numerous others who wished
to continue the war from French North Africa. 45
.douard Herriot courageously took the floor of the National
Assembly to expose that the P6tain government had sent the Massilia
expedition out of France for North Africa on June 21, where the
participants had hoped to continue the fight against Germany, and
that he, Herrriot, personally had delivered the government's order to
the men to leave for North Africa. Moreover, the absent
parliamentary members of the Massilia expedition had sent a
telegram to the National Assembly, protesting the government's
holding a session of Parliament without allowing them to return to
attend it, for the Massilia men vainly had been trying to return since
they first learned of the scheduled parliamentary debates, but their
efforts had met with the government's obdurate refusal to grant them
permission to return to France. Herriot thus exposed P6tain and
Laval's plot to discredit their political opponents, by first distancing
them from France and then preventing their return. 46
43. Texts of Parliamentary Debates, reprinted in EMMANUEL BERL, LA FIN DE LA
IIIE RtPUBLIQUE: 10 JUILLET 1940, at 322 (hereinafter sometimes Parliamentary
Debates).
44. See id.
45. For a complete list of the Massilia passengers, see PHILIPPE SIMONNOT, LE
SECRET DE L'ARMISTICE: 1940, at 281-85 (1990) (Among them were one professor of law,
Paul Bastide, and the 75-year-old widow of Fernand Cr6mieux, after whom the pre-war,
anti-racist loi Crimieux had been popularly named). The Massilia group understood that
Pdtain was prepared to accommodate the Germans on French soil, but believed that the
government would establish itself in French North Africa, and continue the war from
there. Pdtain never had any intention of continuing the war if an armistice could be
negotiated, however, almost regardless of the terms imposed. General Weygand,
Commander of the French military forces, opposed accepting certain terms (such as
turning over the French naval fleet to the Germans), but, like P6tain, Weygand swore
never to leave the soil of France. When Hitler did not demand the French fleet or
Empire, P6tain and Weygand hastened to sign the armistice. For further background
information surrounding these events, see generally Arnistice!, in WILLIAM L. SHIRER,
THE COLLAPSE OF THE THIRD REPUBLIc: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FALL OF FRANCE IN
1940, at 852-900 (1969); MARC FERRO, PtTAIN (1987); DALADIER, supra note 6;
REYNAUD, supra note 6, at 57-58 n.96.
46. See Parliamentary Debates, supra note 43, at 315 for the text of the Massilia
telegram, which the President of the National Assembly read aloud. See also id. at 316
("M. Edouard Herriot: 'Nos colligues sont partis sur des instructions r~guliares du
Gouvernement... qui leur ont 6t6 par moi transmises et dont je garde le texte.'"). See also
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Confronted with Herriot's personal testimony before the
National Assembly, Laval admitted that the men had gone to North
Africa with the government's knowledge and blessing, but protested
the incident's being raised at all during the debates. He stressed that,
unlike the Massilia group, a loyal P6tain had declared from the start
that he intended to stay among his fellow countrymen, and that
indeed Laval himself already had had occasion to say that it was not
by leaving France that one could serve her.47 This argument was to
be repeated ad infinitum throughout the Vichy years to discredit as
deserters those who joined de Gaulle's forces in London or North
Africa. Laval also claimed that the normally slow pace of
governmental bureaucracy accounted for the government's failure to
grant the Massilia men permission to return to France, refusing to
characterize the absence of permission as the unyielding
governmental denial of permission to return it clearly was.48 In fact,
after deceiving the Massilia group into leaving for Morocco by
leading them to believe that he would be continuing the fight against
Germany from North Africa, P6tain would proceed to have two of
the most prominent, Daladier and Mandel, arrested in North Africa
and brought back to France to stand trial.49
DALADIER, supra note 6, at 2 ("On June 30, Members of Parliament were prevented from
boarding ship and returning to France... in order to deny them the possibility of voting in
Vichy.").
47. See Parliamentary Debates, supra note 43, at 317.
48. Id. at 315-17.
49. See DALADIER, supra note 6, at 113. For an illuminating analysis of one of the
ensuing trials, see Leon Blum, The "Stranger" at Riom: Legalized Ostracism and Vichy's
Political Trial, in VICHY LAW, supra note 16, at 6-36. Once P~tain gained dictatorial
powers, most of the legislators who had voted against him were imprisoned and some were
murdered. In his prison journals of 1941- 1945, Paul Reynaud, the last prime minister of
the Third Republic before Ptain, refers to the cases of Marx Dormoy, socialist Minister of
the Interior from 1936 to 1938, imprisoned after he voted against P~tain on July 10, 1940
and later murdered by the Cagoule; Vincent Auriol, socialist deputy, imprisoned in
September, 1940, two months after the vote; Jean Zay, radical party deputy, imprisoned in
Riom after his vote against P6tain; Joseph Denois, moderate deputy (and also member of
the Massilia expedition), imprisoned in 1942; Louis Nogu~res, socialist deputy, also
imprisoned after his negative vote; and Auguste Champetier de Ribes, Under-Secretary of
State 1939-1940, who voted against Pdtain and was arrested in 1942. See REYNAUD, supra
note 6, at 33 n.43, 43 n.68, 56 n.96, 60 nn.98, 99, 115 n.189. Lon Blum also had overcome
harrowing obstacles in order to attend the July 10 assembly, where he cast his vote against
Pdtain. His subsequent imprisonment at Riom was attributable to more than just his July
10 vote, however, as described in VICHY LAW, supra note 16. Some of those arrested,
including Blum, had committed other acts for which Vichy also wanted to imprison them.
At the time de Ribes was arrested, he was leading the Resistance in the B6arn region. See
REYNAUD, supra note 6, at 115 n.182. Similarly, Marx Dormoy had ordered the arrest of
the leaders of the terrorist Cagoule in 1937. See id. The Cagoule was an extremist right-
wing organization established in 1936. For an overview of that organization, see the entry
for "Cagoule" in I GRAND LAROUSSE EN 5 VOLUMES 477 (1989).
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Ultimately, Parliament sided with Laval, and decided not to
count its absent members for purposes of computing whether there
was a majority vote, and, if so, the size of that majority.50 It was
careful, however, to cast this result as an application of Article 8 of
the Constitution of 1875, based on objective legal interpretation
thereof, and not as a substantive decision of the legislature stemming
from political motives. 51
Laval sought to enhance the legitimacy of the parliamentary
vote. To that end, he suggested further prestidigitation with the
numbers. His suggestion was to count only those members both
present, and who exercised their right to vote. Those who were not
present at the actual vote, whatever their reasons might be, and those
who were present but abstained, were to be erased from the record:
"It is... only a question of how we calculate the majority. Are you
not of the opinion, in the interest of the country, that it is better to
show France and the world that the majority the Government will be
getting in a few moments, is a significant one?" 52
This was the first of many attempted erasures-aimed at defining
memory, redefining truth, and controlling meaning-that
characterized both Vichy and post-war renditions of events.
Repressed truths later reared their heads in other ways, however. An
extreme example of erasure would occur during the later Vichy years,
when local precincts were instructed to obliterate from their registries
all references to Jews who had lived there as soon as they were
deported. In this manner, no record of their lives would remain, and,
consequently, no record of their deaths. 53 After the war, de Gaulle
and his successors attempted to erase Vichy itself by redefining it out
50. Parliamentary Debates, supra note 43, at 322.
51. See id.
52. "II s'agit. . . simplement du calcul de la majoriti. N'estimez-vous pas, dans l'intrt
du pays, qu'il vaut mieux montrer d la France et au monde que la majoritY, que le
Gouvernement va recueillir tout t l'heure, est importante." Parliamentary Debates, supra
note 43, at 321.
53. See GEORGE CLARE, LAST WALTZ IN VIENNA: THE RISE AND DESTRUCTION
OF A FAMILY, 1842-1942, at 243 (1980). See also KLARSFELD, supra note 12, at xiii ("The
act of recording was misleading, since the final goal... was total disappearance of the
deportees. And whatever the outcome for Germany, victory or defeat,... French
archives on the arrest and internment of Jews were destined to be kept secret .... At the
Liberation, the Prefecture of Police in Paris destroyed almost all its voluminous archives
on the arrests of Jews, and in addition quietly transferred the family and individual files
from the Prefecture's Jewish registry, and files on Jews arrested in Paris, to the Ministry of
Veterans and War Victims Affairs [where they would be much harder to identify].")
Erasures also saved lives during Vichy. The mayor of the town in southern France in
which Gertrude Stein and Alice B. Toklas resided reportedly erased their names from the
town records to protect them from the Gestapo. See SUSAN ZuccoTri, THE
HOLOCAUST, THE FRENCH AND THE JEWS 47 (1993).
November 1998] THlE LEGALIZATION OF RACISM
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
of French history. As with the psychological process of denial, the
erased in their silence eventually would penetrate to the surface. The
passage of time, however, put them at the mercy of memory's
representations. 54
A second issue arose at the National Assembly debates in which
parliament used a rhetoric designed to invoke continuity with the past
in order to break with the past. The new issue concerned whether the
proposed constitutional amendment itself should be studied by a
special commission. The motion to form a special commission was
brought by de Courtois, who based his motion not on a constitutional
requirement, but on a precedent the National Assembly had
established in 1926 that a Constitutional Commission be designated
to study proposals for constitutional amendments. 55 A commission
was duly formed.
In submitting the Commission's report, its chair made the
following pronouncement that it was a free Parliament which was
ending freedom, and employing a democratic process to end
democracy: "I believe it my duty to make a solemn declaration here,
in the name of my colleagues. The act which we are accomplishing
today, we accomplish freely."56 In the course of this speech, he also
made a connection between the Republic and Vichy, warning against
a new constitution that might abrogate France's traditional
Republican freedoms: "The image of France would not be complete if
there did not appear in it certain liberties for which so many
generations have fought. '57 The Senate Reporter went so far as to
state that "it is not without sadness that that we bid adieu to the
Constitution of 1875. It made France a free country... It dies less
from its own imperfections than from the failings of the men who
were put in charge of its progress and functioning."58
Other members of Parliament also emphasized that the changes
they were enacting were not intended to induce France to imitate the
Germans, but rather, on the contrary, to prevent the Germans from
54. See infra notes 293 to 331 for a discussion of memory and the issues involved in
judicial representations of memory. In a prime example of category-shifting, Laval
reportedly said in 1942 that "we're in the midst of a worldwide revolution. There is a
choice to be made between fascism and Bolshevism. And when Isay Bolshevism, I mean
democracy as well." DALADIER, supra note 6, at 144 (emphasis added).
55. Parliamentary Debates, supra note 43, at 324.
56. Id. at 327 (emphasis added).
57. "L'image de la France ne serait pas complete s'il n'y figurait pas certaines liberts
pour lesquelles tant de g~nirations ont combattu." Id.
58. "Ce n'est pas sans tristesse que nous disons adieu d la Constitution de 1875. Elle
avait fait de la France un pays libre... Elle se meurt moins de ses imperfections que de la
faute des hommes qui avaitent Jd chargs d'en assurer la marche et le fonctionnement."
Reprinted in FERRO, supra note 45, at 129.
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"taking hold of the French soul," and Pierre-ttienne Flandin, who
was soon to be an enthusiastic collaborator with the Nazi occupier,
even went so far as to criticize Laval for having appeared to suggest
otherwise.59 Even Laval's rhetoric was for preserving France, despite
the concerted and fully conscious objective of the assembled
Parliament to opt for German domination. 6°
In sacrificing the democratic structure of government, Parliament
seemed to be saying that democracy would survive, and could only
survive, in the safekeeping of P6tain, and that, in creating a
dictatorship, Parliament's purpose was to preserve what it was
destroying. Indeed, the last parliamentary debates included much
praise for all that was unique about France, and for the new
government which allegedly would preserve it. One also finds,
however, more cursory references, both prescient and nostalgic, to
the impending end of free speech, intermingled with professions that
the National Assembly had ensured France's continuity, as well as
flowery statements to the effect that, although Parliament itself would
be an institution of the past, its members, soon to be stripped of their
function, nevertheless stood ready as ever to continue serving the
nation.61
The parliamentarians' rhetorical style of evoking the unity of
French republican tradition in the paradoxical context of effecting the
end of that tradition is reminiscent of the French nobles' statements
in the cahiers de doliances of the 1789 Revolution: sweeping
commitments to renounce privileges followed by minutiae which
undermined and generally extinguished the import of the initial
declarations. 62 Thus, France's Parliament in 1940 participated in a
long-standing rhetorical tradition by evoking and advocating the very
concepts it was working against.
In the midst of such sentiments and sentimentality, the
59. See Parliamentary Debates, supra note 43, at 310-11.
60. See id. The next day Laval reportedly cynically declared, "[t]his is how to
assassinate a Republic." ("Voild comment on assassine une Rdpublique"), quoted in
FERRO, supra note 45, at 132. According to Stanley Cohen, it is because Laval spoke
those words that he was sentenced to death after the war. Stanley Cohen, Vichy France
and Its Lessons for Contemporary Professional Practices, panel discussion of the Bar
Association of the City of New York, October 23, 1997. By 1942, when the context had
changed and Parliament already had been defunct for three years, Laval would adopt a
more openly pro-German stance, declaring in a speech his explicit hope that Germany
would win the war. For Laval's June 22, 1942, speech, see FERRO, supra note 45, at 402-
403. Daladier reports in his diaries that Laval made a similar expression of hope in
German victory at a press conference in December of 1942. See DALADIER, supra note 6,
at 175. Moreover, Laval had been a pro-German defeatist in 1917 as well as in 1940. See
REYNAUD, supra note 6, at 22.
61. See Parliamentary Debates, supra note 43, at 328-29.
62. See MARKOFF, supra note 15, at 81.
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Commission approved, and the legislators adopted, the following
constitutional amendment:
The National Assembly gives all powers to the Government of the
Republic, under the authority and the signature of Marshal P6tain,
for the passage of a new Constitution of the French State.
That Constitution shall guarantee the rights of work, family
and country.
It will be ratified by the nation and applied by the Assemblies
which it will have created. 63
According to Plato, both states and individuals choose their own
fates or, as he put it, their "demons." 64 France had chosen its demon.
After the passage of the constitutional amendment was announced,
Laval dramatically thanked the Assembly in the name of Marshal
P6tain, on behalf of France.65 When Marcel Astier, one of the few
who had voted against the proposal, cried out "Vive la Rgpublique,
quand mnme!" ("Long live the Republic anyway!"), his voice was
drowned out by the throng of his newly anti-Republican colleagues,
calling, "Vive la France!" The Republic had died.
m. Legality and Legitimacy
Scholars and politicians have argued that Vichy was illegal, based
on alleged defects in the parliamentary proceedings. Nobel laureate
and legal scholar Ren6 Cassin argued that, even if the legislators were
entitled to reform the Constitution in July of 1940, they were not
entitled to delegate that right to P6tain. His position was that their
delegation of what they alone were constitutionally authorized to do
was illegal, rendering the new Constitution and Vichy null and void.66
If accepted, this argument ironically would also have
delegitimized de Gaulle's 1958 mandate, for de Gaulle had the
legislature amend Article 90 of the Constitution to delegate to the
Executive the power to further amend the Constitution. Indeed,
Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour, one of P6tain's staunchest supporters
in 1940, decried de Gaulle's conduct in 1958 as illegal, illustrating the
political shift (what J.M. Balkin has coined an "ideological drift")
from 1940 to 1958: In 1940, it was the anti-Gaullists who supported as
fully legitimate the executive's assumptions of the power of
constitutional amendment; by 1958, the positions were exactly
63. Parliamentary Debates, supra note 43, at 323.
64. See PLATO, REPUBLIC, 346 (Francis MacDonald Cornford trans., 1941) ("The
blame is his who chooses; Heaven is blameless.")
65. Parliamentary Debates, supra note 43 at 331.
66. See FERRO, supra note 45, at 133. Ren6 Cassin had been a professor of law, as
well as France's delegate to the League of Nations and president of the French Veterans'
Union. He joined de Gaulle in June, 1940. See REYNAtD, supra note 6, at 74.
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reversed.67
Vichy's legality has also been attacked on the ground that Article
121 of France's constitution forbade making peace with an occupying
enemy.68 Similarly, Article 75 of the Criminal Code criminalized
intelligence with the enemy.69 Following this reasoning, P6tain's
government was illegal because its avowed purpose was to make
peace with Germany. One might also date the illegality later. This
theory would be that it was only after July 10, 1940, when Parliament
gave P6tain the power to form a new constitution, that the
constitutional laws of the Third Republic ceased to be in effect.70
Under this view, the law of July 10 was null and void by virtue of its
illegality. On the other hand, it must be remembered that the
procedures of the Third Republic were followed with respect to the
July 10 vote: Parliament had been duly convened, and the proposal
for constitutional revision was approved by a large majority.
A somewhat weaker argument has been advanced to the effect
that Vichy lost its legal status because it violated its own law. The law
of July 10 provided for constitutional acts to be ratified by the nation,
and applied by assemblies to be created, but P6tain neither submitted
his constitutional acts to the nation to be voted on, nor did he create
assemblies.71 This argument appears to be the least compelling basis
for refusing governmental status to Vichy, because it assumes Vichy's
legitimacy a priori, until Vichy violated its own law. In positing that
Vichy ceased to be legal through P6tain's noncompliance, it concedes
Vichy's initial legality.
Another argument, which rests more on political theory than
law, is that France's democratically elected legislators had a mandate
to represent the electorate of a republic, to participate in the
67. For a fascinating discussion of the phenomenon he calls "ideological drift," see
J.M. Balkin, The Footnote , 83 N.W.U.L. REv. 275 (1989); and J.M. Balkin, Ideological
Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning in Legal and Political Theory, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869
(1993) (hereinafter Ideological Drift). For the text of the speech Tixier-Vignancour made
in opposition to de Gaulle, see HENRI Rousso, THE VICHY SYNDROME 69-70 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 1991). (Tixier-Vignancour also served as the lawyer for C6line, the
vociferously antisemitic French writer tried for treason after the war. See Angelo Rinaldo,
C6line: d'un chat l'autre, in l'Express, 75-76 (June 11, 1998)). The concept of nationalism
also underwent ideological drift, having a left-wing character at the time of the French
Revolution, and a right-wing conservative one by the time of Vichy. Nationalism in
France continued to be associated with the left into the nineteenth century. See RAOUL
GIRARDET, LE NATIONALISME FRANQAIS 17 (1966).
68. See Dominique Rousseau, Vichy a-t-il existd, in JUGER SOUS VICHY 98 (Maurice
Olender ed., 1994).
69. See CODE PtNAL [C. PEN.] art. 75 (Fr.) (effective 1939). After the war, numerous
collaborators were convicted for having violated Article 75.
70. See Rousseau, supra note 68.
71. See iL
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democracy that was its fundamental and defining characteristic, not to
end the Republic. Under this view, their vote on July 10, 1940, would
have been an act of treason, and consequently invalid and illegal.
The French anti-positivist legal doctrine of principes g6n6raux,
which recognizes super-eminent, unwritten governing principles of
law that need not be expressed in any enacted law, would further
seem to support the view that even democratically elected legislators
are not free to legislate democracy out of existence. The principes
g6ndraux are guiding principles meant to preserve the tenets and
spirit at the heart of the French system of law and government, even
in the uncharted territory of times of crises. 72 The doctrine of
principes g~n6raux is a judicial doctrine, however, and, as such, is
inapplicable to French legislative acts, because in France there is no
constitutional control over legislation. In recent years, the Conseil
constitutionnel, the Constitutional Council, may be said to have
acquired extensive, if not official, powers of judicial review, 3 but the
tradition since Revolutionary times in France has been to privilege
legislative acts as deriving from the ultimate authority of the popular
will, and to relegate the judiciary to an inferior status.
Even in name, the judiciary was (and remains) a mere autoritg
("authority"), while the other branches of French government are
pouvoirs ("powers").74  The judiciary is thus reduced both in
nomenclature and in substance to a position of inferiority with respect
to the legislature, and has no official control over it. Moreover, the
French judiciary consistently has refrained from applying principes
gingraux, at least openly, no doubt because court decisions based on
unwritten principles would be subject to criticism as constituting
judge-made law.76 The grounds for denying the legality of the July 10
vote on the basis of the general principles of French law therefore
appear to be highly dubious.
The membership of Vichy's legal, judicial and administrative
sectors, as well as the laws in effect, largely were unchanged from the
Third Republic. Consequently, it is hard to excise Vichy from
France's historical trajectory by characterizing it as an illegal
72. See RENA DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE
WORLD TODAY, 137-41 (Stevens & Sons Ltd., 2d ed. 1978) (1968).
73. See ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE (1992).
74. See LA CONSTITUTION [CONST.], arts. 64-66 (Fr.) (October 4, 1958).
75. For a discussion of the French judiciary's inferiority relative to the other branches
of government, see RENt DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES AND
METHODOLOGY, 27-28 (Michael Kindred trans., La. State Univ. Press 1972) (1960).
76. See Guiseppe Federico Mancini & David T. Keeling, Language, Culture and
Politics in the Life of the European Court of Justice, 1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 397, 399-400
(1995), ascribing the French judicial dislike of principes gendraux to "a French aversion for
all that is hazy or flexible."
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anomaly. Vichy functioned because the Third Republic's
functionaries remained as the functionaries of Vichy. Other than
those who were ousted from their posts for being Jewish (or for being
"non-Aryans" in the case of descendants of Jews who professed the
Christian faith77), the cast of characters from the Third Republic who
decided cases, who wrote scholarly legal commentary, who argued in
court, and who enforced the law, by and large remained the same
under P6tain. Ptain was careful to emphasize continuity in order to
buttress his government's claims to legitimacy. Thus, the first
antisemitic law was drafted by Raphael Alibert, who had been a well
known and highly esteemed professor of constitutional law and the
mattre des requites of the Constitutional Council for almost twenty
years before the war. P6tain made Alibert his first Minister of
Justice.78
Vichy's continuity with the Third Republic operated on the
levels of both the judicial and legislative processes, but, paradoxically,
Vichy often was most distinguishable from the Third Republic where
it appeared to be most similar. Those laws and regulations that most
fundamentally and flagrantly violated the concept of law as it had
developed in France since the Revolution, were assimilated into the
existing legal corpus by their treatment as laws like any others. 79
Scholarly commentary on antisemitic laws proliferated, but did not
address the implications of their antisemitic, unconstitutional nature.
Given that scholarly commentary in France has an incomparably
77. The distinction I make here between being "non-Aryan," as opposed to Jewish,
was not drawn by Nazi or Vichy antisemitic lay, with respect to those whose parents were
born Jewish. On the contrary, the dehumanization process that was to culminate in mass
murder began with the law's indifference to an individual's personal beliefs. People were
defined as Jews by virtue of their parents and grandparents (Le., their genetic heritage),
personal religious faith being deemed irrelevant. The antisemitic laws themselves,
however, ultimately did resort to individual professions of faith and religious observance
for determining a grandparent's classification, and in direct contradiction to Nazi
proclamations of the racial basis of Jewishness. For example, under French antisemitic
law, an individual was a Jew if more than two grandparents had been Jewish, or if two
grandparents and the individual's spouse were Jewish, even if the individual herself had
been baptized at birth and had been a practicing Catholic all her life. If, however, an
individual had two Jewish grandparent and one "Aryan" grandparent, she would be
deemed "Aryan" if she could establish that the fourth grandparent had been a practicing
Catholic. Thus, ironically, the classification of the fourth grandparent, on which the
grandchild's "racial" classification and, hence, right to life hinged, was based on the
grandparent's religious faith and conduct, not on criteria related to race or genes.
78. For Alibert's pre-war connections to the extreme right wing, see DALADIER, supra
note 6, at 23 n.43.
79. Two formidable studies have been devoted to this process. See POETHICS, supra
note 16, at 127-43; Dani~le Lochak, La Doctrine sous Vichy ou les mdsaventures du
positivisme, in LES USAGES SOCIAUX DU DROiT, 252-285 (Dani~le Lochak ed., 1989); see
also, more generally, VICHY LAW, supra note 16.
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greater influence than in common law legal systems on understanding
and defining the law, as well as on its development through judicial
application, scholarly legal commentary might have, one would like to
think, jolted the French legal field during the Vichy period into open
rebellion against measures deeply at odds with centuries of French
legal tradition.80  It did not do so, however. Legal, including
constitutional, scholars chose instead to analyze the new laws in terms
of their application and construction, and always within a
comfortingly familiar discourse of legal scholarship and analysis that
assimilated them into the existing body of law, thereby implicitly
sanctioning them. The laws themselves were not treated as
aberrational. They were treated as though brought about by
compelling social and political circumstances. Over forty books of
legal commentary were published in the four years of Vichy.
Virtually none condemned the antisemitic laws and regulations as
being contrary to French law.81 The new antisemitic laws spawned a
new area of legal scholarship, with new legal "experts" analyzing and
interpreting the legislation. Legal periodicals accordingly created
new categories: "Jews," "Jewish Matters," and "Jewish issues."82
French legal scholars emphasized an allegedly protective
function of the antisemitic laws, rather than their discriminatory or
exclusionist functions. Thus, the dean of the Sorbonne law school
wrote that "[in France, after the national Revolution [i.e., of P6tain],
an antisemitic tendency appeared, not motivated by racial hatred, but
by the nefarious role which certain Jewish politicians and financiers
had played in the Third Republic."83
Similarly, the dean of the Bordeaux law faculty wrote that the
exclusion of Jews from the professions was "a measure in the general
interest and not a punishment; [and thus] compensation shall be
80. The French legal system, in typical civil law fashion, does not recognize stare
decisis. Scholarly legal commentary is an important influence on judicial decisions. See
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION, 59-60 (1969) ("The teacher-
scholar is the real protagonist of the civil law tradition. The civil law is a law of the
professors."). Accord, Andr6 Tunc, Methodology of the Civil Law in France, 50 TUL. L.
REv. 459,469 (1976) (describing civil-law law as "a law of law teachers.")
81. Three exceptions have been noted by Dominique Gros, Le Droit antis~mite de
Vichy contre la tradition r~publicaine, in JUGER SOUS VICHY, supra note 68, at 18 and 27
n.1: Jean Carbonnier's note of July 9, 1943, published in 1944 by Dalloz; Jean Waline's
Droit Administratif, volume 8; and his Guide des confirences et exercises pratiques, pour la
license en droit, exercise no. 12, published by Sirey in 1944. See also Lochak, supra note 79,
at 256-57.
82. See Dominique Gros, Les "questions juives" une "matigre nouvelle" pour des
juristes vichyssois, in Peut-on parler d'un "droit antisdmite"?, in LE DROIT ANTIStMITE,
supra note 5, at 22-25.
83. GEORGES RIPERT, TRAIT tLMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL, t.II, 170-184 (1943),
quoted in Gros, supra note 82, at 16.
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granted to the affected [Jewish] civil servants [who lose their jobs]." 4
This impassive, objective, neutral, scientific tone generally was
adopted by French legal scholars. The very lack of any apparent
animus against targets of the antisemitic legislation facilitated the
conceit that excluding Jews was normal, and entirely permissible from
a legal perspective. As Dani~le Lochak puts it, "[t]he exclusion of the
Jews did not appear [in legal scholars' writing] as an objective
dictated by racial hatred or political vindictiveness, but rather as
something normal, self-evident, whose rightness was beyond
discussion. 85  Lochak emphasizes that the same scholars who
critiqued every other law they discussed generally refrained from
giving their opinion about antisemitic laws. She concludes that their
effort to maintain a neutral stance caused a dulling of their critical
faculties. 86
Although brilliant in many respects, Lochak's analysis blames
positivism; i.e., the power of law to command obedience by its very
existence, for the French scholarly refusal to protest the antisemitic
laws, and for endowing them with legitimacy.s7 For the reasons more
fully developed in the next section, I conclude that positivism
principally provided a camouflage for the problem, but did not cause
it. This conclusion is consistent with the fact that the same professors
who refrained from offering critiques of the antisemitic legislation
were ready to judge the moral worth of other laws, as Lochak herself
notes.88 Rather, the scholarly silence couched complicity. Lochak
seems to valorize this conclusion elsewhere: "[I]sn't it a fact that this
legislation did not fundamentally go against their convictions? 8 9
Positivism's role was far smaller than most post-war scholars
have allowed. Principally, positivism played a role because the laws
in question enjoyed initial social approval when they were enacted.
The fact of the laws' existence further promoted their implementation
by the courts and citizens' compliance. The framework of initial
84. ROGER BONNARD, PRI CIS DE DROIT PUBLIC, 466 (1944), quoted in Gros, supra
note 82, at 16.
85. Danile Lochak, La legitimation de la politique antisimite, in Acrire, se taire...
Rdflexions sur l'attitude de la doctrine frangaise, in LE DROIT ANTIS MITE, supra note 5, at
436.
86. See id. at 437. Max Weber seems to have foreseen the dangerous potentials for
education posed by cloaking value-laden ideas under a style of neutrality: "The overt
preaching of political creeds... seemed to [Weber] less dangerous to the students'
autonomy than the covert suggestion of ideologies in nominally 'dispassionate' ways."
RINGER, supra note 32, at 132.
87. See Lochak, supra note 85, at 436 ("Positivism categorically rejects any reference
to an alleged natural law and correlatively refuses to subordinate the validity of a legal
order to a judgment about its moral worth.").
88. See id. at 437.
89. Id. at 450.
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social approval was, however, essential.
IV. Antisemitic Legislation and the Role of Positivism
The argument blaming positivism in Vichy France has been put
forth most persuasively by Lochak, who focuses on the catastrophic
consequences of lawyers and judges trained to apply, implement,
obey and uphold the law merely because it is the law, no matter what
the law may be.9° I differ with Lochak's interpretation of positivism's
role for the reasons set forth below, although her view is consistent
with post-war criticism, particularly of Nazi Germany.
The problem with blaming positivism is the impossibility of
defining it adequately, for it is subject to interpretations as varying as
the countless permutations of legislative interpretation. In both
Germany and France, positivism in the sense of the impetus to obey
the law as it is, was subject to mutually incompatible interpretations,
because the laws themselves contradicted each other. In Germany,
for instance, while the Criminal Code required assistance on behalf of
anyone targeted for premeditated murder, other laws prohibited
people defined as "Aryans" from any direct personal dealings with
those defined as "non-Aryans." 91 Technically, this would not have
precluded "Aryan" citizens from informing the authorities, rather
than Jews themselves, of projected murders of Jews. Nevertheless,
the substantially contradictory import of the different laws casts
doubt on even the possibility of practicing a pure positivism.92
I do not accept the view that an otherwise innocent population
and judiciary merely implemented the law because they had been
trained to do so. More precisely, to the extent that the law did
influence judicial and individual conduct, I do not accept the view
that a judicial theory of unreflective application of the law, or a
popular philosophy of unreflective obedience to it, were major
independent constituent factors in shaping the course of events. I
believe that positivism did play some role, but its influence was both
relatively minor and part of a dialectical movement of mutual
influence, indissociably interacting with pre-existing social approval
90. See Lochak, supra note 79, at 252-285; Daninle Lochak, Le juge doit-il appliquer
une loi inique, in JUGER SOUS VICHY, supra note 68, at 29-39; Lochak, supra note 85, at
433-462.
91. See, e.g., the diary of Victor Klemperer, entry of July 19, 1943, recounting that one
form of dissent in Nazi Germany (which endangered the lives of Jews as well as of the
dissenters) was to greet and shake the hand of anyone wearing a yellow star. VICTOR
KLEMPERER, ICH WILL ZEUGNIS ABLEGEN BIS ZUM LETZTEN: TAGEBUCHER 1942-1945,
at 406 (1995).
92. More generally, for a discussion of the interpretive difficulties inherent in statutory
construction, see George Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U.L. REV. 321 (1995).
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of the legislation.
The laws of both Vichy France and Nazi Germany did not fall
fortuitously on unwilling or unwitting populations and judiciaries.
The judiciaries applied laws which on the whole had met with judicial
approval, just as the populations followed laws which on the whole
had met with popular approval.93 Thus, it was in the context of a
general sense of acceptance of the spirit of the new laws that the
judiciaries under P6tain and Hitler also tended to apply the law
because it was the law, just as the citizenries of France and Germany,
initially generally receptive to the new laws, also tended to obey the
law because it was the law. However, this tendency was only one
factor operating within a more complex framework, composed of
reciprocally influential habits of adherence to existing law and
generalized approval of government policy.
In France, antisemitism in public discourse was sufficiently
subtextual that, according to former Minister of Justice Robert
Badinter, Jacques Charpentier, who was head of the Paris Bar in
1940, declared after the war to Badinter that P6tain's r6gime had not
taken antisemitic measures before 1942, the year the Germans
occupied the entire country, and more than two years after Vichy's
inception.94 In fact, close to 150 laws, decrees and regulations
concerning Jews were enacted by the Vichy r6gime, and
approximately 600 Jews were prosecuted for violations of those
laws.95 Judges restricted themselves to focusing on whether their
93. For a book devoted to the subject of French public opinion during the Vichy years,
see LABORIE, supra note 13. With respect to popular approval in Germany, see SAUL
FRIEDLANDER, NAZI GERMANY AND THE JEWS: THE YEARS OF PERSECUTION, 1933-
1939, at 164 (1997) ("the bulk of the population disliked acts of violence but did not object
to the disenfranchisement and segregation of the Jews."). For an analysis of French
popular opinion's evolution, see also infra notes 170-190 and accompanying text.
94. See Robert Badinter, Peut-on Stre avocat lorsqu'on est juif en 1940-1944?, in LE
DROrr ANTISfMITE, supra note 5, at 145.
95. See Michael R. Marrus, Les juristes de Vichy dans "l'engrenage de la destruction,"
in LE DROIT ANTISIMITE, supra note 5, at 51. As Marrus and Paxton emphasize
elsewhere, Vichy's antisemitic repression was highly legalized. See ROBERT 0. PAXTON
& MICHAEL R. MARRUS, VICHY FRANCE AND THE JEWS (1981). Raul Hilberg has
emphasized the centrality of the legal system to Nazi German persecution. See RAUL
HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 60, 359 (Revised ed. 1985)
(1961). Legalization permeated Nazi repression in a variety of ways and on many levels.
See e.g., Victor Klemperer's account of the degree of legalism involved in his personal
experience of dispossession under Nazi rule. While his food rations were being lowered to
a starvation level, pursuant to laws and decrees which also rendered him legally vulnerable
to deportation to a concentration camp, and, consequently, death, Klemperer records that
the Gestapo observed legal niceties when they gave him 40 Marks for his typewriter,
which he was obliged to surrender as a possession forbidden to Jews. Entry of 21
November 1942, in KLEMPERER, supra note 91, at 278-280.
It should be noted that the legalistic prosecution of 600 Jews within the French
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interpretations of anti-Jewish laws should be strict or liberal, but did
not question or denounce the laws themselves. 96
Studies show that, with some notable exceptions, the judiciary
for the most part tended to be lenient towards those few who went to
court to claim relief from the antisemitic laws.97 In other words, the
tendency for the most part was for the courts to conclude that an
individual did not fit within the statutory definition of the term "Jew."
They made their rulings despite the new reversal of the burden of
proof, another departure from French legal tradition, which now
placed the burden on individuals to prove that they were "Aryan,"
and therefore not subject to the antisemitic laws, relieving the French
State of the burden of proof.98
Even when lenient, however, judges who applied the antisemitic
laws implicitly validated them simply by virtue of applying them.99
Those who deviated from the plain meaning of the legislative texts to
allow particular individuals to escape the antisemitic laws, were
following a time-honored tradition of French judges. On the one
hand, French judges during Vichy, like their modern counterparts in
France today, were anxious to show their adherence to a principle of
French jurisprudence sacrosanct since the Revolution of 1789: that
judges never create law, that they do no more than identify and then
mechanically apply written, legislatively-enacted law. On the other
national court system is ironic in light of the fact that the entire Jewish population
simultaneously was vulnerable to imprisonment in camps, where they retained no legal
rights whatsoever. Prosecution by French judges and incarceration in regular French
prisons consequently was a comparative luxury. Daladier recounts the story of the
distinguished lawyer, Pierre Masse, of an old Jewish family, whose insistence on recording
the official plundering of Jewish property landed him in prison, indirectly preventing his
deportation. See DALADIER, supra note 6, at 141-42. (Writing in early 1942, Daladier did
not know that Masse's imprisonment had merely delayed, but not prevented, his ultimate
deportation. Masse's life ended in Auschwitz, to which he was deported from the French
camp of Drancy on September 30, 1942. For an account of the deaths of Masse and both
of his sons, see GEORGES WELLERS, UN JUIF SOUS VICHY 101 (1991, originally published
in 1973 under the title L'ETOILE JAUNE k L'HEURE DE VICHY).)
96. See ARON, supra note 24, at 709 ("Le Conseil d'Atat commenta et appliqua le statut
des Juifs, comme s'il s'agissait d'une loi comparable aux autres, comme si la violation des
principes de la R6publique pouvait 6tre accept6e par les juristes d l'instar d'une d6cision
quelconque du pouvoir. ").
97. There were also numerous judges, however, who applied these laws with draconian
inflexibility. See Isabelle Lecoq-Caron, La Preuve de la qualit6 de Juif; Emmanuelle Triol,
L'Aryanisation des biens. L'application judiciaire du statut des Juifs, in JUGER SOUS
VICHY, supra note 68, at, respectively, 41-59 and 61-71.
98. For an excellent discussion of the Vichy reversal in the burden of proof, see
POETHICS 153-58, supra note 16, VICHY LAW 162-78, supra note 16, based on extensive
analysis of French cases; Isabelle Lecoq-Caron, La preuve de la qualit6 de Juif, in JUGER
SOUS VICHY, supra note 68, at 41-52.
99. See POETHICS 127-28, supra note 16; VICHY LAW, especially chapters 8-10, supra
note 16.
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hand, equally anxious to do justice in the cases before them, French
judges have continually purported to apply the law when in fact
silently engaging in a highly creative, and perhaps even casuistic,
process that leads mysteriously from existing legislation to
improbably derived (or contrived) practical resolutions. While such
unavowed interpretive creativity allows French judges to make law
without doing so openly, it is not a process calculated to call
legislation into question. On the contrary, the methodology of
French judicial decision-making and writing conspires to preclude any
open questioning or challenging of legislation. 1°° The judiciary's
inferior status, unchanged by the transition from Third Republic to
Vichy, made it the least likely governmental branch for effective
resistance to unjust legislation, while the traditionally strongest
branch of French government, the legislature, had legislated itself out
of power and existence.101
The apparatus of French government at all levels respected and
executed Vichy's measures as the law of the land. An illustrative
example occurred in January of 1941, when Prtain asked Jules
Jeanneney, the President of the Senate, to assemble a list of all
senators who were Jewish, in order to implement against them the
anti-Jewish law known as the statut des juifs. Jeanneney responded as
follows: "I condemn the [anti-Jewish] law inasmuch as it violates
justice, the respect of the human person, French tradition, and
because the Germans have imposed it on you. It is, however, the law.
100. This tradition developed because the pre-Revolutionary abuses of French judges
had made them a hated group. The French Revolution aimed to ensure a low status to the
judiciary, viewing it as a necessary evil, not to be trusted. At least in appearance, France's
post-revolutionary judiciary has been eager to refrain from creating law, or seeming to
assert itself as anything more than the means of implementing law created by others. See
John Henry Merryman, The French Deviation, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 109 (1996); John P.
Dawson, Specific Performance in France and Germany, 57 MICH. L. REV. 495 (1959).
101. The situation was different in Germany, where the judiciary traditionally played a
far more powerful role than in France. For a favorable portrayal of the powerful German
judiciary's self-understanding as the guardians of the nation's conscience, see John P.
Dawson, The General Clauses, Viewed from a Distance, 29 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 441
(1977). For an opposing, highly negative portrayal of the German courts as anti-
democratic, see Franz L. Neumann, The Decay of German Democracy, in THE RULE OF
LAW, supra note 30, at 36 (describing Germany's judges as part of the "antistate" that
hastened Weimar's destruction); MOLLER, supra note 33 (thorough study of German
judiciary's pro-Nazism from the 1920s). Milller's study is consistent with Neumann's
historical analysis of pre-1920s events in Germany: "[In 1919], the theory of the free
discretion of the judge became dominant." Neumann analogizes the German judiciary
after 1919 to "a kind of Upper House" of parliament. Neumann, supra this note, at 36.
See also Kirchheimer, Legality and Legitimacy, in THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 30, at 55
("Courts undergo a functional transformation when there is no longer a legislature distinct
from the administration.").
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It must be obeyed."' 2 And then he proceeded to comply. 03
My translation from the French fails to convey an important
nuance in Jeanneney's pronouncement. He did not quite say
"because the Germans have imposed it on us." That would in French
have been parce que or puisque les Allemands nous l'ont imposge. His
exact words were "Je rdprouve la loi.. comme aussi les Allemands
nous l'ont imposge." Those words connote an indeterminate
intersection between "because the Germans have imposed it on us"
and "as though the Germans had imposed it on us," revealing a wish
to interpret the statut des juifs as German-imposed, and
simultaneously betraying an underlying understanding that it was not.
The statut des juifs in fact was not externally imposed on France.
It was internally created, drafted, enacted and implemented. This has
now been established compellingly through comprehensive
documentation from the period. As one historian has put it, "[lt was
believed or pretended at the time and long after the war that, under
German pressure, the Vichy government was obliged to adopt the
statute of 3 October [i.e., le statut des juifs]. Nothing could be further
from the truth."'1 4  While many excused, and still excuse, Vichy
102. JULES JEANNENEY, JOURNAL POLITIQUE, SEPTEMBRE 1939-JUILLET 1942, 282
(Jean-Nodl Jeanneney ed., 1972). Significantly, Jeanneney had been a liberal politician
before the war, and had opposed the armistice in 1940. See FERRO, supra note 45, at 61,
78, 84, 88, 91-94, 115, 122, 129-31, 134, 135, 254, 580, 642. After the war, Jeanneney
became a Junior Minister in de Gaulle's government. See CHARLES DE GAULLE,
MtMOIRES DE GUERRE: LE SALUT 1944-1946 (DOCUMENTS), at 14 (1959) (hereinafter
LE SALUT). For Daladier's poor opinion of Jeanneney, see DALADIER, supra note 6, at
106.
103. Jeanneney in fact insisted that P6tain himself assemble the list of Jewish senators,
although Jeanneney complied with P6tain's request to the extent that Jeanneney sent
every senator a request to report if he was Jewish, but directed them to respond to P6tain
rather than to himself. See JEANNENEY, supra note 100, at 281-284. For the letter of one
senator in protest against being asked to specify if he was Jewish, pursuant to Jeanneney's
compliance in implementing the new law, see id, at 284-285; also quoted in part in
ROBERT BADINTER, UN ANTISIM1TISME ORDINAIRE, 110-111 (1997) ("I n'y a pas de
'Juifs' au Sgnat Ne font partie de cette Assemblde que des citoyensfrangais."). The senator
was Pierre Masse, referred to supra note 95. Jeanneney reports in his memoirs that Masse
and three other Jewish senators asked that their written responses be deposited in the
national archives. JEANNENEY, supra note 100, at 284. Jeanneney portrays his own
response to P6tain as an act of resistance. For a less admiring analysis of Jeanneney's
response to P6tain, however, see MARRUS & PAXTON, supra note 95, at 149. It is perhaps
worth noting that Pierre Masse stated in his letter to P6tain that he overcame his own
initial inclination to refuse to respond out of "deference for the government of which you
are the head." ("J'ai ddcid6 cependant de rdpondre, par ddf~rence pour le Gouvernement
dont vous Stes le chef.") See JEANNENEY, supra note 100, at 284. For a favorable
portrayal of Jeanneney, due to his efforts to improve prison conditions for Reynaud and
Mandel, see REYNAUD, supra note 6, at 60; more generally, portraying Jeanneney as
sympathizing with resistance to Vichy, see id at 94.
104. My quote is from ANDP KASPI, LES JUiFS PENDANT L'OcCUPATION, 56 (1991).
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France from responsibility for its own acts by reference to a German
coercion that was to manifest itself only later, virtually all officials in
the French legal system, like Jeanneney, obeyed the law either
because it was the law, as Jeanneney declared, or because, being the
law, it provided justification and therefore exculpation for those who
followed and applied it gladly. 05
The positivism argument that the French merely obeyed the law,
while meritorious to some degree, also became the scapegoat Vichy
adherents blamed after the events, as they later tried to exculpate
their conduct. Thus, Joseph Barth6lemy, the Minister of Justice from
1941-1943, wrote the following positivistic self-justification from his
prison cell after the war:
There always remains the nation to save and to serve. The only
stable, reasonable, solid policy is the policy of rescue ("la politique
de sauvetage"). The duty of all French people is to cling to him who
holds the flag and to ease his task by their adherence to him. May
God save France!1' 6
Nazi Germany offers a sharp contrast to Vichy France. Hatred
was an acceptable and much-proclaimed sentiment in the German
official discourse and legal scholarship of the time. The theme of
hating Jews as a characterizing element of the German body politic
was particularly well adapted to the legal philosophy of Carl Schmitt,
Nazi Germany's foremost legal theorist. In The Concept of the
Political, Schmitt suggests that hatred and murder of the inimical, the
other, are healthy for the body politic,107 and that the enemy should
In the pages following the quote, Kaspi develops in painstaking detail the wholly French
initiative behind the statut des juifs. Marrus and Paxton similarly demonstrate
conclusively, and with ample documentation, that none of the anti-Jewish measures of
1940 were imposed by the Germans. See MARRUs & PAXTON, supra note 95, at 5 ("Years
of scrutiny of the records left by German services in Paris have turned up no trace of
German orders to Vichy in 1940... to adopt antisemitic legislation."). France's
autonomous initiation of antisemitic legislation stands in stark contrast to the example of
Czechoslovakia, which had not offered military resistance to Hitler, yet whose leaders
"were so reluctant to create anti-Jewish restrictions that the Nazis gave up on trying to
promulgate anti-Jewish laws through the facade of Czech government and issued almost
all antisemitic decrees themselves." HELEN EPSTEIN, WHERE SHE CAME FROM, 199
(1997).
105. On the grave dilemma of deciding whether to break the law, see LUCIEN LAZARE,
LE LIVRE DES JUSTES: HISTOIRE DU SAUVETAGE DES JUIFS PAR DES NON JUIFS EN
FRANCE, 1940-1944, 82-103 (1993); LUCIE AUBRAC, OUTWITTING THE GESTAPO
(Konrad Bieher trans., Univ. of Nebr. Press 1993) (1984). For an illustration of Nazi
Germany's obsession with enacting laws to legalize and legitimize its conduct, see
RICHARD LAWRENCE MILLER, NAZI JUsTiz: LAW OF THE HOLOCAUST (1995).
106. BARTI LEMY, supra note 14, at 549.
107. See CARL SCHMrrT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL, 33 (George Schwab trans.
1996) (defining the enemy in terms of "the real possibility of physical killing"). For a
penetrating analysis of this area of Schmitt's thought, see Leo Strauss, Notes on Carl
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be considered "an outlaw of humanity.' 10 8
The post-war German legal community blamed positivism's
ascendance in German judicial methodology for the compliance of
German judges with Nazi law.1°9  Significantly, however, both
German and French criminal law continued to forbid premeditated
murder. Thus, both judiciaries regularly ignored positive legislation.
Article 139 of the German Criminal Code in particular also
criminalized the omission to inform authorities or the projected
victim of crimes against life.10 In his sermon of 3 August 1941,
Bishop Galen of Miinster, quoted both of the above code articles. He
Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, in HEINRICH MEIER, CARL SCHMrIT & LEO
STRAUSS: THE HIDDEN DIALOGUE 91-97 (J. Harvey Lomax trans., 1995).
108. Id. at 79. On the issue of hatred in German public discourse, see, e.g.,
KLEMPERER, supra note 91, especially entry of 27 February 1943 (describing the
expressions of hatred in recent public speeches by Hitler and Goebbels). For a trenchant
analysis of how the Nazi regime rendered extermination palatable to the SS, see SAUL
FRIEDLANDER, REFLECTIONS OF NAZISM: AN ESSAY ON KITSCH AND DEATH, 104
(trans. Thomas Weyr, 1993) (analysis of Himmler's rhetorical technique in October 4,
1943 speech: "Insert extermination into the fabric of required behavior that is universally
accepted, to evacuate its load of horror").
109. See MOLLER, supra note 33. Miller suggests that Germany's post-war judges who
had been judges throughout the Nazi period tried to exculpate themselves and their
virulently pro-Nazi decisions by pretending to have been legal positivists who had felt
obliged to apply the law, no matter what the law was. Maller also maintains and
documents persuasively that the German judiciary had been pro-Nazi long before 1933,
continued to be so after 1945, and that its post-war rejection of positivism and sudden
espousal of naturalism were designed to provide a theoretical basis for rejecting the future
reforms the new, democratic West German government was likely to propose. See id. at
223. For an excellent article consistent with Mffler's conclusions, and detailing the
German judiciary's theoretical rejection of positivism, see Walter Ott and Franziska Buob,
Did Legal Positivism Render German Jurists Defenceless during the Third Reich?, in 2
SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 91 (1993). For an overview of post-war German legal scholars'
and judges' rejection of positivism and renewed interest in natural law, see Edgar
Bodenheimer, Significant Developments in German Legal Philosophy Since 1945, 3 AM. J.
COiMP. L. 379 (1954). For the argument that the German judiciary was less well able to
resist fascism than its Italian counterpart, due to Germany's tradition of applying the
Generalklauseln, and Italy's contrary tradition, see JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL
LAW TRADITION 53-54 (1985).
110. See Articles 211 and 139 of the German Criminal Code, reprinted in Documents,
160 REVUE D'HISTOIRE DE LA SHOAH 64 (1997) (Article 139: "He who learns in a
credible manner that a crime is being plotted against a life, and who fails to warn in timely
fashion the authorities or the person threatened, will be punished.") But see B.
Mendelsohn, Les infractions commises sous le regime nazi sont-elles des "crimes" au sens
du droit commun?, 43 REvUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE SCIENCES DIPLOMATIQUES
ET POLITIQUES 333 (1966) (arguing that the post-war concept of crimes against humanity
supplemented the national law's failure to criminalize acts committed during the war
against civilian populations, such as deportation and human servitude, with the exceptions
of murder and assassination); Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg
Principles by the French Court of Cassation From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L., 289,358 (agreeing with Mendelsohn).
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announced in his sermon that he had informed the authorities of
victims targeted for death under the Nazi euthanasia program. He
read the following excerpt from the letter he had written the
authorities:
According to news which has reached me, a large number of sick
people from the provincial sanatorium of Minster are to be
transported this week... to the sanatorium of Eichberg, as so-
called "unproductive citizens," and to be put to death there with
premeditation, as has been the practice-according to a conviction
shared by everyone-after analogous transports from other
sanatoria. Such a procedure not only is contrary to divine and
natural law, but it also constitutes murder pursuant to Article 211
of the Criminal Code, murder punishable by death. It is thus my
duty to initiate a complaint, pursuant to Article 139 of the Criminal
Code, and to demand that the threatened citizens be protected
without delay by action to stop the projected transport and by an
occupation of the places designated for the murders. I request that
you inform me of the result of your intervention.
The Bishop then informed his congregation of the authorities'
failure to comply with the law:
I did not learn of any intervention by the Public Prosecutor or by
the police. Already on 26 July I had protested vociferously by
letter to the administration of the Province of Westphalia to which
the sanatoria belong. It was of no use. The first transport of
innocent people condemned to death left Marienthal, and I now
learn that eight hundred sick people were transferred to the
Warstein sanatorium. We must assume that these poor, defenseless
sick people were rapidly put to death."'
Thus, the positivist tradition, if such it was, clearly was practiced
selectively. Depending upon one's interpretation of what the relevant
law was, and which laws were the relevant ones, a positivist approach
equally might have attenuated the injustices of the era in both
Germany and France. Had German and French judges chosen to
apply provisions such as Articles 211 and 139, the results would have
been far different, and arguably equally positivistic in nature.
Although there were notable exceptions, the French and
German judiciaries generally ruled in a manner consistent with their
respective nation's judicial styles. The German judiciary used a
methodology for case-law adjudication based on general principles of
law, or "Generalklauseln." The French judiciary continued its time-
honored, post-1789 tradition of avoiding its version of
Generalklauseln, the French "principes g~n~raux."112 Paradoxically,
111. Text of Bishop Galen's sermon, reprinted in REVUE D'HISTOIRE DE LA SHOAH,
supra note 110, at 64-65.
112. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of principes gingraux
under French law.
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post-war critics have ascribed both judicial systems' appalling failure
of justice during their Nazi years, respectively, to the use of these
"general principles" in Germany's case, and in France's, to their non-
use.
113
Weisberg's analysis of Vichy law and rhetoric, both strikingly
original and profound, emphasizes the importance of the societal
context. He concludes that "the treatment of Jews by the Vichy legal
establishment cannot be fully explained by the existence alone of
specific laws.""14 I particularly agree with Weisberg in his reference
to Stanley Fish's theory: "Fish... has posited... that it is the
community that creates... the meanings that it brings to its practice
and to that practice's central texts ... so any explanation of
institutional behaviour that would hold people defined or constrained
by a text (here, Vichy statutes) would be suspect."'" 5
I differ with Weisberg, however, in that he focuses the role of
positivism within a framework of French interpretive tradition. He
blames what he calls "Vichy hermeneutics" for enabling Vichy's
exclusionary, racist measures. He states his thesis as follows: "The
proposal of these pages, in its ultimate articulation, is that a form of
French Catholic reasoning greatly influenced the ability of Vichy racial
laws to infiltrate a culture otherwise antipathetic to them."" 6 He does
not discuss the interpretive methodology as a failure to implement the
principes gdndraux, but, rather, as a hermeneutics analogous to "post-
modem strategies of reading," which he describes as "ironically close
to a form of French Catholic reading of dominant texts," and
113. With respect to Germany, see Neumann, supra note 31. For a warning in 1933, just
after Hitler came to power, against the widespread judicial use of Generaldauseln, see
JUSTUS WILHELM HEDEMANN, DIE FLUCHT IN DIE GENERALKLAUSELN: EINE GEFAHR
FOR RECirr UND STAAT, 3 (1933) ("[Dliese Frage [der Generalklausel] ist...
wahrscheinlich die wichtigste Frage, die es iiberhaupt far den Juristen des 20. Jahrhunderts
gibt."). But see MOLLER, supra note 33; ROTHERS, supra note 33, at 98. For a well-
balanced approach, emphasizing the degree to which law production in Nazi Germany was
both deformalized and deprofessionalized, see Volkmar Gessner & Konstanze Plett,
Informal Justice in German Legal Development, in BEYOND DISPUTING: EXPLORING
LEGAL CULTURE IN FIVE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 145-168 (Konstanze Plett & Catherine
S. Menschievitz, eds., 1991). With respect to France, see VICHY LAW, supra note 16, at
389. (Weisberg faults the French legal community for a narrow reading of texts, a "low-
level technical precision that inhibited them from making liberal legal arguments.")
(emphasis omitted).
114. Id at 387.
115. Id. at 392 n.9, quoting STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS (1980). Cf
Mirjan Damalka, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and
Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 839 (1997) ("the meaning and impact of
procedural regulation turn on external conditions-most directly on the institutional
context in which justice is administered in a particular country").
116. VICHY LAW, supra note 16, at 389 (emphasis added).
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emphasizes "the religious sources of Vichy legal hermeneutics." 7
My divergence from Weisberg's thesis concerns the emphasis he
places on interpretive methodology. Unlike Weisberg, I believe that
the culture in which Vichy laws were enacted, interpreted and
implemented was not "otherwise antipathetic to them,"" 8 as he puts
it, but, on the contrary, deeply receptive to them. Interpretive
methodologies were not, in my view, an autonomous substantive
factor of significance in France, where the courts' narrow readings
independently constituted what I would call a rejection of the
available principes g~n~raux, and what Weisberg calls an
implementation of "rigorous, low-level technical" readings."9
Interpretive methodologies instead served the interpreters' socio-
political outlooks. This was the primary operating force in both
France and Germany, and explains why the two countries' judiciaries
could and did produce similarly outrageous decisions despite their
divergent, even contradictory, interpretive methodologies.
Fuller and Hart debated positivism's responsibility for legalized
evil in 1958.120 In more recent articles, both Frederick Schauer and
Mark Osiel argue that it is erroneous to ascribe a relationship
between any particular legal theory or philosophy of law and practical
outcomes.' 2 ' Judicial methodology is subject to an equally low
117. Id
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593 (1958); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart
71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958). For a more theoretical critique of positivism, see LON L.
FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940). For an excellent inquiry into the role of
positivism in the German-occupied British Channel Islands, see David Fraser, "Quite
contrary to the principles of British justice": The Jews of the Channel Islands and the Rule
of Law, 1940-1945 (manuscript on file with author).
121. See Osiel, supra note 33. See also Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Positivism, 25
CONN. L. REV. 797, 827 (1993) ("The alleged evils of formalism, positivism, and a host of
other widely castigated -isms are evils, if evils they be, not acontextually, but because of
relatively time-specific, place-specific, and role-specific patterns of social and political
behavior imposed on the moral landscape."). Accord, Ott & Buob, supra note 109. As
Balkin notes, legal theory itself is subject to "ideological drift." See Ideological Drift,
supra note 67. See also BERNARD S. JACKSON, SEMIOTICS AND LEGAL THEORY,
especially Preliminary Conclusions for Legal Theory, 123-43 (1977); Dewey, supra note 36,
at 26 ("Failure to recognize that general legal rules and principles are working hypotheses,
needing to be constantly tested by the way in which they work out in application to
concrete situations, explains the otherwise paradoxical fact that the slogans of the
liberalism of one period often become the bulwarks of reaction in a subsequent era."). A
similar contemporary debate over the role of judicial methodology concerns Justice
Scalia's advocacy of textualism. In his review of ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION (1998), Professor Robert Post concludes that Scalia's theory is "not
convincing when it suggests that the great political issues of constitutional adjudication
would somehow be eased if only we could understand and apply the right principles of
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correlation with practical outcomes in individual cases. To believe in
a high correlation between the philosophical or methodological
theory a judge applies and the specific outcome of cases is to overlook
the indeterminacy embedded in the judicial decision-making
process.122
A recent trend in scholarship concerning Nazi Germany and
Vichy France goes further in an anti-positivist direction than I
consider justified, however. This trend has been to suggest that the
populations' and judiciaries' conduct reflected unalloyed support for
both regimes' discriminatory and even murderous behavior. When
closely examined, this position too easily discounts fear as a
legitimate motivating force for compliance with Nazi or Vichy law.123
The danger of the new scholarly trend is to use recently discovered
facts in order to discredit a motivation that was reasonable and
legitimate within the contexts of former times, among people who
were not privy to recent historical discoveries. In my view, fear was a
logical and reasonable motivator for political compliance in Vichy
France and Nazi Germany.
Recent scholarship has revealed evidence that those who refused
to comply with discriminatory or persecutionist strictures in both
Vichy France and Nazi Germany had less to fear than previously had
been assumed. Sometimes dissidents suffered light penalties, and
interpretation." Robert Post, Justice for Scalia, The New York Review of Books, 57, 62
(June 11, 1998). Post insightfully emphasizes that "there is no escaping the hard
responsibility for judgment that... adjudication imposes upon... judges." Id In the
context of comparative legal theory, Bernhard Grol3feld has reached a similar conclusion:
"I cannot bring myself to believe that any theory is a panacea ... method affords no
security.., is no substitute for thought." BERNHARD GROBFELD, THE STRENGTH AND
WEAKNESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 170 (Tony Weir trans., 1990).
122. This element of indeterminacy, which has been a focal point of concern in
justifications for legal systems, was advocated by Carl Schmitt, the preeminent Nazi legal
philosopher, as a way of ensuring the Fifhrer's unlimited power. See CARL SCHMITr,
UBER DIE DREI ARTEN DES RECHTSWISSENSCHAFrLICHEN DENKENS. In this context,
William Scheuerman also refers to Schmitt's Nationalsozialismus und Rechtsstaat, 12-13
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFrE 63 (1934) and Nationalsozialistisches Rechtsdenken, 10
DEUTSCHES RECHT 4 (1934). See THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 30, at 21. Schmitt's
solution to the chaotic aspect inherent in such judicial decision-making was to require an
ethnically homogeneous judiciary. He believed that this would exclude viewpoints foreign
to the nation or Volk, and result in harmonious case law. He also believed that democracy
depended on the homogeneity of the Volk See CARL SCHMITr, LEGALITrT UND
LEGmMITAT, 43, 90 (1932). Linder aptly observes that "the Nazi flight into the general
clauses merely shifted the question from the judicial interpretation of allegedly
unambiguous statutes to that of the general clauses themselves." Linder, supra note 33, at
3.
123. See DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HIrER'S WILLING EXECurIONERS:
ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1996); STOLTZFUS, supra note 5; JAMES
M. GLASS, "LIFE UNWORTHY OF LIFE": RACIAL PHOBIA AND MASS MURDER IN
HIFTLER'S GERMANY (1997); VICHY LAW, supra note 16; MOLLER, supra note 33.
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sometimes none at all. The fact that this was so does not mean that it
was understood at the time, however. Daniel Goldhagen cites
examples of soldiers who refused to participate in gruesome murders
of Jewish civilians, and who suffered few or no penalties. 24 In a
fascinating book about a previously little-known event, Nathan
Stoltzfus has documented the success of a group of unarmed "Aryan"
women who saved their Jewish husbands from deportation and death
by demonstrating openly and loudly in front of their husbands' prison
in Nazi Germany in February of 1943.1 5 Stoltzfus compellingly
demonstrates that Hitler was anxious to maintain public approval,
and that he was prepared to make significant concessions if he
deemed them necessary to maintain public support. 126 Stoltzfus also
documents popular success in reversing a Nazi government decision
to remove crucifixes from the schools of Germany.127 In addition, the
public outcry against the euthanasia program, widespread and
supported by church leadership, like that of Bishop Galen,128
successfully resulted in Hitler's decision to halt the entire euthanasia
program.
By the same token, with respect to the German judiciary, Ingo
Miiller has documented both the scarcity of judicial opposition to
Nazi imperatives, and the painlessness of such protest as existed. 2 9 A
German judge who was unwilling to apply Nazi rules, and who
protested openly, not only was able to retire in peace, but also with
his pension intact. 30 With respect to Vichy France, Richard Weisberg
has noted that Jacques Charpentier and other members of the Paris
Bar took courageous stands against Vichy orders when they felt that
the independence of their profession was at stake, and that they
suffered little in the way of reprisals.'3' Finally, Danile Lochak refers
to scholars who courageously opposed Vichy laws concerning
124. GOLDHAGEN, supra note 123, at 213-38.
125. See STOLTZFUS, supra note 5, at 209-57.
126. See STOLTZFUS, supra note 5.
127. See id. at 145-47.
128. See supra notes 109-111, and accompanying text.
129. See MOLLER, supra note 33, at 192-97. Mitller notes that two German judges were
executed, but this was for participating in the July, 1944 plot against Hitler's life, not
because of their professional conduct, id. at 192-93, and that "if a judge refused to accept
the injustices of the system, the worst he had to fear was early retirement." Id. at 195.
Accord, Linder, supra note 33, at 27 ("[W]hat is significant here is that despite the strong
rebuke [for a decision favoring Jews], the judge was not [even] forced to retire; instead, he
was transferred to a civil division. His scheduled promotion to director of an appellate
division did not materialize and he was expelled from the Nazi party."). For similar
conclusions with respect to unpunished, but nevertheless rare, dissent in the Nazi-occupied
Channel Islands, see Fraser, supra note 120, at 21-24.
130. See MOLLER, supra note 33.
131. See VICHY LAW, supra note 16, at 47-58.
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illegitimate children, but who remained silent concerning the
antisemitic laws.132
Further arguments to debunk fear as a reasonable and legitimate
motivating force dwell on P6tain's sense of dependence on public
approval. Robert Paxton quotes P6tain as saying that he needed
"continuous circuits between the authority of the state and the
confidence of the people.' 1 33 Serge Klarsfeld presents compelling
evidence that P6tain and Laval's eventual, reluctant refusal to comply
with German demands for Jewish deportations masked the Vichy
government's underlying enthusiasm for the German policy of Jewish
deportations, and that Vichy's refusal to comply was a concession
from a government fearful of growing popular disapproval towards
France's active participation in the persecution of Jews.
134
The recent anti-positivist scholarship provides valuable evidence
that protest may have been possible and successful to a far larger
extent than previously was realized. It also further undermines the
credibility of collaborators who claimed after the war that protest had
not been possible, and that they would have been killed had they not
complied with official persecution policies.135 The danger of the new
132. See Lochak, supra note 79, at 542. This evidence militates against Lochak's prior
argument that the culprit was positivism.
133. See PAXTON, supra note 6, at 192. Moreover, in the French Supreme Court's 1997
decision that Maurice Papon could stand trial, the Court explicitly stated that no threat of
reprisals ever was carried out against a French civil servant. See Cass. Crim., Jan. 23, 1997;
Papon [arrt no. 502], 14 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE 22812 (1997) ("aucune menace de
repr~sailles contre les fonctionnaires frangais n'a ... jamais dtj exicutge.").
134. See SERGE KLARSFELD, VICHY-AuSCHWITz LE R6LE DE VICHY DANS LA
SOLUTION FINALE DE LA QUESTION JUIVE EN FRANCE. 1943-1944 (1985) (discussing
P6tain's reluctance to assist the Germans once French popular opinion had turned against
such aid, despite his own desire to collaborate as actively as ever). Klarsfeld also
documents Vichy's anger that the Italians occupying Nice were helping Jews escape the
Vichy-Nazi dragnet, and French government protests against Italian control over Jewish
policy, because the Italians were protecting Jews. Klarsfeld notes that "[t]his protest of
Vichy in the name of French sovereignty and relying on the Hague Convention with
respect to the Italians, who tried to save Jews regardless of their nationality, is in contrast
to the absence of any protest by Vichy with respect to the Germans regarding the fate of
deported Jews, among whom were many French nationals." Id. at 53. Klarsfeld also
provides meticulous documentation of Vichy's anger that the Germans were not better
able to force the Italians to comply with the Nazi deportation policy. Vichy was
particularly distressed because its own eager collaboration could less easily be passed off
as forced compliance as long as Italy was successful in eluding German deportation
demands. See idL at 26-28. See also PAXTON, supra note 6, at 183 ("In June 1943 Italian
police prefect Lospinosa blocked the French arrest of 7,000 foreign Jews at Mg6ve. That
a fascist Italian police prefect should have to point out to Antiganac, Darquier de
Pellepoix's hatchet man in the [Vichy] Commissariat-General of Jewish Affairs, that Italy
'respected the elementary principles of humanity' is some measure of judgment upon
Vichy antisemitism.").
135. Stoltzfus has stated that one of the goals of his new book, see supra note 5, is to
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scholarly trend, however, is the risk of confusing currently recognized
facts with contrary contemporaneous perceptions. While it may be
true that in fact people had less to fear than previously was
understood, it is not logically permissible to infer additionally that
citizens and judges did not sincerely, genuinely and reasonably (even
if incorrectly) fear that their lives depended on compliance with the
law. Thus, fear of reprisals may have been unnecessary, but
nevertheless a genuine and reasonable force in inhibiting political
dissent.
I also believe that some of the recent scholarly trend has
exaggerated the extent to which fear was misguided, and the extent to
which the Nazi and Vichy governments were prepared to tolerate and
accommodate political dissent. French judges had before their eyes
the example of the Belgian judiciary as a frightening augur of what
might happen to themselves if they chose to protest. The Nazis did
not hesitate to deport and murder Belgian judges, policemen, lawyers
and supporting court personnel who refused to comply with German
orders. With characteristic brutality, the Nazis swiftly responded to a
strike by the judges of Antwerp with arrests, murders and hostage-
takings.136
The treatment of dissenters was not entirely uniform, but torture
and summary executions were frequent in both Germany and France,
as well as in other German-occupied territories. Concentration
camps abounded, overflowing with political prisoners arrested by the
secret state police. Reprisals were publicized intentionally to
discourage dissent. French non-Jews who protested the requirement
that Jews wear a yellow star were interned in French concentration
camps, although they were not deported.137 Resistance members
were summarily executed and brutally tortured in France and
elsewhere. The Vichy government officially instituted the milice, a
paramilitary organization known for its Gestapo-like brutality, to
combat opponents of the Vichy r6gime, and to support the Nazi
undermine the credibility of "the early [post-war] paradigm about resistance which held
that ordinary Germans could do nothing about Hitler once he held power." Transcription
from author's notes of talk by Nathan Stoltzfus at University of Pittsburgh, October 21,
1997.
136. For a discussion of Belgian political dissent, its qualified results, and the vigor and
brutality of Nazi reprisals, see Didier Boden, le Droit beige sous L'Occupation, in LE
DROIT ANTIS-MrrE, supra note 5, at 543-58. Daladier tersely notes in his journal entry for
October 18, 1941 that France's "judges would appear to be on the verge of resigning. The
government has let them know that if they do, they'll be sent to prison." DALADMER,
supra note 6, at 90. See also REYNAUD, supra note 6, at 258 (describing a "campaign of
fear" in his journal entry of February 24, 1943).
137. See WELLERS, supra note 95, at 114.
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occupier.138 In a retaliatory measure, the Nazis massacred the French
town of Oradour, including the women and children. In Germany,
protest at the pulpit led Pastor Martin Niem6ller to be incarcerated
for close to a decade in a prison and concentration camp; and
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, minister of the Confessional Church, to be
imprisoned and finally murdered in Dachau.139 The slow torture to
death of the July, 1944 conspirators against Hitler's life is well
known.14 Throughout occupied Europe, the price for harboring Jews
was deportation to the same concentration camps to which the Jews
were sent.
Fear was thus a logical and potent force. If seen as part of
positivism's sway, fear was an enabling influence in the
implementation of Nazi and Vichy injustice. Its repressive influence,
however, operated primarily on those who contemplated political
dissent.141 Thus, while it is erroneous to discount the powerful effect
of fear on the conduct of the citizens of Vichy France and Nazi
Germany, it is equally erroneous to ascribe the demise of democracy
to positivism, particularly because such a position overlooks the
extent to which the new regimes' laws were planted in receptive soil.
With respect to the judiciaries in particular, to blame positivism for
the injustice of judicial decisions is also to ignore the capacity for
.choice and the flexibility that reside in the judicial decision-making
process.142 As with so many competing claims to truth, both the
138. For photocopies of German printed announcements in France of mass reprisals,
and warnings of more merciless future reprisals, see RAYMOND AUBRAC, THE FRENCH
RESISTANCE 1940-1944, 130-131 (Louise Guiney trans., 1997). The milice was a throw-
back to the pre-Revolutionary era. For a discussion of the original French milice, see DE
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 104.
139. See, e.g., SABINE LEIBHOLZ-BONHOEFFER, THE BONHOEFFERS: PORTRAIT OF A
FAMILY (1971); LOVE LETTERS FROM CELL 92: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN
DIETRICH BONHOEFFER AND MARIA VON WEDEMEYER 1943-1945 (Ruth-Alice von
Bismarck & Ulrich Kabitz eds., John Brownjohn trans., 1994); MARIE VASSILTCHIKOV,
BERLIN DIARIES, 1940-1945 (1987). For the dates of Niemiller's incarcerations, see
ALISON OWINGS, FRAUEN 304 (1995).
140. See, e.g., JOHN TOLAND, II ADOLF HITLER 927 (1976).
141. Hannah Arendt defined totalitarianism as a r6gime of total arbitrary terror, in the
sense that each and every inhabitant of the state lives in constant terror of the knock on
the door that signifies arbitrary arrest. According to Arendt, only Stalinist Russia ever
reached the fulfillment of complete arbitrariness of punishment necessary to qualify as a
totalitarian state, although Hitler's Germany was progressing towards that point by 1945.
See ARENDT, supra note 21.
142. But see Lochak, Le juge doit-il appliquer une loi inique?, in JUGER SOUS VICHY,
supra note 68, at 29-39, for a persuasive (and positivistic) account of the limits to judicial
freedom. Lochak recounts the story of Alessandro Galante Garrone, an Italian judge who
decided to try to subvert Mussolini's rule by remaining on the bench, but who eventually
left the bench to go underground, having concluded that he could not do justice by
working within the system, that, in effect, he was unable to subvert the system from within.
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positivists and the anti-positivists have captured pieces of the picture.
It is in combining the pieces that one begins to see them as
indissociably interactive, each less significant on its own than its
proponents suggest, and each dependent on a confluence of other
reciprocally generative factors.
V. The Multiplicity and Polysemicity of "True" Frances
Law thus had a dual role: it was a factor in preparing a smooth
transition from constitutional democracy to fascism, but also in
disguising that transition under a fagade of continuity. Defining
Vichy as a radical break from the Third Republic, as a discontinuity
not meriting the name "France" wedged between two republics,
promotes the perception of a true France that is a republic,
interrupted by an alien and illegal Vichy, and restored with the end of
the war.
While I do not share this view, I do not mean to disparage it. It
was not just the view of a post-war, self-serving French officialdom
and citizenry that hoped to avoid confronting France's ugly
contributions to the holocaust. It was also my grandfather's vision of
France, long before the end of the war. He wrote to my mother and
the rest of his family of "la vraie France," the true France, in whose
return he fervently believed, to which he had shifted the deep
allegiance he formerly had felt for his native Germany, and the very
idea of which made him reluctant to consider emigration. 143 He
preferred to wait for the aberrant France to cast off her shell, tO
recover her former, civilized identity, the one he considered to be
fundamental, latent and ultimately ineradicable.
References to "la vraie France" abounded during the Vichy
period. The import of this term fluctuated according to the particular
sets of concepts and categories dominant in the particular community
employing it. Used in my grandfather's sense, references to "la vraie
France" were typical in French Jewish, refugee and Resistance circles.
For example, Georges Wellers, the distinguished scientist,
I include this reference because it illustrates the limits to judicial flexibility. My point,
rather, is that judicial interpretive freedom also must be taken into account, and that it
attenuates positivism's role, without, however, eliminating it.
143. For a more developed portrayal of my grandfather's attitude towards emigration,
including his comment in the fall of 1941 that he wished the boat taking him away from
France were sailing in the opposite direction, see RONALD, supra note 8. For an analysis
of the "deep, existential crisis" emigration provoked in assimilated German Jews, see W.
MICHAEL BLUMENTHAL, THE INVISIBLE WALL: GERMANS AND JEWS 376 (1998), a
monumentally scholarly work, despite disclaimers to the contrary by its author, the former
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury. More generally, for a most insightful depiction and
analysis of assimilated German Jews that goes far beyond the autobiographical, see PETER
GAY, MY GERMAN QUESTION: GROWING UP IN NAZI BERLIN (1998).
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concentration camp survivor and later holocaust historian, in
recollections of his imprisonment in Drancy, a notorious French camp
and eventual way-station to Auschwitz, recounts how Ren6 Blum, the
brother of France's Jewish prime minister L6on Blum, tried to
comfort children in Drancy before deportation to Auschwitz.
According to Wellers, Blum was crestfallen when a sick, solitary
and bitter little girl refused to countenance his explanation that the
French who had rounded her up, taken her family from her and who
guarded her now were not the "true" French, and that, similarly, the
only France she had ever known was not la vraie France, the true
France.144 In a role reversal, it was the adult who sought to persuade
a child too cynical to have retained her ability to suspend disbelief,
that the apparent, lived experience was the mirage, and that the
viable reality was an abstract, unobservable construct of an invisible
true France, sonmolescent beneath its Vichy personificator.
References to a "true France" were also pervasive among Vichy
enthusiasts and officials. They promised, proclaimed and celebrated
a resurrection of la vraie France, starting with the elimination from
public life and power of those who were not "truly French," those
who allegedly had sullied and degraded France politically, socially
and culturally, betraying and reducing it to the state of weakness that
had caused it to lose the war. In the discourse of the marichalistes,145
the "true France" was not the France of business and industry, but
was the nation rooted in soil. It was not the France of egotistical
individualism, which touted individual rights as ultimate values, but
144. See WELLERS, supra note 95, at 118-122. Despite Ren6 Blum's arguable na'vetd in
the anecdote recounted above, Wellers' portrait of him ranks among the most moving in
holocaust literature. Blum emerges as a man characterized by a mixture of heroism,
selflessness, idealism and profound integrity, strikingly reminiscent of countless
descriptions of his more famous brother which one finds in many pre-war and wartime
recollections of contemporaries. Ren6 Blum's story ended more tragically than his
brother's, however, as he perished in Auschwitz. (Lon Blum managed to survive,
although imprisoned in Buchenwald, because, along with Daladier, Reynaud, Gamelin,
Weygand and other Third Republic dignitaries eventually deported to Germany, the
former prime minister was considered by the Germans to be a potential hostage.) For
Lon Blum's vision of "the true France," see TONY JUDT, THE BURDEN OF
RESPONSIBILITY: BLUM, CAMUS, ARON AND THE FRENCH TWENTIETH CENTURY 44,82
(1998). For Third Republic prime minister Paul Reynaud's description of Vichy and the
armistice as contrary to the true France, see REYNAUD, supra note 5, at 92-93 ("II dtait
6crit en lettres de feu dans l'armistice que nous monterions d genoux l'escalier de la
servitude, que nous finirions par Jtre en guerre avec l'Angleterre, par nous brouiller avec
l'Amdrique etfinalementpar etre en guerre avec elle aussi. Heureusement, l'armistice, c'est
Vichy, et Vichy, ce n'est pas la France.") Writing to his aged mother in December, 1941,
Reynaud assured her that, if France ever became France again, he would forgive the
nation for his mistreatment: "si la France redevient un four la France, pour ce qui est de
moi, tout sera oublig " Id. at 154.
145. Le., supporters of Marshal Pdtain's Vichy rdgime.
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the France that placed community, over individual, and hard work
over profiteering.146 This France could flourish only if purified of
alien, foreign elements, such as the foreigners and Jews who had been
flooding the country for years.147
After the war, de Gaulle would revive, reanimate and
reconstruct the concept of a single, true and eternal France ("la seule
France,... la vraie France,... la France 6ternelle") as he sought to
wipe Vichy from the slate. Implicit in the concept of a single, true
France was not just a legitimate government versus an illegitimate
one, but also the myth of a unified, harmonious people. 148 This latter
theme de Gaulle evoked more explicitly in a speech he gave in Vichy,
fifteen years after the fall of Ptain's r6gime: "We are one people...
we are the people of France, the one and only French people."' 49 De
Gaulle's vision remains intact today in many official circles. 50 As
recently as September, 1997, the Figaro literary supplement's front-
page editorial, in an issue devoted to Vichy, defined Vichy as not
being French: "France, vanquished, occupied by a foreign power,
shocked, helpless, blinded, no longer was herself."'51
During the recent trial of Vichy police official Maurice Papon, a
lawyer who represented two French Jewish institutions also referred
to a true France that implicitly excluded Vichy. Addressing the jury,
he defended the trial against criticism that it was nothing but a case of
146. The Vichy concept of corporatisme harked back to pre-Revolutionary times. For a
discussion of the feudal nature of pre-Revolutionary communal rights in France, see
MARKOFF, supra note 15, at 171-175; BLOCH, supra note 15.
147. The 6puration or "cleansing" of Jews from professional life also had precedents in
pre-war France. For a history of the repeated politically motivated $purations of French
teachers from France's schools, see SINGER, supra note 21, at 49-51; and id., at 354 n.39,
citing Paul Gerbod, Les 6purations dans l'enseignement public de la Restauration a la
Quatrieme Ripublique: 1815-1946, in LES tPURATIONS ADMINISTRATIVES XIXE - XXE
SItCLES, 81-98 (1977).
148. Cf. "France... one and indivisible" ("la France... une et indivisible") in de
Gaulle's speech at Chaillot Palace on September 12, 1944, reprinted in his memoirs, LB
SALUT, supra note 102, at 20. See also de Gaulle's radio address of October 14,1944, in id.
at 116-17 ("Agriculteurs, ouvriers, artisans, patrons, fonctionnaires, n'ont jamais, depuis que
la France est la France, gtg plus itroitement solidaires qu'ils ne le sont... la France... sous
peine de prir... a besoin de leur union"); and his September, 1944 speech in Nancy:
"France, bruised, scoffed-at France, oppressed France, finally rose again, entirely unified
in a single will and a single hope." ("La France, la France meurtrie, bafouge, la France
opprim6e, s'est redress6e enfin tout entiere rassemblde dans une seule volontd et dans une
seule esp~rance."). CHARLES DE GAULLE, LETrRES, NOTES ET CARNETS, 319 (1983).
149. Le Monde, 19 and 20 April, 1959, quoted in Rousso, supra note 67, at 73.
150. See, e.g., VALRY GISCARD-D'ESTAING, DtMOCRATIE FRANc AISE, 65 (1976)
("Une soci~t6 unie est l'aboutissement nicessaire... Notre socit6 ne sera completement
r~concil~e avec elle-mdme que lorsque les anciennes divisions auront 6t6 effac6es.")
151. Jean-Marie Rouart, Editorial, in le Figaro littgraire, 18 September 1997, No. 16514,
at I (emphasis added) ("la France vaincue, occup6e par une puissance 6trangere, choquge,
dasempar~e, aveugle, n'6tait plus elle-meme").
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Jews seeking revenge: "It is the Attorney General who, in the name
of the French State, the real one, will ask for Maurice Papon to be
punished.' 52 The lawyer, Maitre Jakubowicz, railed against former
Resistance members who had testified on behalf of Papon: "we don't
want your truth" ("votre vgritg on n'en veutpas").153
The differences coexisting in the many Frances within the nation
have been the more wrenching because dominant Frances have
denied the existence and values of others. Those who are reluctant to
classify Vichy as the government of France from 1940 to 1944 do not
want to honor it with the denomination of legal government. They
may also prefer that Vichy carry the opprobrium of illegality because
its illegality would shield France as a state and as a people from
connection to Vichy's acts. The arguments for illegality noted above,
even if correct, hold little suasion, however, because they are highly
technical in nature, and because similar technical arguments might be
made to dispute the legality of de Gaulle's presidency.154 In this
context, Joseph Weiler's distinction between social and political
legitimacy is most helpful: "To suggest that the legitimacy of the
polity, or some of its features, may be called into question is not to
say that the polity is about to become illegitimate, either in the strict
legal sense or in the court of public opinion.' 1 55
152 "C'est Monsieur le Procureur g~nAral qui, au nom de l'lAtat franqais, le vrai,
requerra une peine d l'encontre de Maurice Papon." Me. Alain Jakubowicz's argument to
the jury on behalf of the Consistoire Isradlite de France and the B'nai B'rith of France,
March 13, 1998, reprinted in Jean-Marie Matisson, ed., Chronique quotidienne, at
<http://www.matisson.comlaffaire-papon/chronique-quotidienne.htm> (emphasis added in
English translation above).
153. Id. (Emphasis added in English translation.)
154. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. See also Weiler, supra note 2, at 12;
Weiler, Parlement europ~en, integration europ~enne, dbmocratie et lgitimit6, in LE
PARLEMENT EUROPtEN DANS L'tVOLUTION INSTITUTIONNELLE 325, 334 (Jean-Victor
Louis et al. eds., 1988). Weiler notes that the United States' Constitution's formal
legitimacy can be attacked for violating the Articles of Confederation. Id. at 338. Weiler
distinguishes between formal legitimacy (when the official, legal requirements have been
followed) and social legitimacy (when the government enjoys broad societal support),
noting that democratic Weimar Germany had little social legitimacy, while undemocratic
Nazi Germany enjoyed a great deal for many years. Weiler, supra note 2, at 18-19.
According to these criteria, Vichy enjoyed social legitimacy until 1942, when the
Resistance ranks swelled in response to increasing German demands for French labor and
the growing prospect that Germany was going to lose the war. Weiler also notes that
social legitimacy can prevail even where large segments of society do not approve of
specific governmental measures, provided that a majority of the population approves of
the underlying rules. Weiler, Parlement europ~en, integration europienne, d~mocratie et
l~gitimit, supra, at 334. See also Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International
System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705, 712 (1988) (signaling four constituent elements of
legitimacy: "determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence and adherence").
155. Weiler, supra note 2, at 12. See also Richard S. Kay, Legal Rhetoric and
Constitutional Change, 7 CARRIBEAN L. REv. 161, 162 (1997) ("we would call a change
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In all of the Nazi-conquered nations of Europe, France alone had
a collaborationist government that was neither selected nor imposed
by the Germans. Those who contest Vichy's status as the French
government from 1940 to 1944 must contend with P6tain's having
derived his power from democratically elected representatives of the
French following established legal procedures, and with the fact that
the majority of the country considered him at the time to be the
legitimate head of state. If one accepts the premise of legality,
however, the question arises as to how nearly two centuries of
tolerance and respect for human rights could collapse in France with
such lightning speed.
The answer is that it did not die with lightning speed. The
groundwork for exclusion and xenophobia was laid in the prewar
years of the 1930s and even earlier. In 1938 and 1939, laws revoking
citizenship and rabid attacks against Jews in the press inspired the Loi
Cr6mieux, outlawing racial and religious libel and slander. 5 6 Anti-
democracy was a respectable intellectual position.5 7  Indeed,
according to Henri Amouroux, long-time historian of the Occupation,
Vichy's antisemitic laws appeared normal because pre-war antisemitic
media propaganda had paved the way for them.158 French legal
revolutionary if it made a great enough change in the political underpinning of state
authority-even if it were accomplished with a punctilious regard to existing rules of
constitutional change"); Otto Kirchheimer, The Rechtsstaat as Magic Wall in THE RULE
OF LAW, supra note 30, at 254 ("the Rechtsstaat concept can be honored by scrupulous
observation of all prescribed forms and proceedings while its spirit is constantly violated").
156. But see Rousso, supra note 67, at 19 ("Classical republican democracy was...
deeply rooted in French habits") (quoting Maurice Agulhon, Les Communistes et la
lib6ration de la France, LA LIBtRATION DE LA FRANCE (1976)); accord, DE
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 317 ("Ceux qui ont itudi6 attentivement la France au
XVIIfe siacle, ont pu voir naftre et se d6velopper dans son sein deux passions principales ...
L'une... est Ia haine violente et inextinguible de l'in6galitj Celle-ci 6tait nie et s'6tait
nourrie de la vue de cette in~galitj meme, et elle poussait depuis longtemps les Franqais d
vouloir d6truire jusque dans leurs fondements tout ce qui restait des institutions du moyen
fge, et... tI ... bdtir une socidt6 oil les hommes fussent aussi semblables et les conditions
aussi 4gales que l'humaniti le comporte. L'autre... les portait d vouloir vivre non
seulement 6gaux, mais libres.")
157. See WEBER, supra note 32, at 265. Interestingly, in Germany, Nazi legal theorist
Carl Schmitt professed anti-liberalism but not anti-democracy. Schmitt claimed that
Nazism was a nonliberal democracy, based on the Fiihrerprinzip. See Otto Kirchheimer,
Remarks on Carl Schmitt's Legality and Legitimacy, in THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 30,
at 64-98; Kirchheimer, State Structure and Law in the Third Reich, in id. at 142-71.
158. Interview with Amouroux in Figaro littdraire, supra note 151, at 5. For the
philosemitic propaganda of Vichy opponents, see La Propagande philosmite, in LAZARE,
supra note 105, at 151-163. Accord, Marrus, Les juristes de Vichy dans "l'engrenage de la
destruction," in LE DRorr ANTIstMrTE, supra note 5, at 53. For the virulent, widespread
antisemitic propaganda which appeared in the French press earlier in the century, see
PIERRE BIRNBAUM, LES FOUS DE LA RPUBLIQUE: HISTOIRE POLiTIQUE DES JUIFS, DE
GAMBETrA A VICHY (1992).
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scholarship of the 1920s and 1930s expressed antisemitism
frequently,159 and administrative documents used the term "Jew" with
increasingly pejorative connotations in the 1930s. 160 As one scholar
has put it, "there was a Vichy before Vichy" ("il y eut un 'Vichy avant
Vichy'").161
France's history prior to 1940 was a complex mixture of different
strains and undercurrents, rather than a linear progression of
tolerance from the Declaration of the Rights of Man onwards.
Robespierre's Reign of Terror occurred after the Revolution, and the
Dreyfus affair at the turn of the century foreshadowed Vichy in
numerous ways. 162
VI. Democracy's Post-Mortem: Vichy's Systems of Symbols
At all levels, exclusionary measures were couched in a rhetoric
designed to reassure, and to disguise the substantive rupture they
represented with the past legal system and culture's values of
inclusion and non-discrimination. Institutional rhetoric mimicked the
rhetoric of legislation, thus maintaining an aura of continuity
(designed to convey the comfort of long-standing traditions and
established authority) while simultaneously cementing and appealing
to a growing ethos of hierarchization and exclusion. Typical of
Vichy's institutional rhetoric was the language in the letters sent to
Jewish professionals, announcing that they no longer were allowed to
continue their professional lives.
The following was the standard form letter sent by Vichy's
medical council' 63 to inform Jewish physicians that henceforth they
were barred from practicing medicine in France. The letter preserved
every formal, outward attribute of solicitous respect and French
politesse, including, in perhaps its greatest irony, the expression of
confraternity due one physician from another (for the addressee was,
until the letter went into effect, still a colleague in the medical
profession). Finally, there is the expression of regret, as if to an
invitee being disinvited to a social occasion for reasons beyond the
control of the messenger:
159. See Dominique Gros, Peut-on parler d'un "droit antisdmite"?, in LE DROIT
ANTIStM1TE, supra note 5, at 13, 17.
160. See BIRNBAUM, supra note 158, at 420.
161. Broussolle, supra note 5, at 115, 118 (quoting F.G. DREYFUS, HISTOIRE DE VICHY
(Fayard 1990)).
162. On the Dreyfus affair as a continuing subtext of Vichy's persecution of Jews, see
infra note 267. See also SINGER, supra note 21, at 17 (suggesting that French antisemitism
may have been stronger during the Dreyfus Affair than in 1940).
163. Pdtain formed various councils or "conseils"to implement Vichy's exclusionary
laws. These bodies were hand-picked for antisemitic leaders who would be zealous in
fulfilling their task of excluding Jews and unsympathetic to arguments for exceptions.
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My dear Colleague,164
Pursuant to the law of 2 June 1941 and the Decree of 11 August
1941, the Conseil de l'Ordrel65 has the regret to inform you that
your name will cease to appear on the list of physicians of the Seine
precinct within two months' time from the present.
The Conseil was led to make this decision by reason of the
limitation to 2% of the number of Israelite 166 physicians, a
percentage currently filled by the physicians entitled to benefit
from Article 3 of the law of 2 June 1941, and to whose number it is
not possible to add you.
Moreover, it has been brought to the Conseil's attention that you
were not able to be on the list of Israelites who are eligible for
authorization to continue to exercise their professions as exceptions
to the law' 67
The Conseil de l'Ordre reminds you that its decision may be
appealed within 15 days to the Conseil Supgrieur de l'Ordre. Such
appeals do not delay the decision's entry into effect.
Be so kind, my dear Colleague, 168 as to accept the expression of my
collegial/confraternal sentiments.1 69
164. The word used in French is warmer than the English "colleague" (and indeed the
French equivalent to "colleague" would be "collgue"). The French term used here was
"confrere," which, in addition to collegiality, also connotes brotherhood in a professional
fraternity.
165. See supra note 163.
166. For the connotations of the term Israelite, see infra note 184 and accompanying
text.
167. The exclusionary laws on their face permitted exceptions, thus appearing to make
concessions for French-born Jewish professionals if they could establish an unblemished
reputation and illustrious heritage of service by themselves and their ancestors to the glory
of France. In fact, however, exceptional status virtually never was granted, as the arbiters
of the decision were not members of the relevant professions, but, rather, officials at the
Commissariat aux questions juives, an administrative body whose officials were selected
for rabid antisemitism, and whose head, Xavier Vallat, routinely refused all exemption
requests. See Du c6td du commissariat g~n~ral aux Questions juives, in BADINTER, supra
note 103, at 165-171. Also see SINGER, supra note 21, at 262, for the decision of a Jewish
professor to refuse to apply for exemption from the antisemitic laws that ousted him from
his teaching position. Similarly, Lucien Vidal-Naquet, the father of historian Pierre Vidal-
Naquet, was a well-known lawyer at the Paris bar who refused the bar association's efforts
on his behalf to exempt him from the racial law which disbarred him. Unbeknownst to
him, however, his gesture of refusing any special privileges occurred after higher
authorities at the Commissariat had already stricken him and others from the list of the
exempted, though all in question were French Jews of old French families with illustrious
past military service to the country. Lucien Vidal-Naquet and his wife were to die in
Auschwitz. See Vidal-Naquet, supra note 25, at 198. See also ARON, supra note 24, at 162
(discussing Lucien Vidal-Naquet's courageous conduct).
168. See supra note 164.
169. A copy of one such letter, sent in 1942, is reprinted in l'Express at 18, semaine du 9
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The above letter was part of the initially unobtrusive and
progressively more manifest "ddsdmitisation" or "desemitizing" of
France's professions and government positions which PNtain had set
in motion within weeks of gaining dictatorial power. The rhetoric of
desemitization, couched in replications of standard official rhetoric,
camouflaged the harsh nature of the desemitization measures,
forming a terrain on which Vichy officials could tread cautiously
while they tested the country's reactions.170
The antisemitic policy met with negligible opposition from the
French population.171 Indeed, the new regime generally benefited
from popular approval or acceptance throughout 1940 and most of
1941. By 1942, and perhaps even the end of 1941, however, the winds
of popular sympathy were turning. The shift from pro- to anti-Vichy
was itself composed of heterogeneous and fluctuating views. Neither
Vichy's supporters nor its opponents had homogeneous or frozen
outlooks. Public opinion was also influenced by Vichy's legislative
measures. Popular sentiment encompassed a huge variety and
complexity of motivations and reactions, and was itself a process in
flux rather than a fact or an event. Vichy France consequently
provides an arresting example of ways in which myriad views and
discourses coexist and shift within a nominally single polity, resulting
in disparate experiences and disparate contemporaneous as well as
subsequent renditions of the period. Such multiple perspectives and
discourses consequently mold the categories that become points of
reference for future generations, as they attempt to define and
redefine national and individual memory, as well as to seek in the
past instruction for the future.
The 1941-1942 shift in French opinion with respect to the
treatment of Jews was, principally, neither a cynical response to
Germany's deteriorating military situation nor representative of a
au 15 octobre 1997.
170. Thus, in November, 1941, the German military wrote the following letter to
Pdtain's General Commissary on Jewish Questions, with respect to the total elimination of
France's Jews: "The [German] occupying authorities did not wish to take into their own
hands, in place of the French Government, the elimination of the Jews of France. It is
only because in the fall of 1940, the French Government, concluding that the political
climate did not allow for it to take those measures for itself, that the Militdrbefehlshaber
[Le., German Military Commander] was forced to intervene in the interest of the
occupying army and those first measures necessarily led to others." This letter appears in
French translation from the original German in a publication of the French Center for
Contemporary Jewish Documentation, BILLIG, supra note 12, at 19 (emphasis added).
171. For a book devoted entirely to the subject of French public opinion under P6tain,
see LABoRIE, supra note 13. See also H.R. KEDWARD, IN SEARCH OF THE MAQUIS;
RURAL RESISTANCE IN SOUTHERN FRANCE 1942-1944 (1994) (containing extensive and
persuasive references to public opinion as reflected by southern French police surveillance
exhaustively studied by its author).
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profound sense of solidarity with Jews. It was instead a combination
of (1) widespread feeling that the antisemitic laws already had solved
a very real "Jewish problem" of previously excessive Jewish influence
in French professional, public and financial life; 72 (2) increasing
disenchantment with Germany, as it robbed and brutalized France
and conscripted its youth for labor in Germany; and (3) a growing
consciousness of Germany's diminishing chances for ultimate military
success. The last two reasons are often given as explanations for the
anti-German shift in opinion. Similarly, much has been written about
the indignation of the French at the sight of Jews forced to wear the
yellow star, of the Jewish round-ups, and the wrenching scenes of
families torn apart. 73
A complexity and variety of motives and emotions coexisted and
evolved, however, within the same individuals, rather than
representing various outlooks of different people. The French
welcoming of antisemitic laws and wish to see Jews disappear from
perceived positions of power and political and financial dominance
was not the unyielding "eliminationist" animus that Goldhagen has
attributed to the German population. 7 4 French people who felt
satisfied that Jews were now neutralized and no longer posed a threat
were better able to feel compassion later at the humiliating treatment
to which Jews were subjected, as well as at the horrific consequences
of incarceration, forced family separation, and deportation deriving
from their deprivation of legal protection. Compassionate feelings
were no doubt further facilitated by a growing awareness of German
brutality against non-Jewish French people, and the emerging
likelihood that the Allies would be the ultimate military victors. 75
172. Jews constituted .25 percent of the population of Paris in 1939, but were more than
30% of its bankers, 12% of its doctors, 10% of its lawyers and 12% of its journalists.
MICHEL ROBLIN, LES JUIFS DE PARIs: DtMOGRAPHIE, ItCONOMIE, CULTURE, 105-9
(1952). The recently discovered police file on Professor Adolphe Steg's father states the
following cause for the elder Mr. Steg's incarceration in Beaune-la-Rolande (one of the
French camps from which deportations to Nazi concentration camps proceeded): "surplus
in the national economy" ("en surnombre dans l'conomie nationale"). President Chirac
quoted this in his December 5, 1997 speech, at a ceremony to deposit a cache of recently
discovered files on Jews with the Centre de documentation juive contemporaine. For the
text of Chirac's speech, see le "Fichier juif' au MWmoria; 162 REVUE D'HISTOIRE DE LA
SHOAH 203, 206-209 (1998). For further discussion of the fichierjuif affair, see infra note
217.
173. See, e.g., DALADIER, supra note 6; KLARSFELD, supra note 134, at 163-192.
174. See GOLDHAGEN, supra note 123; accord, GLASS, supra note 123.
175. Although he does not discuss it directly, Klarsfeld implies a similar conclusion as
to non-Jewish French sentiment. See KLARSFELD, supra note 134, at 7 et seq. He at least
implicitly recognizes the particular interplay of sentiments I describe above and which I
consider crucial to the opinion shift: the combination of initial antisemitism with limits to
the same. My references to public opinion are to the majority of the French population,
not to individuals. There were individuals who opposed the antisemitic measures from the
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Thus, the shift in public opinion was due to Vichy's appeasement
of the population's antisemitic aspirations to be rid of what it deemed
excessive Jewish presence and influence, rather than a reaction
against those measures, or a mere concession to opportunism or
newly discovered anti-German sentiment. When one views the
opinion shift in this manner, it becomes less mystifying that even
people with the courage to take risky anti-Nazi stands were not
inclined initially to protest Vichy or Nazi measures against their
Jewish colleagues and neighbors. The limited, or perhaps delimited,
antisemitism which was common in France, is captured in the
following protest against Jewish round-ups by France's Bishop Deloy
in 1942:
[W]e fully acknowledge that our country has the right to take every
useful measure to defend itself against those who, especially in
recent years, have hurt it so much, and that it has the duty to punish
severely all those who have abused the hospitality so liberally
bestowed upon them. But the rights of the State have limits. 76
Richard Weisberg concludes that, ultimately, the resounding
silence with which the non-Jewish French population received the
antisemitic laws stemmed from its initial general welcoming of those
measures. 7 7  Weisberg documents the non-Jewish French bar's
feeling that Jews were over-represented in the professions, that recent
Jewish immigrants were changing the French style of practice-in
short, that there was a Jewish problem, and that the antisemitic laws
addressed the problem in the right direction, even if they erred in also
targeting harmless Jews from old French Jewish families, individuals
whom most of the non-Jewish French population perceived as not
meriting exclusion from their professions.178
Like the legal profession, the medical profession expressed
animosity towards its Jewish members. In July of 1940, within mere
days of France's military defeat and P6tain's accession to power, the
medical union of Seine-et-Oise sent P6tain a letter, proposing the
elimination of foreigners and Jews from the profession, decrying the
start, and individuals who, like de Gaulle, believed from the start that Germany would
lose the war.
176. LE PROCP-S DE XAVIER VALLAT PRE2SENTPE PAR SES AMIS 497 (1948), cited in LE
DROrr ANTIS MITE, supra note 5, at 29. Sartre capttred a particular brand of French
antisemitism residing within some of those who protested Vichy persecution: "During the
occupation, the democratically-minded person was deeply and sincerely appalled by the
antisemitic persecutions, but he occasionally sighed: 'The Jews will return from exile with
such insolence and desire for revenge that I fear a resurgence of antisemitism."' JEAN-
PAUL SARTRE, RP FLEXIONS SUR LA QUESTION JULVE 69 (1954). Clearly, it was not a
resurgence of antisemitism which preoccupied such speakers foremost.
177. VICHY LAW, supra note 16; accord BADINTER, supra note 103.
178. See VICHY LAW, supra note 16, at 84-85.
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alleged Jewish "basely commercial mentality" that was degrading the
practice of medicine in France.179
With respect to the legal profession, Weisberg notes the
statement of Jacques Charpentier, head of the Paris Bar Association,
to the effect that the Paris Bar had suffered from a Jewish problem
that P6tain's laws sought to remedy. Charpentier was a man of
courage, prepared to be inflexible to Vichy and German demands
when it came to defending his profession's proud heritage of
independence.180 Charpentier also made efforts on behalf of
persecuted Jewish colleagues, so long as they were considered
frangais de vieile souche, from established French families. 18' He did
not, however, protest Vichy's initial exclusion of Jews from the legal
profession.'8
An equally characteristic example of the French attitude is
revealed in the following letter, written in 1941 by Philippe Henriot, a
member of the last Parliament of the Third Republic and a devout
supporter of P6tain.183 The letter was addressed to a French Jew:
I feel that you are anxious without reason. With respect to the
179. Reprinted in I'Express, no. 2414, week of 9 October, 1997, at 18.
180. See VICHY LAW, supra note 16, at 21-22, 85. Charpentier demonstrated courage
by agreeing to represent former prime minister Reynaud (imprisoned by P6tain as an
alleged menace to the new order) and by suggesting in October of 1941 that he try to
organize a protest against German propaganda attempts to smear Reynaud. See
REYNAUD, supra note 6, at 38,68,142 (entry for October 18,1941).
181. Concurring with Weisberg, Badinter points out that the very act of saving a few
Jews' professional lives meant accepting, and at least indirectly sanctioning, that all other
Jews would be excluded from their professions and livelihoods. Badinter asks rhetorically
what remained of the principle, so touted by France's bar associations, that all lawyers
enjoy equal rights in their professions. See BADINTER, supra note 103, at 117. Badinter's
criticism should be examined in the context of the larger problematic of what it means to
exist in a totalitarian society. Holocaust literature is replete with survivors' tormented
conclusion that any Jewish camp inmate's survival inevitably was at the expense of others
who died in his or her stead. This issue is discussed, both in personal and historical terms,
throughout the works of Elie Wiesel, Bruno Bettelheim, Viktor Frankl and Primo Levi,
and in historico-philosophical terms by Hannah Arendt. For further discussion of this
issue, see Vivian Grosswald Curran, Deconstruction, Structuralism, Antisemitism and the
Law, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1, 44 (1994).
182. Indeed, Charpentier wrote that "certain professions, including our own [legal
profession], require a minimum of assimilation .... In this respect, Vichy's policy
coincided with our professional interests." JACQUES CHARPENTIER, AU SERVICE DE LA
LIBERTP, 127 (1949), quoted in BADINTER, supra note 103, at 38.
183. Henriot should not be confused with the similarly named Herriot, also a member of
parliament, who courageously defended the Massilia group. See supra, note 46, and
surrounding text. Henriot, the author of this letter, was assassinated by the Resistance. In
reprisal for his assassination, the French milice of Vichy murdered seven Jews. The
decision to murder them was made by Paul Touvier, and it was this decision by Touvier
that was the subject of his 1992 trial, discussed infra, notes 274 to 278, and surrounding
text.
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Jews, it is never for one moment a question, in our minds, of
Frenchmen like you. It is my understanding that, in the statute
currently being drafted, it is explicitly specified that people who
have been French for so many generations, French [also] by their
conduct, citations, decorations, services rendered-other of course
than financial services, which often are only alibis-are to remain
French without qualification.
You know very well that we are thinking only of Jews, and not of
French people of the Hebrew religion. If our campaigns against
those people upset you, they should not.... Let me tell you that
one of my colleagues from the Chamber [of Deputies of the
National Assembly], who in former times was my most vociferous
political opponent, was a Jew.184 It was Pierre-Bloch, Deputy from
the Aisne district. I had the great pleasure of seeing him again the
other day. Magnificent soldier that he is, cited, decorated, escapee
[from a German prisoner-of-war camp], do you suppose for one
second that our [anti-Jewish] campaigns target such men as he?
The French people has the good sense not to be mistaken on this
point. It has long made these distinctions. 8
5
The term Henriot uses to contrast with the derogatory "Jew" is
"Franqais de religion israglite." "Israglite", which I imperfectly
translate here as "Hebrew", is a term that the French Jewish
community had chosen to use in self-description since the nineteenth
century, preferring it to "fuif "186
184. Interestingly, although Henriot has just taken pains to explain the difference in his
eyes between the undesirable "Jew" and the worthy "Frenchman of the Hebrew religion,"
in the present sentence, Henriot nevertheless uses the word "Jew" to describe a man he is
about to praise.
185. This letter is quoted in its entirety in PIERRE-BLOCH, supra note 14, at 184-85.
Incidentally, Pierre-Bloch, the deputy for whom Henriot professes affection and
admiration in the above passage, despised and reviled Henriot as a collaborator and
antisemite. See id.
186. For a history of this matter, see Paula Hyman's excellent book, FROM DREYFUS
TO VICHY: THE REMAKING OF FRENCH JEWRY, 1906-1939 (1979). In a fascinating
passage, the identical contrast between juif and israglite, similarly condemning the former
and praising the latter, had been made half a century earlier by none other than Bernard
Lazare, Jewish defender of Dreyfus, who described the juifs as characterized "by fraud,
lying and trickery," in contrast to the French israelites. See BERNARD LAZARE,
ENTRETIENS POLrrIQUES ET LrITrRAIRES, I, 177, 179, 232 et seq. (1890), quoted in
WEBER, supra note 32, at 290. See also Philippe Oriol, Bernard Lazare: le premier qui se
leva pour le juif martyre, in MIL NEUF CENT: REVUE D'HISTOIRE INTELLECTUELLE
(CAHIERS GEORGES SOREL) 63-65 (1993); BADINTER, supra note 103, at 15 (noting the
increasingly xenophobic attitude in France before the war, including among French Jews).
Accord ARON, supra note 24, at 18 (noting hostility of French Jews towards foreign Jews).
French Jewish contempt for foreign Jews often reflected the sentiments of much of
the non-Jewish population, and is reminiscent of the French aristocracy's enthusiasm for
revolution in another time, about which de Tocqueville wryly commented that "the only
thing the nobles lacked to effect the Revolution was the rank of commoners." ALEXIS DE
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In fact, notwithstanding Henriot's declarations in his letter,
Vichy's laws did not make any distinctions between Jews of French or
foreign extraction. Many thousands of the people Henriot
proclaimed to be beyond the aim of the antisemitic laws he endorsed,
including Pierre-Bloch, the very individual his letter praised as being
beyond the target of Vichy's racial laws, were among their targets and
victims. Thousands of Jews born in France to families that had been
French for generations were impoverished by "aryanization" laws
depriving them of their assets, and then arrested, delivered to the
Germans, deported and murdered. 187
The substantive inaccuracy of Henriot's letter offers an
illuminating view of French antisemitism from a comparative
perspective. Vichy's legal definition of "Jew", like its Nazi German
counterpart, did not depend in any way on foreign birth or ancestry.
Nevertheless, in France, in contrast to Germany, the popularly
perceived target seems to have been the foreign Jew.188 In his
brilliant work on the languages of totalitarianism, Jean-Pierre Faye
points out that the Germans used the term "race" in the sense of
"species" rather than of race, relegating Jews to the non-human, such
that their individual characteristics became irrelevant
considerations. 189 French antisemitism stands in contrast to that of
Nazi German officials and legal scholars who advocated complete
indifference to the individual attributes of persons of Jewish
extraction. French animus in its most widespread form did not reach
such complete deindividualization.
TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD RIGIME AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTIoN, 272 (1955), quoted
in MARKOFF, supra note 15, at 66.
187. The Paris Centre de documentation juive contemporaine et mdmorial du martyr juif
inconnu, located at 17, rue Geoffroy L'Asnier, Paris (4th arrondissement), was a rich
source of research for this article. The Centre consists of archives, a library and museum
exhibits. It contains numerous letters by such Jews de vieille souche as I describe above,
often requesting exemptions from imprisonment, not for themselves, but for children and
grandchildren, on the basis of their own brilliant and previously recognized service to
France. Perhaps the measure of what it cost these men to write such letters is revealed by
their frequent proud refusal to ask for release or relief of any kind for themselves.
188. Of an estimated 330,000 Jews in France in 1940, 24% were murdered.
Approximately 43% of the foreign Jews in France were murdered. See ZUCOTH, supra
note 53, at 3; see also LEVIN, supra note 12, at 427-28; PAXTON, supra note 6, at 183.
189. See FAYE, supra note 21, at 366-67 (discussing in particular Nazi legal theorist Carl
Schmitt and the German statute prohibiting copulation between Jews and non-Jews). In
contrast, while Vichy law prohibited intermarriage, it did not extend to criminalizing
sexual relations. In pre-war France, a French antisemite also advocated the prohibition of
sexual relations and marriage between Jews and non-Jews. See RENP GONTIER, VERS UN
RACISME FRANVAIS (1939), quoted in SERGE KLARSFELD, LE STATUT DES JUIFS DE
VICHY 9 (1990); see also VICrOR KLEMPERER, LTI [LINGUA TERTII IMPERII]:
NOTIZBUCH EINES PHILOLOGEN (1975; originally published in 1947) (analyzing language
of the Third Reich).
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VII. The Frayed Threads of Memory: Post-War
Representations and Significations
Vichy France powerfully illustrates the vital, dynamic and active
function that representations of memory acquire in society.19° The
Vichy period provoked a crisis of national identity in post-war
France, as increasing challenges were brought to bear on official post-
war definitions and categorizations that sought to erase Vichy from
French national history by delegitimizing it and consequently denying
its very existence as a government of France.' 91 Outside of France,
Vichy also raises intricate problems of the nature of governmental
legitimacy, the value and functions of law, the ability of constitutional
democracies to assure inclusiveness to minorities, the nature and
consequences of law's ineradicable connection with language, and the
capacity of democracy to sustain itself in times of crisis.
Since the war, Vichy has been represented variously as a puppet
government of Nazi Germany, an illegal gang that never gained the
legal status of government, and the lawful government of France from
1940 to 1944. These different intepretations of Vichy reflect different
realities of the period for the various individuals and communities
living through it. Some interpretations also represent more of an
effort to reconcile the period with preexisting political theories or
objectives than a desire for accuracy. I argue here that Vichy was not
merely an aberration or an alien phenomenon in an otherwise
fundamentally coherent body politic, and that Vichy should be
incorporated into the memory and identity of France as a French
phenomenon in the contexts of its times. I suggest a pluralistic
assessment of Vichy and, by implication, of French identity and
history. One cannot understand France without Vichy or Vichy
without France, and it is in the context of France's long-standing
constitutional democracy that Vichy emerges as instructive for
identifying democracy's self-corrosive characteristics and potentials.
The speed and facility with which Vichy came into existence on
the heels of France's military defeat reflected, inter alia, the
popularity of its self-representation as the antithesis of the Third
190. On representations of memory as an active social force, see RAPHAEL SAMUEL,
THEATRES OF MEMORY, at X (1994) (memory as "dialectically related to historical
thought, rather than being some kind of other to it"). See also Pierre Nora, Entre
Mimoire et Histoire: La problimatique des lieux, 23-43, in I LES LIEUX DE MtMOIRE
(Pierre Nora ed., 1997) (analyzing history and memory's interactions, oppositions and
mutual dependence).
191. See infra text accompanying note 199 for de Gaulle's statement that Vichy never
existed. Succeeding French statesmen up to and including Mitterrand maintained this
position, as did Mitterrand's Minister of Justice, Robert Badinter, himself a Jewish
holocaust survivor and scholar of the Vichy period.
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Republic. Vichy benefited from a widespread rejection of the Third
Republic across the political spectrum, a rejection that was to have
implications not only for Vichy but also for the post-war
government.192 Political conservatives, monarchists and the Catholic
Church had long been opponents of the Third Republic. Some
opposed the particular government, while others frankly opposed
parliamentary democracy. In the 1930s, the press battered the r6gime
on a daily basis. Discontent with the Third Republic was common
also among liberals, who felt that the government was ineffectual and
the system incapable of solving the country's urgent economic and
social problems, including massive immigration, unemployment and
perceived governmental corruption. The collapse of 1940 resulted
from, inter alia, the political crises and instability of the 1930s, when
the average lifespan of a French ministry was six months.193
The growing prominence of foreigners, particularly foreign Jews,
in France's public, financial and cultural spheres distressed many in
the French population, cutting across a broad swath of differences
among those reacting negatively to foreigners. 9 4 In the aftermath of
France's national trauma at its unexpected military defeat, most
French people were relieved and grateful to see Marshal P6tain take
the reins of government, or at least did not oppose him. 9 5 As had
been the case in 1789, virtually all groups in France in 1940 were open
to change, if not eager for it.196
192. See, e.g., Stanley Hoffman, Paradoxes of the French political Community, in IN
SEARCH OF FRANCE 14-15 (Stanley Hoffman ed., 1963); PIERRE-BLOCH, supra note 14,
at 46 (widespread attacks on parliamentarianism, the Republic and democracy in France
during the 1930s). For similar German disenchantment with Weimar, see TURNER, supra
note 5; GAY, supra note 30.
193. De Gaulle notes in his memoirs that France had 102 governments between 1875
and 1940, while Great Britain had 20 and the United States 14. See DE GAULLE, supra
note 102, at 276. Cf. Rogoff, supra note 1, at 64 n.186 ("From 1791 to 1958, French
systems of government oscillated from broadly representational, but ineffective, to
authoritarian.").
194. See, e.g., LABORiE, supra note 13, at 125-54. The prominent role of the exile in
France of the 1930s offers some striking parallels with the situation in Weimar Germany.
Peter Gay goes so far as to claim that "Weimar culture was the creation of outsiders,
propelled by history into the inside, for a short, dizzying, fragile moment." GAY, supra
note 30, at xiv.
195. See LABORIE, supra note 13, at 228 et seq.; PHILIPPE BURRIN, FRANCE UNDER
THE GERMANS: COLLABORATION AND COMPROMISE 18-20 (Janet Lloyd trans., 1996).
196. See, e.g., ANDREW SHENNAN, RETHINKING FRANCE: PLANS FOR RENEWAL
1940-1946, at 10 (1988) (widespread desire in France across political spectrum for "a
complete break with the pre-war status quo"); Stanley Hoffman, The French Political
Community, in IN SEARCH OF FRANCE, supra note 192, at 48 ("dissatisfaction with
parliamentarianism had become general"); William D. Irvine, Domestic Politics and the
Fall of France in 1940, in THE DEFEAT OF FRANCE: REASSESSMENTS 85 (Joel Blatt ed.,
1998), citing SERGE BERNSTEIN, LA FRANCE DES ANNtES 30, 170-171 (1993). For
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France's post-war officials trod a narrow path, anxious to
repudiate Vichy, but also determined to distance themselves from
Vichy's predecessor, the much-reviled Third Republic. Many in post-
war French government, from de Gaulle to Mitterrand, including
Badinter, a former French Jewish Minister of Justice and President of
France's Constitutional Council (whose father was murdered in
Auschwitz), have maintained that France is France only when it is a
republic, and, therefore, that post-war France is not responsible and
can not be held accountable for Vichy's acts. 97 This view is in
keeping with France's official identification of itself, as reflected in
the post-Occupation ordonnance of August, 1944, which declared that
"the form of France's government is and remains a republic.., in
law, [and the Republic] never ceased to exist." 98 This was also de
Gaulle's position. When asked in 1944 to proclaim the Republic, he
refused, saying, "The Republic has never ceased to be. Free France,
fighting France, the French Committee of National Liberation have
each in turn embodied it. Vichy always was and remains null and
void. I myself am the president of the government of the Republic.
Why should I proclaim it?' 199
De Gaulle in effect recategorized the French to exclude
collaborators, and to include the Resistance, the Free French, and
other opponents of Germany, thereby permitting the conclusion that
Vichy was a non-French, alien phenomenon, created in the shadow of
German guns, with no claim to recognition as a legitimate
government. De Gaulle's sweeping nullification of Vichy thus was
premised on a recategorization of those who qualified as French.
Although substantively at dramatic odds with the Vichy
recategorizations that had excluded Jews and naturalized foreigners,
de Gaulle's technique, like Vichy's, was to reclassify Frenchness to
meet a new political agenda. Both Vichy and de Gaulle essentially
created new definitions for old terms in order to resolve or avoid
problems and contradictions that the prior status quo otherwise
would have generated, and to foster new associations and concepts
without acknowledging their novelty.2°°
similarly widespread receptivity to the idea of change in 1789, see MARKOFF, supra note
15, at 67. Accord DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1.
197. See Alfred Grosser, Du bon usage de la mdmoire, in JUGER SOUS VICHY, supra
note 68, at 107, 112.
198. Quoted in Dominique Rousseau, Vichy a-t-il existd?, in JUGER SOUS VICHY, supra
note 68, at 97, 103.
199. CHARLES DE GAULLE, MMOIRES DE GUERRE: L'UNrmt 1942-1944, at 308
(1956).
200. Accordingly, French post-war memorials to Vichy's victims suggested only
German guilt, even when the perpetrators of murders had been French. Thus, the 1946
memorial to Georges Mandel, erected where Mandel had been murdered by members of
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In her analysis of de Gaulle and the texts he produced, literary
semiotician and psychotherapist Julia Kristeva, ruminates on de
Gaulle's promotion of the symbolic over the real, and what she refers
to as his taste for interpretive systems that defy truths (his "goat des
systemes qui bravent les r~alitds.")201 Kristeva analyzes de Gaulle's
rhetoric in Freudian terms, noting among others his self-identification
with France. She describes de Gaulle's rallying cry of June 18, 1940
from London, in which he invited the French to continue the war
against Germany, and urged all fighting Frenchmen to join him, as
consisting of a call to himself, only on the surface addressed to
France: "The great Charles without a land who speaks to himself
when he addresses a France whom he is." ("[L]e grand Charles sans
terre qui se parle en s'adressant d une France qu'il est. ")202
Significantly, in his war-time memoirs, de Gaulle declared that
France could not be France without grandeur. ("La France ne peut
6tre la France sans grandeur.")2 3  If Kristeva's theory can be
extended, de Gaulle's conflation of himself with the nation offered a
seductive national refuge to post-war France, for the French to shed
their guilt for Vichy by adopting de Gaulle's myth of synonymity
between himself and the nation. Thus, during the war, de Gaulle
became an icon for the proposition that France no longer existed, but
that he, de Gaulle, did exist, and he was great, and therefore of
necessity so too were the French.204 Since France could not but be
great, and could not but be a republic, Vichy could not but not have
been. It thus could be stricken from national history and memory.
This willed confusion of de Gaulle with France also appeared in
a song popular in France in 1944, when Germany's defeat was
imminent:
Tous les Frangais sont enfants de la Gaule
Vichy's French milice in the forest of Fontainebleau, contains the following inscription:
"In this place, Georges Mandel died, assassinated by the enemies of France, on 7 July
1944." See Rousso, supra note 67, at 23. (The predictable, but untrue, inference viewers
would be likely to draw is that Germans murdered him.)
201. Julia Kristeva, La Nation et le verbe, in LETTRE OUVERTE A HARLEM D. SIR 48
(1990).
202. Id. at 46. For the entire text of de Gaulle's radio address of 18 June 1940, see
Appendix 3 to SIMONNOT, supra note 45, at 281. The importance of the self-creation is
also confirmed by the opening lines of de Gaulle's memoirs. See DE GUALLF, supra note
9, at 1.
203. See DE GUALLE, supra note 9, at 1. According to le Figaro, in 1958, de Gaulle
warned U.S. Secretary of State Dulles that unless France was a world power, it would
cease to be France. ("Si la France cesse d'etre mondiale, elle cesse d'etre la France.") Le
Figaro littdraire, February 26,1998, at 6 (untitled article by Alain Peyrefitte).
204. See Kristeva, supra note 201, at 51 ("La France n'existe plus, or je suis la France,
donc vous 4tes grands.") On the structure, appeals and functions of myths, particularly in
political life, see CASSIRER, supra note 36. See also GILDEA, supra note 14.
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Et les Gaulois 6taient de fiers soldats
Voilh pourquoi le gdnrral de Gaulle
Sera vainqueur dans le dernier combat20 5
(All the French are children of Gaul
And the Gauls were proud soldiers
This is why General de Gaulle
Will vanquish in the final battle)
An unspoken subtext of the song was an identification of de
Gaulle with the French Revolution, since a long tradition links the
Gauls, as opposed to the Franks, with the French Revolution.2a 6
Moreover, Eugen Weber states that "[a]ssertion of Gaulish descent
stressed emancipation from servitude, or the need and moral duty to
bring this about."2 ° 7
This association was complicated, however, by Vichy's attempt to
co-opt the connection, by equating the Gauls, not with revolution, but
rather with the need to be conciliatory after military defeat, as the
Gauls had been with Rome, allegedly engendering the Gallo-Roman
tradition at the heart of French identity and culture. This link
between Rome and Germany was spelled out in a 1941 speech by
Gaziot, Vichy's minister of agriculture,20 8 and Vichy's hope to
appropriate the gaullish myth for self-promotion was also reflected in
its choice of the Gallic weapon as the model for Vichy's highest
decoration, the francisque.209
Vichy's efforts to link Germany with Rome by analogy to
France's gaullish past, however, ran counter to a widespread
perception that Rome had been a conqueror with much to offer,
while the ancient Germanic invaders had contributed nothing positive
205. See JEAN GALTIER-BOISSIkRE, MtMOIRES D'UN PARISIEN 908 (1994).
206. See WEBER, supra note 32, at 22. See also PIERRE CHAUNU & ERIC MENSION-
RIGAU, BAPTtME DE CLOVIS, BAPTIME DE LA FRANCE: DE LA RELIGION D'ETAT k LA
LA!Crnt D'tTAT 29 (Franks viewed as barbarians).
207. WEBER, supra note 32, at 33. See also MARC BLOCH, MILANGES HISTORIQUES,
I, 95 (1963), quoted in WEBER, supra note 32, at 335 n.35 (petition of citizens of Paris to
abandon "'the infamous name"' of Franks, "who had reduced the French to servitude, and
a return to the name of Gaulois").
208. See Krzysztof Pomian, Franks and Gauls, in NORA, supra note 37, at 27-76.
209. The francisque, emblem of the Vichy rdgime, was also known as the francisque
gallique. From the Latin "francisca," however, the term literally meant the "battle ax of
the Franks." See entry for "francisque" in PAUL ROBERT, DICIONNAIRE
ALPHABtTIQUE ET ANALOGIQUE DE LA LANGUE FRAN(AISE 744 (1972). For Vichy's
attempt to appropriate Joan of Arc as a symbol of Pdtain's new order, and for the contrary
imagery of her Resistance symbolism, see REYNAUD, supra note 6, at 74. Joan of Arc
remains a hotly contested symbol to this day, claimed by both the right and left wings of
French politics. For attempts by both Vichy and the Resistance to appropriate other
symbols, see Hoffman, The French Political Community in Search of Itself, in IN SEARCH
OF FRANCE, supra note 192, at 35. For figures of potent symbolism throughout French
history, see CHAUNU & MENSION-RIGAU, supra note 206.
[Vol. soHASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
to French identity or culture.210 The implicit analogy Vichy tried to
construct between Rome and Nazi Germany thus depended on
ignoring popular mythology concerning Germany's historically
negative role in France's development.
The Resistance did far better in appropriating France's gaullish
ancestry as the symbol of the need to resist. Anti-Vichy forces relied
on the ancient contrast between Gauls and Franks, on the link
between the Gauls and the French Revolution, and on numerous
contemporaneous rhetorical opportunities providentially afforded by
the name of General de Gaulle. His name's symbolic value became a
potent rallying force. While Sartre wrote plays set in antiquity which
camouflaged his anti-German message and passed the German
censor,211 the anti-Nazi French congregated in apparent political
innocence on the Champs-Elys6es carrying two fishing poles, because
in French two fishing poles are "deux gaules," a homophone of "de
Gaulle.212 In his 1997 book of memoirs, de Gaulle's son makes the
astonishing revelation that the family name had been spelled
differently by its various branches, and that his father actually traced
the name's ancestry primarily to Wales ("Galles"), not Gaul. 213 This
fact was not publicized during the Vichy years.
De Gaulle's symbolic link to the Revolution of 1789 heightened
the symbolism of Vichy as rupture from France. Further
strengthening this dissociation were Vichy's frequent and explicit
repudiations of the French Revolution.214 Vichy's antisemitism also
represented a repudiation of the Revolution in that the post-
Revolutionary r6gime had granted the Jews of France full citizenship,
and was therefore, depending on one's perspective, blamed or
revered for the emancipation of Jews in France.215
210. See FUSTEL DE COULANGES, HISTOIRE DES INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES DE
L'ANCIENNE FRANCE: L'INVASION GERMANIQUE ET LA FIN DE L'EMPIRE, 225-26 (1891),
cited in Pomian, supra note 208, at 65.
211. See, e.g., JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, LES MOUCHES (1944).
212. See AUBRAC, supra note 138 (reproducing numerous Resistance as well as Vichy
and Nazi German tracts).
213. See PILIPPE DE GAULLE, MlMOIRES ACCESSOIRES: 1921-1946, at 9 (1997).
214. See JUDT, supra note 144, at 7 ("one of the few themes on which the denizens of
Pdtain's 'National Revolution' could initially agree was their wish to unmake the
Revolution and its heritage"). Pdtain and his cohorts were not alone in repudiating the
French Revolution. It was equally anathema to Hitler, who explicitly boasted that he
aimed to reverse the French Revolution. See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE SENSE OF REALITY 43
(1997).
215. The Napoleonic Code of 1804, generally considered the embodiment of the French
Revolution, did not make any formal distinctions between Jews and other French citizens.
For a qualification of this statement, based on the Civil Code's retention of the different
oaths traditionally administered to Jews, see Jean-Jacques Clre, Une 6mancipation
tardivement contest~e: Les exceptions apportges au principe d'6galitd d lgard des Juifs
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Nevertheless, the French Revolution introduced patterns that
Vichy echoed, as would post-war Gaullism, in that the Revolution's
political inclusiveness towards the Third Estate, and other "out-
groups," such as peasants and Jews, reflected a selective approach to
inclusion, not generalizable inclusiveness. The Revolution violently
excluded aristocrats, and repudiated the clergy. The r6gimes of
P6tain in 1940 and de Gaulle in 1944 mirrored the Revolution's
qualified approach to inclusiveness.
In 1995, President Chirac departed abruptly from the official
French tradition of excluding and denying Vichy by declaring that
Vichy was France. Many in the French Jewish community were
pleased, interpreting the statement as a belated assumption of French
responsibility for Vichy's part in the holocaust. Among the French
who were not happy, however, were some who had been members of
the Resistance, who had risked their lives to fight the Nazis, who had
from the beginning rejected Pgtainisme wholeheartedly, who had
shown solidarity with all like-minded compatriots, and who to this
day refuse any identification of France with P6tain and the
collaborators. 216 They too speak of la vraie France, and they mean
what my grandfather meant. Chirac's declaration was far from the
end of the story, however, for in the fall of 1997, as the trial of
Maurice Papon began to grip the nation, both socialist Prime Minister
Lionel Jospin and right-wing RPR president Philippe S6guin openly
disagreed with Chirac, and warned against the danger of equating
Vichy with France.217 The difficulty with relegating Vichy to the
pendant le XIXe si~cle, in LE DROIT ANTIStlMITE, supra note 5, at 57. For a brilliant and
most persuasive challenge to the established notion that the Napoleonic Code in fact
embodies the revolutionary spirit, see James Gordley, Myths of the French Civil Code, 42
AM. J. COMP. L. 459 (1994). For the view, expressed by numerous French Jews, that
French Jews were more attached to the Revolution than non-Jews because the Revolution
had emancipated them, see, e.g., JULIEN BENDA, LA JEUNESSE D'UN CLERC 36-42 (1936).
Accord PIERRE VIDAL-NAQUET, MEMOIRES: LA BRISURE ET L'ATTENTE 1930-1955, at
45 (1955) ("nous 6tions des Frangais fils de l'Amancipation rvolutionnaire, citoyens de la
Rdpublique qui avait le droit de tout nous demander"); ARON, supra note 24.
216. This point was made with particular force and beauty by a former resistance
fighter who wrote a letter to the New York Times in protest against Chirac's
pronouncement. I did not record her name or the date, but recollect that it was published
shortly after Chirac's speech.
217. See Internet Discussion group, <Law-France@amgot.org>, attachment to "Law-
France Digest #67." Jospin heads the socialist party, while S6guin, whose father was killed
by the Germans when he was a small child, is president of the Gaullist RPR party, has ties
to the right wing, and generally is thought to have presidential aspirations for the year
2002.
An incident illustrative of contemporary France's dilemma arose recently, when the
Nazi files on the Jews of Paris allegedly were discovered. A huge, highly publicized
debate ensued as to where the files should be stored. Minister of Culture Jack Lang, and
Prime Minister Edouard Balladur appointed a Commission to look into the matter. Some
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status of an aberration not to be dignified with the name of France or
with the mantle of governmental status, however, is that many events
cannot be reconciled with such a view. 18 The first camps in France
predated Vichy. Interned were refugees from Hitler's Germany, who
later were handed over to the Nazis pursuant to Article 19 of the
armistice France signed with Germany. Almost all were to perish in
Nazi concentration camps.
The armistice itself was signed before Vichy came into
existence.2 19 Even the word "collaboration," which was to become
the catchword for Vichy's ignominy, appeared in the armistice, thus
also predating Vichy. 0 The word's negative connotations only arose
later, however, on October 30, 1940, when P6tain declared his agenda
of collaboration with Germany. Although P6tain intended to convey
a positive message, the word "collaboration" from then on became
tainted with connotations of betrayal and cowardice.221
Nor were Vichy's connections to France's post-war government
insignificant. The national collapse of 1940 had stemmed not only
from France's military defeat, but also from national discontent with
the Third Republic, and de Gaulle consequently was careful to
distance himself from the Third Republic when establishing his
government after the war.m Indeed, the strong executive that France
argued that the files should be destroyed; others that they should be in the archives of the
Center for Jewish Documentation and Memorial to the Unknown Jewish Martyr; still
others argued against in any way separating Jewish records from those of other French
people, and, therefore, for placing them in the national archives. In the midst of this
public turmoil, it was discovered, however, that the files were not, after all, the notorious
Nazi census files of Paris Jews. A mistake of interpretation had been made. In the
context of the public nature of the debate over where to store the files, a high-level
governmental decision was made to conceal the new discovery of non-discovery, so as not
to further inflame the situation. Perhaps most significant of all, however, is that no-one
seemed concerned with the whereabouts or even the existence of the Jewish files that
Vichy had compiled. As long as the debate concerned the Nazi German files of the
Occupied Zone, it was free to rage openly and unimpeded by governmental interference.
See Eric Conan, Vichy: le rapport qui leve l'nigme sur le "fichierjuif', in L'EXPREss, July
10, 1996, at 36-42. The files eventually were given to the Centre de documentation juive
contemporaine. See supra note 172.
218. For an excellent discussion of sources of state legality and legitimacy, see generally
Joseph H.H. Weiler, After Maastricht Community Legitimacy in Post-1992 Europe, in
SINGULAR EUROPE: ECONOMY AND POLITY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AFTER
1996, 11-41 (William James Adams ed., 1992).
219. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Alfred Grosser, "Du bon usage de la
mfmoire, "*in JUGER SOUS VICHY, supra note 68, at 107, 112..
220. I owe this insight to Robert Paxton, who notes that the word appears in Article 3
of the armistice. See PAXTON, supra note 6, at 19. For the full text of the armistice, see
SIMONNOT, supra note 45, at 273-78.
221. See BURRIN, supra note 195, at 4.
222. See generally ANDREW SHENNAN, RETHINKING FRANCE: PLANS FOR RENEWAL
1940-1946 (1989).
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eventually adopted under de Gaulle, and that has come to
characterize modern French government, had its model in Vichy and
stands in stark contrast to the short-lived pre-war French republics.
Vichy's portrayal as a puppet government, rather than an
autonomous and sometimes rival government to the Nazi occupier,
has been challenged increasingly and compellingly.3 For instance,
when the Germans began the process of "aryanizing" Jewish
businesses and possessions, Vichy plunged into the fray with
legislation more rigorous than that of the Germans, for Vichy wanted
at all costs to keep "aryanized" Jewish property within French, rather
than German, hands. 224 Some of Vichy's antisemitic measures
predated any German coercion, and some, particularly the definition
of who was a Jew, actually were harsher than the corresponding
Nuremberg laws.32
A little-known but abiding irony of Vichy rhetoric is that a
portion of it was created by a Jew, Emmanuel Ben, an eminent
French journalist and man of letters, writer and Editor-in-Chief of the
leftist publication Marianne. Berl was well connected to most of the
prominent political figures of both the pre-war and Vichy eras.
Ptain paradoxically hired him as a speech writer, before Berl went
underground.226 Although much attached to P6tain as the hero of
223. See KASPI, supra note 104; PAXTON & MARRUS, supra note 95; VICHY LAW,
supra note 16. On the other hand, references to Vichy as inauthentically French, because
a mere puppet of Germany, continue unabated. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL.,
COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS: TEXTS, MATERIALS AND CASES ON THE CIVIL
AND COMMON LAW TRADITIONS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO FRENCH, GERMAN,
ENGLISH AND EUROPEAN LAW 71 (2d ed. 1994), quoting S. E. FINER, FIVE
CONSTITUTIONS 27-28 (1979).
224. For a thorough account of Vichy and German aryanization, see L'aryanisation et
seq., in KASPI, supra note 104, at 112-29. For the role of the private sector's autonomous
efforts in eliminating Jews in order to trade with the Germans, see Annie Lacroix-Riz, Les
llites frangaises et la collaboration gconomique: La banque, l'industrie, Vichy et le Reich,
159 REVuE D'HISTOIRE DE LA SHOAH 8 (1997).
225. See supra notes 5 and 77.
226. The paradox to which I refer here lies in P6tain's very real antisemitism. A
commonly held contemporaneous view of P6tain, and one shared by my parents, was that
the aged Pdtain suffered from senility, but did not have much personal anti-Jewish animus.
For a contemporary proponent of this view, see Broussolle, supra note 5, at 115, 123.
Extensive research has persuaded me otherwise. Reliable evidence of his senility appears
to be nonexistent, while unimpeachable, documented evidence of his personal
interventions to introduce or heighten antisemitic measures on numerous occasions is
plentiful. See PAXTON & MARRUS, supra note 95, at 86. See also GALTIER-BOISSntRE,
supra note 205, at 922 (Pdtain's reputed deafness, like his reputed senility, also a sham).
Cf. Ptain ne permettrait pas cela; in 146 REVUE D'HISTOIRE DE LA SHOAH 200 (1997)
(misplaced nature of widespread faith in P6tain's decency); Badinter, supra note 103, at
46. (Although no official personal declaration by Pdtain exists with respect to Jews, Paul
Baudouin, who was then Minister of Foreign Affairs, reported that P~tain was by far the
most harshly antisemitic of all present at the meeting of ministers convened on October 1,
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Verdun, Berl approved heartily of General de Gaulle, and had few
illusions about the Germans, or his own treatment as a Jew under
Vichy.227
Perhaps no image of Prtain's rhetoric was more deeply
associated with his Vichy agenda than the recurrent one of returning
to the soil and working the land. It was also one of speechwriter
Ben's inspirations. This presumed bedrock of Prtain's so-called
political philosophy played into the hands of Hitler's intention to
deindustrialize France and transform it into an agricultural food
supplier for Germany. The image soon transmuted into a metaphor
antisemites used against France's Jews, as French p~tainistes sought to
establish that Jews were alien to France, no matter how long their
families might have been French, because they did not have enough
"soil in the soles of their shoes." Indeed, in August of 1942, bags of
soil sent from all over France were consecrated as part of a ceremony
in which P6tain symbolically identified France with her soil, or soils.229
Berl also revealed that he originated one of the most famous of
all phrases of PMtain's speeches: "The earth [or soil] at least does not
lie" ("La terre, elle, ne ment pas"),210 part of Ptain's admonition to
the French to return to the sure values they always could trust, and to
make themselves invulnerable to the sort of the deceit with which
previous French governments and profiteering industrialists allegedly
had cheated and deluded them, bringing them to the depths of defeat
in 1940.21
1940, to discuss the scope of the antisemitic statute that would go into effect two days
later.)
227. BERL, supra note 43, at 148. Indeed, Berl went into hiding in July of 1941, much
earlier than most French Jews. One can surmise that his proximity to power in Vichy
alerted him better than most to the fact that Vichy meant to pose mortal danger to all of
France's Jews.
228. This imagery was of such common currency that a French Jewish member of
Parliament and escapee from a German prisoner-of-war camp, when received by Xavier
Vallat, one of France's most notorious antisemites and head of the infamous Commissariat
gdndral aux questions juives, on being asked by Vallat what he intended to do now that he
was free, responded sarcastically that he would "work the earth." See PIERRE-BLOCH
supra note 14, at 186. See also CHARLES MAURRAS, LA SEULE FRANCE (1941) (avowed
antisemite's imagery of Jews as lacking the soil on the sole of their boots to qualify them
as French). As Stanley Hoffman points out, paradoxically, "Vichy, which wanted to coax
the French back to the land, ... consolidated instead the business community." Hoffman,
supra note 192, at 59.
229. For the important role played by the father of the future French president, Valdry
Giscard-d'Estaing, in this curious and highly bombastic ceremony, see Pomian, supra note
208, at 29.
230. See BERL, supra note 43, at 178.
231. All of these accusations had Jews as their subtextual targets, for the qualities
named are precisely those which the Catholic Church traditionally had attributed to Jews
since at least the 19th century. See ZUCCOTII, supra note 53, at 12; cf SINGER, supra note
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Bed disavowed any part of P6tain's antisemitism, although the
metaphoric conflation of land, soil and earth with Frenchness became
one of the most enduring images French antisemites used to illustrate
the Jew's allegedly alien nature. Its hold on the French imagination
harked back to stereotyped images of Jews as city people dealing in
finance, or as pale ghetto creatures from the East, cloistered from the
sun.232 Years after the war, Jean-Paul Sartre was to evoke and dwell
on this same symbolism of the soil in his famous analysis of French
antisemitism.2 33
Berl claimed to have been inspired by the image P6tain favored
of himself as a peasant from the Artois region. Berl emphasized that
the bucolic imagery was far more his own than P6tain's: "I must
nevertheless acknowledge that-against all likelihood and, in a
certain sense, against all reason,-I insisted more than anyone and
even more than the Marshal himself, on this bucolic character. '234
However innocently intended, Berl's words nevertheless were
appropriated to sinister ends once they left his pen, as his images
were funneled through the antisemitic-laden categorizations
prevalent in Vichy France.
Berl's fascinating book chronicles the paradoxical complexities
of political choices during the Vichy period, and the complicated,
unpredictable nexus of human and political motivations that
influenced those choices. After the war, Berl stated that he had not
felt it contradictory at the time both to support de Gaulle and yet to
continue to work on P6tain's speeches. Berl added, however, that he
wondered if there were anyone in the post-war generation who would
not judge him either imbecilic or insincere. 235 Berl had an intuitive
21, at 19-26 (antisemitism of French church in nineteenth century).
232. Significantly, the first Jews after the French Revolution to be entitled to full
French citizenship were those engaged in working the land. See Jean-Jacques Clre, Une
imancipation tardivement contestie: Les exceptions apportges au principe d'dgalitd d l'6gard
des Juifs pendant le XIXe sidcle, in LE DRorr ANTIStM1TE, supra note 5, at 57-72. See also
MAURICE BARRIS, 1 SCtNES ET DOCTRINES DU NATIONALISME 67 (1925, 1901)
(defining the French nation [patrie] in terms of soil); MAURRAS, supra note 228.
233. SARTRE, supra note 176, at 161-62. With respect to German imagery of the soil,
cf. Heidegger's inaugural address in May of 1933, upon becoming Rector of Freiburg
University, in which he coupled an "attack on objective science, [with] the fervent
proclamation of the powers of blood and soil." GAY, supra note 30, at 83. For a history of
the symbolism of the soil in France, see PAXTON, supra note 6, at 200-202. See also
NORA, Between Memory and History, in REALMS OF MEMORY, supra note 37, at 11 ("the
traditional French image of memory [is] something rooted in the soil.").
234. BERL, supra note 43, at 178. Berl disavowed any direct connection with
antisemitism or antidemocracy in Pdtain's speeches. See id. at 186-253. For a critical view
of Berl as a collaborator, see DALADIER, supra note 6, at 12.
235. See BERL, supra note 43, at 148 ("maisje me demande si aucun lecteur, aujourd'hu4
pourra ne pas croire d mon imbdcilit6, s'il ne met pas en doute ma sincfrit").
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understanding of posterity's tendency to historical oversimplification,
and its difficulty in grasping the ways of thought, and particular
combinations of concepts and associations, prevalent in a time not
one's own.
His prediction of the contemptuous evaluation the current
generation was likely to give him strikes at the heart of flawed
conceptual connections the post-war generation has not been
accustomed to questioning, for one of our tenets has been
unwarranted but unchallenged dichotomizations of resistance from
collaboration, of support for de Gaulle from support for Pdtain. The
conceptual fallacy involved lies in polarizing two positions without
considering the possibility of their even partial fusion or overlapping.
The tendency has been to associate all Resistance members with
being anti-P6tain, and all collaborators with being anti-de Gaulle.
These associations and dichotomies reflected actual political positions
only in their extreme manifestations. Popular reactions spanned a
continuum, and included combinations that may appear mutually
inconsistent.3 6 As Stanley Hoffmann has pointed out, similar points
of view led some to join the Resistance and others to rally to Vichy.237
In a famous commentary on his own errors in predicting who would
become pro- and anti-Dreyfus, L6on Blum warned in 1935 that "[t]he
most faulty undertaking of the mind is to calculate in advance the
reaction of a man or a woman in the face of a truly unforeseen
ordeal.... Each ordeal is new and each ordeal reveals a new man."' 8
It should be remembered that in 1940, de Gaulle and P6tain were
not yet endowed with the symbolism of immutable antagonism they
later acquired.239  Similarly, antisemitism was not necessarily
236. See generally LABORIE, supra note 13. In a recent interview, Simone Veil, former
judge, cabinet minister under President Giscard d'Estaing, member of the European
Parliament, and Auschwitz survivor, expressed a similar view: "Certains se sont bien
comports, d'autres mal, beaucoup les deux d la fois. Ce n'dtait pas aussi simple qu'on le
pr~sente aujourd'huL" L'EXPRESS, Oct. 9-15 1997, at 20. For the identities of a number of
socialist and radical party deputies who became collaborators, see REYNAUD, supra note
6, at 29 nn.30-32. In particular, Laval himself had been at the far left of the socialist party
in 1917. See id. at 22.
237. See Hoffman, supra note 192, at 42-57. Cf. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 108, at 14
("Nazism's attraction lay less in any explicit ideology than in the power of emotions,
images and phantasms. Both left and right were susceptible to them.").
238. LUON BLUM, SOUVENIRS SUR L'AFFAIRE 51 (1935) ("La plus fallacieuse des
operations de l'esprit est de calculer d'avance la rdaction d'un homme ou d'une femme, vis-
tl-vis d'une 6preuve r~ellement imprvue... Toute 6preuve est nouvelle et toute 6preuve
trouve un homme nouveau")
239. See BERL, supra note 43, at 149. De Gaulle himself, although condemned to death
in absentia by Vichy, never entirely repudiated Pdtain. It was widely believed that de
Gaulle named his son Philippe after Pdtain (although Philippe de Gaulle denies this in his
recent, 1997 memoirs, see supra note 213); and when Pdtain was sentenced to death, de
Gaulle commuted the sentence to life in prison.
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coterminous with pro-Nazism. Pierre-Bloch, a Jewish socialist
member of Parliament, notes in his memoirs that, after Germany
defeated France, the French fascist and antisemitic group, Action
frangaise, had to "forget" its original anti-German stance.240 P6tain's
first Minister of Justice, Raphael Alibert, who drafted the first statut
des juifs, was another example of a perhaps equal mixture of
antisemitism and anti-German animus.241 While France's right wing
was opining "Better Hitler than L6on Blum!", those who had been on
the left in the 1930s, the anti-Munich Accord group ("les anti-
munichois"), including both socialists and communists, sometimes
became transmogrified into the leading collaborators of the
Occupation.242
Nationalism, which today we associate with conservative, right-
wing politics, had until at least 1914 been a socialist, left-wing
position. 243 And indeed, antisemitism, today associated with right-
wing political views, was a left-wing phenomenon in nineteenth-
century France, a fact that Eugen Weber interprets as owing to, and
part of, the left's opposition in the nineteenth century to the
development of capital and industry.244 Moreover, as Weber has
noted, "the taste for extreme positions [was] often stronger than the
attachment to left or right. ' ' 245 If we look at events of 1940 through
the prism of post-war associations and categorizations, we lose sight
of the far more murky lines, the intersections of perspectives half a
century ago, and we increase the inevitable distance separating
ourselves from the Vichy period as it was experienced
contemporaneously.
The consequence of this fallacy has been a blocked vision,
preventing, inter alia, an understanding of protagonists such as
240. See PiERRE-BLOCH, supra note 14, at 106. Political opportunism also led
politicians to exploit antisemitism as a means of unifying political support. See ZuccoTrr,
supra note 53, at 13; JEAN-LOUIS BREDIN, L'AFFAiRE 46-57 (1983).
241. Ironically, although Alibert was far more of an antisemite than his successor,
Joseph Barth6lemy, Alibert's hatred of Germans ran counter to P6tain's collaborationist
objectives, and therefore caused P6tain to dismiss him. See PAXTON & MARRUS, supra
note 95, at 75, 368.
242. See PIERRE-BLOCH, supra note 14, at 165-224, for the unexpected political
positions some of his acquaintances espoused after the Occupation. Accord, GALTIER-
BOISSIPRE, supra note 205, at 773-916; WEBER, supra note 32, at 319 (more recent
example of similar political transmogrifications).
243. See WEBER, supra note 32, at 263, quoting Charles Maurras, the third number of
the daily Action frangaise, 23 March 1908, to support the thesis that Maurras and his fellow
nationalists were also interested in social reform at that time.
244. See WEBER, supra note 32, at 289-90.
245. Id. at 51. See also LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 76 (1940)
("extreme points of view have a kind of hidden affinity, as if in travelling away from the
middle ground each had completed the same circuit from opposite directions").
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Franqois Mitterrand, a hero of the Resistance who also worked for
and was honored by Vichy. A scandal erupted shortly before
Mitterrand's death in the wake of the revelation of his participation in
Vichy, and P6tain's having awarded Mitterrand the francisque.246
France's disparate communities plunged into a reassessment of
Mitterrand as villain or hero, depending on the particular group's
dominant culture, but they continued the binary focus that had
generated the initial fallacy.
One who tried to avoid polarization or denying complexity was
Elie Wiesel, holocaust survivor and long-time friend of Mitterrand.
In his book of interviews with Mitterrand, Memoir in Two Voices,
Wiesel attempted to have the French President address the issue of
his Vichy past, but Mitterrand did so reluctantly.247  Perhaps
Mitterrand, like Emmanuel Berl, did not trust posterity to distinguish
between complexity and insincerity.
By seeking to understand the contexts of the time, and to
scrutinize traditional post-war categorizations for logical fallacies and
obfuscations, one can better assess the extent to which those who
lived through Vichy were mostly neither heroes or villains, but
individuals who, on their own and as part of communities, weighed
the trade-offs inherent in their options. Vichy France was fashioned
by indigenous forces in anticipation of Nazi domination, at a moment
when many in France considered Nazi hegemony to be the wave of
Europe's, if not the world's, future, and the costs of further resistance
to Hitler more burdensome than survival under fascism. The
difficulty of available choices, and even of the perception that choice
existed, was rendered all the greater by their inability to know what
the future of Europe would hold.
Vichy, like Nazi Germany, illustrates the phenomenon of a
preexisting segment of society rising to political power during a
period of national crisis. As the millennium approaches and we look
back on the eruptive, traumatic century for Europe that is our own
century, we might do better to replace la vraie France, the concept of
a monolitihic entity, with an acceptance of les vraies France, in the
plural.
We define legal and historical questions according to the various
prisms through which we see, the varying categories we create and in
which we classify selected data. As we cast a backward glance at the
millennium, we might appreciate the competing nature of human
246. See PIERRE PEAN, UNE JEUNESSE FRANCAISE (1994). See also supra note 209
(regarding the francisque).
247. See FRANCOIS MirrERRAND & ELIE WIESEL, MEMOIR IN Two VoicEs 84
(Richard Seaver & Timothy Bent trans., 1996) (1995) ("I feel no obligation to respond to
those who, whatever their motives, set themselves up as judge and jury.").
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needs, concerns and motives. Competing and incommensurate values
exist not only in every society, particularly in our own increasingly
globalized and overpopulated world, but also within each human
being.
Despite his belief in the inevitable resurrection of his version of
la vraie France, my grandfather emigrated from France after all, but
so late that he had to spend several years in Cuba before he was able
to take his family to the United States. Had he not left France when
he did, in the fall of 1941, he would have discovered that his choice
was not, as his letters show he mistakenly believed, between
emigrating and staying in a French prison camp until the end of the
war. Had he stayed, he would have been under German control
within months, to be deported "eastward," vers l'est, as the vague and
ominous euphemism of the time went.
He had been able to salvage his movable assets in his first
emigration from Germany to France. By June of 1940, when France
fell, he was in a prison camp, anxiously contemplating what the fate of
his Jewish wife and three children would be under the Nazi occupiers.
Unbeknownst to him, his family had fled south from Paris,
abandoning what they could not carry.
It was in France that all of his bank accounts were, as he wrote,
bloquis. "Bloqugs" means "blocked"-a euphemism for the
aryanization process that began with the freezing of Jewish assets.
His letters to his wife, once contact was reestablished, frequently refer
to his attempts to dbloquer, or "unfreeze" their bank accounts. In
retrospect, his naYvet6 at this and similar events, and the faith he had
in his French business associates and acquaintances, seem hopelessly
unrealistic.248 At the time, however, on the contrary, it was the
measures at odds with generally accepted concepts of legality and
equality under the law that seemed unreal and necessarily ephemeral
to those who experienced them.
My grandfather's attempts to reverse French antisemitic
measures were of course fruitless. He arrived in Cuba as a man
approaching sixty, with four dependents, for what proved to be a five-
year stay, his last remaining asset being a bank account in
Switzerland. 249 My grandfather eventually was able to take his family
248. A recent publication reveals the intensity of the French business community's
eagerness to do business with Germany. Even the highly collaborationist Vichy
government was distressed, as industry was less intent than the government on keeping
profits in France. See Lacroix-Riz, supra note 224.
249. Switzerland's policy of anonymous bank account holdings rescued people like my
grandfather from dire poverty, but also resulted in the retention by Swiss banks of huge
funds at the end of the war, since the overwhelming majority of the anonymous holders
and their heirs, having been murdered by the Nazis, were never to claim the funds. These
funds, now the subject of heated controversy, recently led Switzerland to disclose the
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to the United States, where he found some work as a stockbrocker.
He lived until 1976, dying at the age of 92. After the war, he returned
to Europe at least once a year, but more often to Germany, his
original homeland, than to France. I was not privy until 1995 to the
letters he had written in 1940 and 1941 to my mother and her siblings
from the French internment camps of les Milles and Gurs. I
discovered the letters in the far recesses of my father's desk after both
he and my mother had died, so I never was able to ask my
grandfather or my parents whether his perception of France had
changed after 1941, or whether he maintained to the end his earlier,
Gaullist vision of the ineluctability of la vraie France, and believed
that it had in fact reemerged in 1944 with de Gaulle, like a proverbial
phoenix, out of the flames of the shoah.
VII. "Entering the Future Backwards":250 The Trial of
Maurice Papon and the Judicial Solution to Understanding
Vichy
In the war-time atrocity and Jewish deportation cases of recent
years, the French courts have become guardians of a memory that
encompasses far more than the defendants themselves, or the acts of
which those defendants have been accused. One of the many modern
questions Vichy raises is whether its history should be inscribed at all
by judicial hands, whether trials are the appropriate vehicle for
instructing French youth about Vichy and the holocaust. 21
identity of holocaust-era investors. In yet another example of entrenched categorizations
which both inform one's perspective and impede one's ability to understand others'
perspectives, those pressing for Swiss disclosure focused on fifty frustrating years of
enduring Swiss bank stallings and refusals to disburse funds that belonged to descendants
of holocaust victims. In disclosing the identity of their account holders, however, Swiss
bankers saw, rather, the profound changes in their way of doing business which such
disclosure seemed likely to entail, for account holder anonymity had become a practice
endowed over the years in the Swiss national psychology with a sacrosanct quality. See,
e.g., Alan Cowell, Swiss Offer to Start Fund for Victims of Holocaust, in N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
8, 1997, at A6. Until recently, the belief was widespread that Swiss bank account
anonymity was enacted to protect German Jews when H-itler demanded the transfer to
Germany of all foreign-held German Jewish funds. Marc Perrenoud maintains, however,
that account holder anonymity was designed to buttress Switzerland's policy of protecting
capital that tax authorities from either Switzerland or abroad might attempt to locate. See
Marc Perrenoud, Aperqu des relations dconomiques et financieres de la Suisse avec
l'Allemagne, 163 REVUE D'HISTOIRE DE LA SHOAH 110, 111 n.2 (1998), citing MARCO
DURRER, DIE SCHWEIZERISCH-AMERIKANISCHEN FINANZBEZIEHUJNGEN IM ZWEITEN
WELTKRIEG. VON DER BLOCKIERUNG DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN GuTHABEN IN DEN
USA UBER DIE 'SAFEHAVEN'-POLITIK ZUM WASHINGTON ABKOMMEN (1941-1946), at
126 (1984).
250. See WEBER, supra note 32, at 318 ("We enter the future backwards.").
251. Classes of French schoolchildren attended the Papon trial, as they did Touvier's.
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In 1951, the French government began to enact amnesty laws to
apply to certain former Vichy collaborators. Amnesty in French is
l'oubli juridique, "juridical forgetting". The French word for
"amnesty" is amnistie, derived from the Greek amn~stos, which
means "forgotten," and is also the origin of the English word
"amnesia". The French term for amnesty is defined as a legislative
act, mandating official forgetting (l'oubli officiel). 252
A countervailing movement in France resulted in the passage of
a law in 1964, which aimed to put an end to the national drive for
amnesia2 3 The new law provided that crimes against humanity no
longer would be subject to any limitations period2 4 Such crimes
without temporal bounds are known as "imprescriptibles," and under
French criminal law, imprescriptability applies exclusively to crimes
against humanity. Thirty years later, in 1994, when France's new
criminal code entered into effect, the law of imprescriptability for
crimes against humanity was incorporated into the new Criminal
Code 5 5 "Imprescriptible" in French connotes both that which is not
subject to a statute of limitations, and that which is unforgettable.
French law thus decided that the crime of genocide had become
legally unforgettable.
The new law of imprescriptability initially was not intended as an
opening to try Vichy officials for their past crimes. The law was
intended for German Nazis, not for the French, and more than fifteen
years of litigation would be required in Papon's case before he would
See Craig R. Whitney, Vichy Aide Still Rejects Blame, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 8,1997, at A8.
252. See ROBERT, supra note 209, at 54. France's amnesty laws in particular allowed
people whose deeds otherwise would have involved up to a 15-year sentence not only to
escape trial, but also to run for political office. See also Vidal-Naquet, supra note 25, at 87
(describing the amnesty after the Dreyfus Affair as "a time-tested technique for the
appeasement of spirits"); EVA HOFFMAN, SHTETL 14 (1997) (explaining negative
consequences of "lacunae in collective consciousness").
253. Law No. 64-1326 of Dec. 26, 1964, D.S.L. 1991-92, 1240.
254. The issue of whether crimes against humanity should be without any limitations
period continues to divide France. One of France's foremost philosophers, who was also a
Jewish Resistance hero, answered the question resoundingly in the affirmative in his book,
appropriately entitled L'Imprescriptible. See VLADIMIR JANKFILIVITCH,
L'IMPRESCRIPTIBLE: PARDONNER? DANs L'HONNEUR ET LA DIGNrIT (1986). For a
French legal scholar's similar conclusion, see Georges Levasseur, Les Crimes contre
l'humanitg et le probleme de leur prescription, 93 J. DE DROrr INT'L 259, 273-86 (1966).
For a recent discussion of the issue in the context of Paul Touvier's trial, see Leila Sadat
Wexler, Reflexions on the Trial of Vichy Collaborator Paul Touvier for Crimes Against
Humanity in France, 20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 191 (1995). For an analysis of trials involving
crimes against humanity as "the formalized embodiment of the conscience collective," see
Mark J. Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 463, 478, and sources cited therein, especially timile Durkheim, and Osiel's
illuminating analysis of Durkheim.
255. See C. PEN. Art. 213-5 (1994).
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be brought to trial, on October 8, 1997, at the age of 87.
In 1981, when Frangois Mitterrand was elected President, he
made Maurice Papon his Budget Minister. Michel Slitinsky, a French
Jewish holocaust survivor, gave archival evidence to the French left-
wing newspaper, le Canard enchan , which the paper proceeded to
publish on May 6, 1981, revealing that Papon had arranged for the
arrests and deportations of more than 1,600 Jews when he was second
in command of the police for the Bordeaux region (la Gironde)
during the Vichy period.256 On December 8,1981, the first complaints
were lodged against Papon by relatives of victims, and he requested a
jury d'honneur to salvage his reputation.257 Composed of former
Resistance members, the jury d'honneur exonerated him from the
charge of crimes against humanity, censuring him only for having
failed to resign his position in 1942.258
Despite the gravity of the crime alleged by the civil plaintiffs, the
State did not indict Papon. Only two years later did the parquet259
bring charges against Papon, in response to public outcry. Perhaps
more significant than Papon's 1983 indictment was the State's failure
to indict the man who had been Papon's superior in the Vichy police
hierarchy, Maurice Sabatier, former pr~fet of the Gironde police, who
had given Papon his orders, and who has since died.26° The
investigating magistrate (juge d'instruction) decided to terminate the
investigation of Papon without further action. On February 11, 1987,
the Supreme Court dismissed the entire matter because of a
procedural error it said the juge d'instruction had committed: failing
to indict Sabatier, despite possessing sufficient incriminating evidence
about Sabatier in the form of a copy of the jury d'honneur's verdict,
256. See Eric Conan, Papon, les Frangais et Vichy, L'EXPRESS, Oct. 8,1997, at 11.
257. Article 85 of France's Code of Criminal Procedure provides that one alleging to
have been harmed by a crime may file a complaint and become a "civil party" in a criminal
case. See C. PR. PAN. Art. 85 (Dalloz, 1988-89). Pursuant to Article 86, the juge
d'instruction to whom the complaint is submitted must inform the prosecutor (the
procureur de la R~publique) of the matter. See id., Article 86.
The jury d'honneur was created in 1945 to hear the quasi-criminal charges of
"national indignity" against Vichy-appointed officials. For more on this institution, see
Mark Gibney, Decommunization: Human Rights Lessons from that Past and Present, and
prospects for the Future, 23 DENV. J. INT. L. & POLICY 87 (1994); PETER NOVICK, THE
RESISTANCE VERSUS VICHY: THE PURGE OF COLLABORATORS IN VICHY FRANCE 94-
155 (1968).
258. See Eric Conan, Onjugera Papon. Et Vichy?, L'EXPRESS, Jan. 30,1997, at 25.
259. The French parquet is a kind of prosecution department, integral to the court,
rather than separate or independent. See generally MARTIN WESTON, The Investigation,
Prosecution and Punishment of Crime, in AN ENGLISH READER'S GUIDE TO THE FRENCH
LEGAL SYSTEM 119-38 (1991). For a detailed description of the procedural progression of
criminal trials in contemporary France, see Bron McKillop, Anatomy of a French Murder
Case, 45 AMER. J. COMP. L. 527 (1997).
260. See Eric Conan, Le zele tardif duparquet, L'EXPRESS, Nov. 13-19,1997, at 19.
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which had more or less exonerated Papon. The jury d'honneur's
report stated that "Mr. S[abatier], 261 former regional pr~fet for
Bordeaux, declared to the jury [i.e., to the jury d'honneur composed
of the Action Committee of the Resistance, the Comitg d'action de la
Rgsistance] that he [personally] assumed the entire responsibility for
the anti-Jewish measures taken in the area under his office's
jurisdiction." 262
The Court reasoned that the juge d'instruction had violated
Article 681 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure by failing to
inform the prosecutor, the procureur de la R~publique, of Sabatier's
amenability to indictment, in light of Sabatier's open declaration of
his own responsibility for the anti-Jewish acts. According to the
Court, the judge's omission to set Sabatier's indictment process in
motion without delay rendered both himself and the prosecutor's
office unable to continue to investigate or prosecute Papon.263
The Court based this startling conclusion (that charges against
one man had to be dropped because charges against another also
should have been brought) on Article 659 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.264 Article 659, however, far from mandating such a result,
merely allows the Supreme Court, in such cases as it deems to so
require, to decide questions of procedural validity when the issue
involves judges: "The Supreme Court also may... rule with respect
to judges. '265
On July 8, 1988, a second investigation was undertaken against
Papon, and on October 20, 1988, Sabatier was indicted, but he died
soon afterwards, in April of 1989.266 In June of 1990, Papon sued the
news magazine le Nouvel Observateur for including him in a reference
to "French accomplices of genocide." Papon seized the occasion to
liken himself to Dreyfus: 'je suis le capitaine Dreyfus!" ("I am
Captain Dreyfus!") 267 The juge d'instruction and public prosecutor's
261. The text of the Supreme Court opinion refers to Sabatier only as "Mr. Sxxxx." See
La Cour de cassation, Cass. Crim., Feb. 11, 1987, Pourvoi NC 87-80.612, available in
LEXIS. Library: World/French Language/Priv6. File: CASS ["Cour de cassation"].
Search: "Maurice Papon".
262. Id.
263. See id.
264. See id
265. C. PR. PEN. Art. 659 (emphasis added).
266. See Eric Conan, Le grand absent: Le spectre de Maurice Sabatier, le 'patron' de
Maurice Papon, hante les d~bats de Bordeaux, L'EXPRESS, Nov. 20, 1997, at 12.
267. The Dreyfus affair constitutes a subtext, often unarticulated but powerfully
present, for Vichy's antisemitic persecutions. The notorious antisemite Charles Maurras,
when convicted after the war, had one comment: "This is Dreyfus' revenge!" ("C'est la
revanche de Dreyfus!") See, e.g., Benjamin F. Martin, Political Justice in France: The
Dreyfus Affair and After, 2 THE EUROPEAN LEGACY 809, 822 (1997). Moreover, after
the Court of Appeals initially dismissed charges against Touvier, nearly 200 famous people
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office once again decided to request the dismissal of all charges
against Papon. The Minister of Justice, Jacques Toubon, however,
described as having been in a state of panic at the prospect of the
public outcry likely to follow a second dismissal, asked the prosecutor
to reverse its decision and to issue instead a renvoi d'assises, an order
committing the case for trial at the trial court level.268 This was done
on December 19, 1995.269
Papon's initial indictment in 1983 presented the issue of whether
he could be tried for crimes against humanity, with the lurking
subtext of how Vichy might thereby be implicated. In the course of
several decisions spanning a number of years, France's courts
progressively reinterpreted controlling law so as simultaneously to
have Papon stand trial, and yet to avoid confronting the omnipresent,
thorny question of how to define Vichy's role in the holocaust. The
feat has shown a casuistical skill, and bespeaks of the French
judiciary's long, unarticulated and unavowed tradition of creative
interpretation.270
Ten years earlier, the Court had sought to avoid tarring France
and Germany with the same brush. In 1985, Klaus Barbie had been
tried and convicted in France for crimes against humanity which he
committed as part of the Nazi German occupying force in France.
Barbie was precisely the sort of person French law had intended to
target when it made crimes against humanity beyond the reach of
French limitations periods. Barbie's lawyer, however, the renowned
Jacques Verges, whose clients have included numerous Middle
Eastern terrorists, raised the unpleasant specter of France's crimes in
Algeria in the 1950s, suggesting that a guilty verdict for Barbie
signed a protest that they titled "Nous accusons," echoing the famous article "J'accuse,"
published in l'Aurore by Emile Zola to challenge Dreyfus' conviction. See Leila Sadat
Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation:
From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 289, 350-51
(1994).
268. For a chronology of events in the Papon cases, see L'EXPRESS, Oct. 8, 1997, at 11-
31. For a summary of the French criminal law process, beginning with the initial
investigation by a juge d'instruction, see WESTON, supra note 259, at 125-33; McKillop,
supra note 259.
269. The parquet's passive submission to politically motivated orders from above in this
and other politically sensitive cases have triggered considerable criticism in France and
have generated a movement for reform. Both France's present and former Ministers of
Justice, Elisabeth Guigou and Robert Badinter respectively, recently commented publicly
on the problem. See, e.g., Mine Guigou met la justice en libertd renforcde,
<http://www.amgot.orgtlibe 1029.htm>; Robert Badinter, De l'indipendance du parquet,
<http://www.lemonde.fr/journallemonde/971029/une/0110.HTM>.
270. See supra notes 72-75, 99-101, and accompanying text. See also Merryman, supra
note 100, at 116-17; Pierre Legrand Jr., Judicial Revision of Contracts in French Law: A
Case-Study, 62 TUL. L. REV.963 (1988).
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necessarily would augur by analogy the same result for those
responsible for crimes of torture and murder committed in France's
name during the Algerian war of 1954-1962.271
In a judicially created phrase that would be repeated until it took
on a statute-like resonance, the Supreme Court of France, the Cour
de cassation, decided that crimes against humanity henceforth would
be limited to crimes committed "in the name of a State practicing a
policy of ideological hegemony."272 Consequently, France's acts in
Algeria would not be amenable to prosecution as crimes against
humanity inasmuch as the French government in the 1950s did not
meet the definition of "practicing a policy of ideological hegemony,"
a term interpreted as describing a fascist-totalitarian state.273
The problem of dealing with Vichy arose in the case of Paul
Touvier even before it posed a problem in the Papon case. In 1992,
the Supreme Court reviewed a lower court decision to dismiss charges
against Touvier, a former leader of the Vichy milice, a French
paramilitary organization known for its Gestapo-like brutality.274 The
lower court had dismissed the charges against Touvier on the ground
that he had worked for Vichy, rather than Germany.275 The lower
court had found that he could not be guilty on the rationale that
Vichy, unlike Nazi Germany, had not practiced a policy of
"ideological hegemony" within the Supreme Court's meaning of that
term.
Thus, the limitation on crimes against humanity, which had been
intended to immunize the French in Algeria, now was being
interpreted so as to immunize the Vichy r6gime from the judiciary's
271. For an excellent analysis of the Barbie trial, including the manifold tactics of
Verges on Barbie's behalf, see Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and
Identity at the Trial of Klaus Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321, 1324-44, 1355-67 (1989), and
sources cited therein. For comparisons between French police brutality in Algeria and
Nazi brutality, see MAURICE MACHINO, LE REFUS 121-23 (1960).
272. "[A]u nom d'un ttat pratiquant une politique d'hdgdmonie iddologique." Cass.
Crim., Jan. 23, 1997; Papon [arrAt No. 502], in La Semaine juridique, No. 14, Apr. 2, 1997,
at 22812. For a history of the judicial decisions leading to Papon's criminal trial, see id.,
the final Supreme Court decision, holding that Papon would stand trial, including
commentary thereafter by Professor Jacques-Henri Robert (hereinafter "1997 Papon
Decision"). The Supreme Court's definition of crimes against humanity limited the class
of potential defendants but simultaneously expanded the class of potential victims.
Excluded as a potential defendant was the French army of the 1950s and 1960s, but now
included as potential victims were Resistance members.
273. For an interesting discussion of the legal definition "hegemonic" has had
historically, see Wexler, supra note 254, at 202 n.59 (disputing the accuracy of the
unchallenged French judicial interpretation of the term); Wexler, supra note 267, at 360-
61.
274. For an English translation of the charter of the milice, see Wexler, supra note 267,
at 368-69.
275. See Arrt de la chambre d'accusation de Paris du 13 avril 1992.
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reach. This interpretation, however, constituted an implicit
recognition that Vichy was a French phenomenon, not German-
imposed, something many of the same people who did not want
Vichy officials to be prosecuted systematically had been refusing to
concede for half a century.
Although the Supreme Court reversed the lower court dismissal
in Touvier's case, it nevertheless managed to avoid taking any
position on Vichy. Instead, the Court introduced yet another
substantive limitation on the definition of crimes against humanity. It
held that crimes against humanity require that the acts be committed
by a European Axis power, or by a perpetrator acting in complicity
with an Axis power.276 This eliminated as a matter of law any inquiry
into whether Vichy France could be deemed an autonomous
perpetrator of crimes against humanity. Thus, the jurors in the
Touvier case would be permitted to convict the defendant only if they
found that he had committed his crimes for Germany (or,
theoretically, for Italy). Touvier had been indicted for what had
appeared to be a totally French crime in that he had been charged
with having decided on his own to have Jewish hostages shot.277 In
light of the Court's rulings, however, his ultimate conviction
necessarily implied a jury finding, albeit in the absence of any
evidence whatsoever to support such a conclusion, that Touvier had
acted on German instructions.
Although the Court had done its utmost to distance Vichy from
the judicial proceedings, the nation perceived Touvier's trial as the
trial of the state. Schoolchildren attended Touvier's trial to learn
about France's role in the holocaust, and news headlines announced
the trial's developments in terms of the Vichy state.278 Because
Touvier was an important personage in the Vichy-established milice,
France largely perceived Touvier as a representative of Vichy. The
charges against Touvier, however, thwarted this interpretation, in that
they focused exclusively on his personal, individual decision to
commit murder.
Papon's case seemed better calculated to force the issue of Vichy
into the forefront, because Papon's file revealed that from 1942 to
1944 he had ordered and arranged for the arrests and deportations of
some 1700 Jews in the Bordeaux area in obedience to explicit,
documented orders from his French superiors in the Vichy
276. See Cass. Crim., Nov. 27,1992, Touvier. JCP 1993 G, 11, 21977, note M. Dobkine.
277. This incident arose as a retaliatory measure for the Resistance execution of
Henriot. See supra notes 183-189 and accompanying text.
278. A LEXIS search of headlines revealed innumerable such headlines in the French
newspapers and news magazines on line. Libraries: World/PRESSE ("French language").
Search: "Paul Touvier".
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government. Papon's acts were state acts, and the state which he had
served was Vichy. Thus, it seemed as if the Supreme Court in the
Papon case finally would have to confront the issue of whether Vichy
had been a puppet government of Nazi Germany or an autonomous
entity.
Once again, however, the Court managed to skirt the issue,
despite a lower court's explicit attribution of crimes to the Vichy
government. In its 1997 decision, France's Supreme Court preferred
to rule ambiguously that Papon had been "fully cognizant of the
Vichy government's antisemitic policies," 279 but it drew no legal
conclusions from this concerning the nature of Vichy. Instead, the
Court proceeded to characterize Papon as having worked to further
Germany's plan to exterminate Jews, limiting its references to Vichy's
antisemitic policies to establishing that Papon had been aware of
participating in a scheme to murder. In the Court's words,
[the] illegal arrests, imprisonments and internments, carried out at
the request of the German authorities, particularly of the
Kommando der Sicherheitspolizei und der Sicherheitsdienst (SIPO-
SD), lending its services to the Bordeaux branch of the
Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA), the Reich security
organization, [the above illegal acts] were accomplished with the
active assistance of Maurice Papon, at the time the Secretary
General of the prefecture of the Gironde, who, by virtue of the wide
delegation of power accorded him by the regional pr~fet [i.e., the
head of the prefecture], exercised authority equally over the
[several] services of the police, as well as over the running of the
M6rignac camp and services emanating from the war, such as that
of Jewish Questions [i.e., an organization set up by Petain" to
accomplish the elimination of Jews from French public and
professional life and from property ownership];
[Further, Papon] fully assisted the German leadership at all stages
of the operations; namely, in preparing the arrests and in the
practical organization of the convoys;... Maurice Papon himself,
from July, 1942 to May, 1944, delivered orders for the arrest,
internment and transfer of persons to [the] Drancy [camp];... the
service which he led always sought to ensure maximum efficiency in
the anti-Jewish measures that were in his jurisdiction-such as the
updating of files on Jews, or regular communication with the
[German] SIPO-SD to provide information about Jews-and
sometimes even without waiting for instructions from the central
authorities of the Vichy Government, where he requested the same
[from Vichy] or from the occupier.280
In yet a third modification of the definition of crimes against
humanity, this time tailored to the Papon case, the Supreme Court
279. See 1997 Papon Decision, supra note 272-
280. Id at 22812.
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further stated that the defendant could be guilty of crimes against
humanity even if he personally had not adhered to the policy of
ideological hegemony.281 The Supreme Court to date has never
pronounced a conclusion on whether Vichy itself had the "hegemonic
ideology" which would qualify it for responsibility for "crimes against
humanity" pursuant to the Court's earlier restrictive interpretation of
that phrase. Papon's trial nevertheless was perceived by a public and
media eager to try Vichy as the trial of Vichy France.mR
For his part, Papon argued, among other points, that he could
not be found guilty because he did no more than follow the orders of
the then-legitimate government. This legal defense, also proffered by
defendants at the Nuremberg trials, is known in France as "the order
of law and the command of the legitimate authority. '"283 The French
Supreme Court rejected this argument when it upheld the lower
appellate court decision that Papon should stand trial. The Supreme
Court relied on Article 213-4 of the French Criminal Code, pursuant
to which "the perpetrator or accomplice... shall not be exonerated
from responsibility by the sole fact of having performed an act
prescribed or permitted by legislative or regulatory provisions or an
act ordered by the legitimate authority."'' 4
As the trial of Maurice Papon unfolded in Bordeaux, serious
problems persisted. To the consternation of the children of deported
Jews, who testified about Papon's role in the murder of their parents
and siblings more than half a century ago when he was Secretary
General of the Vichy police for the Gironde region, Papon offered
indignant testimony that his official work for Vichy was merely a
camouflage for his Resistance work. Roger Bloch, a French Jewish
survivor and Resistance fighter, stated that Papon had saved his
281. See id. The Court noted in particular that the Statute of the international Military
Tribunal does not do so and that it also does not require the defendant to have belonged
to an organization declared criminal by the Nuremberg Tribunal.
282. Arno Klarsfeld, the lawyer for the civil party accusers, has been quoted as saying
that "through Maurice Papon, I shall plead for the conviction of the apparatus of the State
of Vichy," Proc&s Papon: La Derniere Ligne Droite, PARIS MATCH, March 19, 1998, at 65,
and "[t]he verdict is a condemnation of... Vichy." Craig R. Whitney, Ex-Vichy Aide Is
Convicted and Reaction Ranges Wide, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 1997, at A-11. A typical
French news article is titled, "Papon: the duty of History. We [are] obliged to judge a
man, an epoch, a r6gime." Denis Jembar, Papon: le devoir d'Histoire-Nous revoild...
contraints de juger un homme, une dpoque, un rdgime, L'EXPRESS, Oct. 8,1997, at 9.
283. "L'Ordre de la loi et le commandement de l'autoritd lgitime." See 1997 Papon
Decision, supra note 272, at 22812.
284. "L'auteur ou le complice d'un crime vis6 par le present titre ne peut 6tre exonr6 de
sa responsabilit6 du seul fait qu'il a accompli un acte prescrit ou autoris par des
dispositions lgislatives ou r6glementaires ou un acte command6 par l'autorit l6gitime." C.
PtN. Art. 213-4 (1994).
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Michel Berg~s, a professor of political science at the University
of Bordeaux, who in 1983 personally saved 35 sacks of documents
concerning Papon's Vichy activities from the Bordeaux police
archives as they were about to be burned, also supported Papon. In a
recently published interview, Berg~s baldly described the evidence
against Papon as both absurd and shoddily concocted. According to
Bergs, Papon was a civil servant of only secondary stature during the
Occupation, a cog in the administrative machinery. Berg~s is quoted
as saying that it would be "absurd" to try to attribute the 1600
Bordeaux deportations to Papon, and even more so to try to turn
Papon into the French Eichmann. According to Berg~s, the
documents that the prosecution touted as arrest and deportation
orders signed by Papon actually are no more than administrative
minutes, and Papon signed them only after the fact. In his opinion,
the real culprits are the German S.S. men, Knochen and Hagen, both
still alive and peacefully living out their days in Germany, as well as
Papon's French superiors, the regional prfet and others, all of whom,
however, are now dead.286
The obstacles to portraying Papon as an unmitigated criminal,
and the fervor of the desire to do so, attest to two disquieting
phenomena: (1) the use, or misuse, of criminal trials to judge Vichy
qua government and era, rather than to judge an individual for his
personal guilt; and (2) a current agenda to view Vichy selectively,
expurgated of its contemporaneous complexities and paradoxes, of
the complications, indirections and inconsistencies that thwart easy
interpretation. To the extent that the repeal of the limitations period
for crimes against humanity rendered Papon's trial incompatible with
the current Fifth Republic's established procedural legality, the trial
became amenable to attack as political in nature, and an instance of
285. See Je Considirais M. Papon Comme SOr, LE MONDE, February 27, 1998; Lexis
Libraries: World/PRESSE. Search: "Roger Bloch."
286. See Frangois LabrouiUlre, Papon. Le t~moin attendu, PARIS MATCH, Nov. 13,
1997, at 91. Bergs was partially mistaken: Knochen lives in retirement, but Hagen was
tried by a German court and condemned to twelve years' imprisonment, although only in
1980, and only after Serge Klarsfeld had led a public and highly publicized campaign
against him. See KLARSFELD, supra note 134, Notes biographiques, at 541. Berg~s' view
of Papon's low level of responsibility appears to be shared by Arno Klarsfeld, lawyer for
some of the civil parties and son of renowned Nazi hunters Serge and Beate Klarsfeld.
Arno Klarsfeld advocated a lesser category of crime against humanity, better suited to
Papon's status and deeds. See Eric Conan, Procds Papon: Ilfaut enfinir!, L'EXPRESS, Jan.
22, 1998, at 10, 15. Of course, Klarsfeld's position may have reflected principally a
strategic concern that Papon not be acquitted. In this context, it is interesting to note that
Papon's defense lawyer was scrupulously respectful of the holocaust. He took the position
that Papon's role was so minor and passive that his conviction would demean the concept
of the crime against humanity.
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victor's justice, as well as for misrepresenting an adjudication of state
crimes as the trial of an individual.
Critics as disparate as Papon's defense attorney, Jean-Marc
Varaut, and Simone Veil, a lawyer, former judge, former cabinet
minister under President Giscard d'Estaing, public figure and
Auschwitz survivor, condemned allowing an indefinite passage of
time for the prosecution of any crime, in view of the inevitable deaths
of most eyewitnesses, losses of relevant documents, unreliability of
memory, and other reasons for which statutes of limitation are
passed, including European defendants' right to a speedy trial as
guaranteed by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights of 1950.287 Indeed, the European Convention on Human
Rights suggests that France's obtaining Papon's conviction quite
literally may mean that Papon will proceed to obtain France's 2
Anticipating the Papon trial's vulnerability to challenges, French
Attorney General Henri Declaux declared in October, 1997 that "[i]t
is not a State which is being judged here, but only a man."289 The
nation's obsessive focus on Papon's trial casts doubt on Declaux's
statement, and on whether the trial would have taken place at all if
the nation were not struggling with how to define a State.
On April 2, 1998, the criminal trial court, or cour d'assises, of
Bordeaux convicted Papon and sentenced him to ten years in
prison.290 Paradoxically, the court convicted Papon of "crimes against
humanity," as it was obliged to do in order to convict him at all, since
otherwise the statute of limitations would have run, but the court did
not find that Papon had even known of the Nazi genocide during the
time relevant to the criminal charges against him. Rather, it held that
287. Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that, "[iln
determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable amount of time."
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5, as amended by Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55, and
Protocol No. 8, E.T.S. 118, reprinted in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 464 (1995). See N.Y. TIMES., Oct. 10,
1977 (World News Briefs). For the opposing view, in support of imprescriptability, see
Levasseur, supra note 254.
288. Indeed, after Papon's conviction, his lawyer stated that he intended to "take the
case to... the European Court of Human Rights." See Whitney, supra note 282, at A-11.
289. "Ce n'est pas un Atat qui est jugd ici, mais seulement un homme." Internet
Discussion Group, "Law France, Digest #66," Oct. 13,1997, supra note 217.
290. The court's sentence, including a transcription of almost all of the 764 questions
posed to the jury, with the jury's responses thereto, is available on the Internet at
<http://www.matisson.comlaffaire-papon-02_avril.htm> (hereinafter referred to as "Papon
Verdict"). Papon was also ordered to pay 4.6 million francs to the civil plaintiffs. See
Fralon Jose Alain, Maurice Papon est condamnd 6 verser 4,6 millions de francs aux
victimes, LE MONDE, April 6,1998, available in LEXIS.
November 1998] THE LEGALIZATION OF RACISM
Papon had been an accomplice in the "arrests and sequestrations"
that were part of the Nazis' war against the Jews. 291 His crimes were
deemed sufficiently grave to qualify as crimes against humanity, yet
not grave enough to merit a sentence of more than ten years.292
The court precluded any holding that directly implicated Vichy
by allowing the jury to answer questions that referred exclusively to
Germany. Thus, one question which arose recurrently with respect to
various victims was whether Papon's acts were "committed within the
framework of a concerted plan on behalf of a State practicing an
ideological hegemony; namely, in this instance, the German National
Socialist State?" 293 As we have already seen, France's prior court
decisions had paved the way for the trial court's exclusion of Vichy as
a possible culprit. By its manner of framing the jury questions, the
court limited to Nazi Germany any jury finding of culpability. A
verdict against Papon had to be linked to his conduct on behalf of
Germany, because French law had been so defined as to eliminate
Vichy as an actor subject to the criminal law category of "crimes
against humanity."
France's choice of the judiciary as its vehicle for (re-)constructing
memory reflects the judicial trial's unique adeptness at purported
constructions of truth. Trials are ideal vehicles for (re-)defining
reality, and more precisely, for constructing alleged reality as they
purport to reconstitute a reality which in fact they set about to define.
Evidence the court deems admissible forms a closed universe of
mathematical-like axioms as the sole point of departure from which
legal reasoning can proceed. Facts of record, sanctified by the court's
opinion, become immutable and exclusive truths for purposes of legal
reasoning-unless a new trial is necessitated by a successful appeal, in
which case the process begins again, with a successor court redefining
the past anew, but continuing, like its predecessor, to control the
power to define, the power to construct significance.
French historian Pierre Vidal-Naquet suggests that his colleagues
have studiously avoided writing about Vichy because they have not
wanted to confront the issue of Vichy collaboration. 294 A recent
article published in the Revue d'histoire de la Shoah, appropriately
titled The Silence of the Historians, provides support for Vidal-
Naquet's thesis, inasmuch as its author, Rita Thalmann, recounts the
many stumbling blocks French graduate students in history have
encountered since 1945 if they wished to write doctoral idissertations
on Vichy. According to Thalmann, such students until recently could
291. See Papon Verdict, supra note 290.
292. See Denis Jeambar, Unjugement d'opinion, L'ExPRESS, Apr. 9, 1998, at 5.
293. See Papon Verdict, supra note 290.
294. Vidal-Naquet, supra note 25, at 145-46.
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not find thesis directors and were unemployable in the French
government-run university system.295  Thalmann mentions in
particular that eminent French historian Fernand Braudel openly
explained to his own former student, L6on Poliakov, that he fully
intended to thwart Poliakov's professional advancement, saying, "[a]s
long as you work on antisemitism, you will not find help from me. '296
Vidal-Naquet believes that this attitude, widespread among
French historians, explains why the primary historians of the Vichy
period to date have been either foreign historians297 or French non-
historians, such as the lawyer Serge Klarsfeld, who has become a
prolific writer on the subject of Vichy France.2 98 On the other hand,
the French court decisions referred to above in the Barbie, Touvier
and Papon cases all attest to a reluctance to confront collaboration
during the Vichy period, a reluctance perhaps equally as potent
among members of France's judiciary as among its historians. These
decisions also reflect a judicial history of circumvention and foot-
dragging in cases likely to require such a confrontation.
The explanation for France's privileging its judiciary's role in
historicizing Vichy may lie elsewhere: in an underlying function of
trials to provide a forum for expiating, channeling, and thereby
regulating public passions, as well as in a French tendency to resolve
295. Rita Thalmann, Le Silence des historiens?, 160 REVUE D'HISTOIRE DE LA SHOAH:
LE MONDE JUIF 154 (1997). Cf. Rousso, supra note 67, at 265-71. More generally, on the
status of French intellectual dissent and dissenters, see PAUL M.COHEN, FREEDOM'S
MOMENT: AN ESSAY ON THE FRENCH IDEA OF FREEDOM FROM ROUSSEAU TO
FOUCAULT (1997).
296. Thalmann, supra note 295, at 158. Thalmann also recounts Poliakov's difficulties
in finding a publisher for le Br~viaire de la haine, considered today by many to be a
masterpiece and long translated into numerous foreign languages. That Braudel should
have opposed the study of Vichy antisemitism contains its own peculiar irony, inasmuch as
Braudel famously assumed the direction of a French historical journal, Annales, founded
by Marc Bloch in 1929. In 1941 Bloch's name was removed from the journal, and three
years later, in June of 1944, he was murdered by the Germans after the French milice
delivered him to the Gestapo. Bloch's innovative concepts of history can be seen as a
point of departure for Braudel's. Thalmann's portrayal of Braudel contrasts with his
general reputation for having revered Bloch's memory.
297. American historian Robert Paxton did the first groundbreaking work on the
previously unsuspected extent of Vichy autonomy. See PAXTON, supra note 6. The
profound influence of Paxton's work in France is evident from the fact that he was called
by the French court to testify as an expert witness in the Papon trial. See Craig R.
Whitney, Vichy Figure Goes on Trial for Deportation of Jews, N.Y. TIMES, October 9,
1997, at A-3; Robert 0. Paxton, Vichy On Tria4 N.Y. TIMES, October 16, 1997, at A-21
(Op-Ed). For Paxton's own views of the problems with French historical renditions of
Vichy, see PAXTON, supra note 6, at xi-xvi.
298. This is particularly noteworthy when one considers the growing role of historians
in France. See NORA, supra note 37, at 14 (describing contemporary France as a nation
which "has changed so radically that it has lost its memory and become obsessed with
understanding itself historically").
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increasing numbers of issues by recourse to the courts.299 The trial
can be an ideal medium for representing memory, so long as the
concern is to control meaning according to present perspectives, to
concretize a normative position in contemporary France's official
interpretive stance vis-A-vis Vichy, and to delegitimize the values
associated with Vichy, rather than to understand the past in its
contemporaneous, elusive and often paradoxical complexities.
Judicially imposed strictures limit both the questions posed and the
answers permitted. Even the nature of the lawyers' questions to
witnesses and parties becomes defined by the presiding judges'
interpretations, for a judge's directions presuppose the judge's
unimpeachable understanding of the questions. 300 If one posits that
such alleged judicial understanding inevitably involves an interpretive
component, the idea of objective reality coming to fruition in the
courtroom is further undermined. Rather, the emergent version of
reality is determined by the judges' array of presuppositions and
perspectives, operating within the particular formative framework of
the judicial setting.301
The judicial context offers more than a contemporary
interpretation of Vichy. It also appeals to the demand for moral
certainty by virtue of its process of triage with respect to cognizable
facts, its rejection of claims that do not fit existing legal
prohibitions,3°2 and the concrete, final nature of its conclusions, set
299. On the expiatory needs of society, see RENt GIRARD, LA VIOLENCE ET LE SACRT
(1972), especially le sacrifice, at 13-62, and la crise sacrificielle, at 63-101. On the expiatory
function of trials and of judicial rituals, see Antoine Garapon, Que faut-il penser du rite
judiciaire [What Should One Think of Judicial Ritual in Law?] (Vivian Grosswald Curran
trans.) in R1TUAL AND SEMIOTnCS 23-30 (J. Ralph Lindgren et al. ed. 1997). For the
general view that the courts function as last resort when community morality becomes
unable to enforce ethical conduct, see Otto Kahn-Freund, Pacta Sunt Servanda-A
Principle and Its Limits: Some Thoughts Prompted by Comparative Labour Law, 48 TUL.
L. REv. 894, 895 ("the importance of legal sanctions... is inversely proportional to the
strength of the expectation that social sanctions and moral or religious principles will
ensure that promises are kept. Is not the modem insistence on the availability of the law
for the enforcement of contractual promises to some extent the result of the weakening of
religious beliefs and also of the binding force of social norms of conduct?"). For an
analysis of what he calls "liberal show trials," see Osiel, supra note 254, at 511-14.
300. Despite what has been said above about the French judiciary's inferior role vis-A-
vis the other branches of government, French judges have a much greater role in molding
the judicial proceeding than do their American counterparts. French court proceedings
are not constricted by American-style rules of discovery or evidence.
301. For an excellent analysis of the implications of "bringing [an] ancien regime to
trial" and the "dilemma[s] raised by successor criminal justice," see Ruti Teitel,
Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.
2009, 2018 (1997). See also id. at 2021 ("The response to past tyranny... lie[s] in the
domain of politics"); Binder, supra note 271 (deconstruction of the Barbie trial).
302. On the depth and breadth of the human longing for moral certainty, see Curran,
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forth in immutable words that represent finality and certainty,
creating what Peter Goodrich calls the judicial "governance of
perception. '303 Trials offer resolution by purporting to supply the
answer, while in fact producing merely one of many possible answers.
History, on the other hand, represents mutually incompatible
interpretive possibilities, complexity and plurality.
The judicial effort to (re)construct is also an effort to define
contemporary France by analogy to the past. By understanding the
present through analogizing it to the past, the court purports to create
identity through differentiation from the other.3°4 Modern cognitive
science suggests that human thought proceeds at its most
fundamental levels by processes of comparison, of which metaphor is
the most powerful. The method is one of assimilating data by
comparison and contrast to previously processed, like or unlike data,
thereby filtering it in and through already constructed, culturally
influenced categories.305
In selecting the judiciary to create or recreate its understanding
of Vichy, contemporary France is striving to understand its past by
comparison with its present, as much as to understand its present by
comparison with its past. Just as memory can be blocked, subject to
unconscious denial, to repression, and to willed or unwilled
selectivity, so too the judicial process can and even must ignore facts
supra note 181, at 26-28. See also JUDITH SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 8 (1990)
(criticizing "the parajudicial conception of morality" and, implicitly, the judicial
conception) (quoting JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 85 (1970)).
303. PETER GOODRICH, CEDIPUS LEX: PSYCHOANALYSIS, HISTORY, LAW x (1995).
Cf George Steiner's definition of the "serious act of signification... [as] inexhaustible to
interpretative summation. It cannot be anatomized or held in fixed place. Each and every
reading, in the larger sense of the term, each and every hermeneutic-critical mapping,
remains provisional, incomplete and possibly erroneous." Steiner, supra note 37, at 21.
For a discussion of legal rhetoric in meaning construction, see Denis J. Brion, Saying the
Law: The Power of Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of Power, in STATES, CITIZENS, AND
QUESTIONS OF SIGNIFICANCE 19 (John Brigham & Roberta Kevelson eds., 1997) and
Denis Brion, The Ritual of the Judicial Opinion, in RrrUAL AND SEMIOTICS, supra note
299, at 1. See also Larry Cata Backer, Tweaking Facts, Speaking Judgment" Judicial
Transmogrification of Case Narrative as Jurisprudence in the United States and Britain, 6 S.
CAL. INTERDIS. L. J. 611, 626 (1998) (describing the judiciary as creating "stories which
distort the input but which serve the cause of moral approbation").
304. As Derrida has shown, identity is no more foundational a concept than difference
and, indeed, only acquires its significance through differentiation. See JACQUES
DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 278-79 (Alan Bass trans., Univ. of Chicago Press
1978); JACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 3-27 (Alan Bass trans., Univ. of
Chicago Press 1982).
305. See GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE AND OTHER DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT
CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 269-303 (1990); STEVEN L. WINTER, A
CLEARING IN THE FOREST: How THE STUDY OF THE MIND CHANGES OUR
UNDERSTANDING OF LIFE AND LAW (forthcoming 2000; portions of manuscript on file
with author).
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and issues which do not fit into the grids previously created for
categorizing what is legally cognizable. In this sense, the judiciary
mirrors the process of memory Aristotle discussed as anamnesis, or
willed recollection, but excludes mneme, the Aristotelian concept that
Raphael Samuel gracefully defines as "the memory which comes
unbidden to the surface. ''3 °6 The "unbidden" may hover in the wings,
but does not penetrate into the reification of memory that is the
judicial proceeding.
Judicial reification not only displaces and deforms; it also
banalizes by eliminating the unspoken, and by equating the judicial
record with reality itself.307 This problem generally affects the
relation between the judicial event and adjudicated life occurrences,
but it is a particularly acute problem with respect to the holocaust.
Many holocaust historians have noted the importance of silence in
representing the holocaust.30 8 To reduce the unspeakable to words is
to transmute it into material which must fit within a previously
constructed system for the assimilation of data, but one that has been
constructed of categories that cannot encompass events or ideas of
the order of magnitude of the holocaust.
The holocaust, a cas limite, illustrates a more general and
pervasive problematic of representation, in that it highlights
difficulties of transmitting to another that which never can be
understood in the same way by the addressee as it is by the
addressor.30 9  This inhibiting feature of communication and of
understanding is minimized where (1) the interlocutors share similar
306. SAMUEL, supra note 190, at vii. For a discussion of Plato's concept of anamnesis,
see CASSIRER, supra note 36, at 83. Cf. J.M. Balkin, The Promise of Legal Semiotics, 69
TEX. L. REV. 1831, 1837 (1991) ("[w]hile moral conflict is always with us, we have a
natural tendency to reduce the cognitive dissonance that recognition of such tension would
produce. In other words, our sense of moral coherence in a system of beliefs is due not
only to its actual lack of moral tension, but to a process of forgetting.")
307. Cf Julia Kristeva, Psychoanalysis and the Polis, in THE POLITICS OF
INTERPRETATION 98 (W.J.J. Mitchell ed., 1983) ("the modem version of liberty is
being... threatened... by a single, total, and totalitarian Meaning"). For law's
involvement in the public keeping of memory, see SAMUEL, supra note 190, at 24
(referring to MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY (1961)).
308. For a discussion of historical representation of the holocaust, see SAUL
FRIEDLANDER, PROBING THE LIMITS OF REPRESENTATION: NAZISM AND THE "FINAL
SOLUTION" (1993). See also Myriam Ruszniewski-Dahan, La Shoah, entre mdmoire et
roman, 162 REVUE D'HISTOIRE DE LA SHOAH 141 (1998) (broader discussion of similar
issues); DOMINICK LACAPRA, HISTORY AND MEMORY AFTER AuscHwITz (1998).
309. Cf. WrITGENSTEIN, supra note 32, at 2e (Wittgenstein discussing the impossibility
of someone else's thinking a thought for him). See also JOHANN WOLFGANG VON
GOETHE, FAUST, 1226-27 (1808) ("Ich kann das Wort so hoch unmglich schatzen/ Ich
muJ3 es anders tibersetzen."). I am grateful to Peter W. Schroth for bringing these
beautiful lines to my attention. See Peter W. Schroth, Language and Law (1997)
(manuscript on file with author).
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cultural backgrounds and (2) the subject of the communication
corresponds to the concrete, depending less, rather than more, on
what Quine calls verbal stimuli.310 Conversely, the problem grows to
the extent that (1) mutual foreignness impedes a meeting of the
interlocutors' perspectives and (2) the subject matter of the
communication is abstract.311
If metaphor is the powerful tool that cognitive scientists such as
George Lakoff claim,312 if it is the best hope for transmitting
something of the new, of the other, it is because metaphor makes use
of silence, because the essence of its communicative function is
precisely what it leaves unsaid. The power of metaphor lies in the
blank space that must be filled by the recipient in order to link the
two juxtaposed, conflated elements or domains that metaphor
presents. 313 The sense of reality that strikes the recipient of the
metaphor derives from the recipient's ability to connect the
metaphor's two elements, which may appear unrelated. Where a
metaphor triggers a jolt and an illumination, it is because the
recipient's embodied, contingent, experience-based reason permits
the recipient to bridge the distance, to supply the unarticulated link,
between domains the speaker has connected without explanation.
This means that the reality metaphor achieves is a sense of
reality; it is a new reality for the recipient who hitherto had not seen a
connection between the metaphor's dual domains, but the link, the
connection, the understanding newly achieved, depend on the
recipient's pre-existing experiences and stored associations, for the
latter permit the recipient to create the new information that the
metaphor has inspired and instructed.314
Charles Sanders Peirce's explanation of the phenomenon he calls
"trace" signifies that cognition is dependent on prior experience,
determined by previous cognitions. According to Peirce, "the
meaning of a term is the conception which it conveys. Hence a term
can have no [absolutely incognizable] meaning," and, similarly, "[w]e
310. See WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECr 27 (1960). For a fuller
discussion of this issue, see Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and
Categories in U.S. Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMp. L. 43 (1998).
311. See Curran, supra note 310.
312. See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
313. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Metaphor Is the Mother of All Law, in LAW AND
THE CONFLICr OF IDEOLOGIES, 65, 67-69 (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1996); see also sources
cited therein.
314. See Steven L. Winter, Death Is the Mother of Metaphor, 105 HARV. L. REV. 745,
769 (1992) (reviewing THOMAS C. GREY, THE WALLACE STEVENS CASE: LAW AND THE
PRACTICE OF POETRY (1991) (asserting metaphor is our way of having a reality)). Accord
Curran, supra note 313; Kristeva, supra note 307, at 89 (defining analysis as "a
construction which ... triggers other associations on the part of the analysand, thus
expanding the boundaries of the analyzable").
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have no conception of the absolutely incognizable. 315 This process
permits the extension of previous mental boundaries by building on
prior understandings, and building over a chasm left for such
construction. It is in this way that the unspoken, the silence in
language, is the most constructive force for understanding the new.
Judicial connections, by contrast, do not suggest with faint
brushstrokes. They are not like pointilliste paintings composed of
separated dots that spectators are challenged to connect with their
own visions. The judicial decision seeks to bridge every chasm, to
supply its own logic, to avoid being elusive, to preclude alternative
visions and interpretations. The judicial decision is that which does
not encourage or even permit others to invest it with idiosyncratic,
deeply personal meaning. The judicial decision must be explained
and explicated. It must articulate underlying reasons and
justifications. In the French legal system since the time of the
Revolution-and in reaction against the pre-revolutionary judicial
decision that did not explain, that could order arbitrarily-the judicial
decision must be motivg, or reasoned.
If, as I believe, communication becomes most effective where it
is least controlled by explanation and articulation, as where
metaphors unleash their power by allowing interpretants to invest
their own life meaning to join two otherwise disparate domains, then
the judicial rendition of events banalizes what it describes, because its
power resides not in the power to communicate a sense of reality, but
to delimit, to control and to define. The judicial decision is
justification posing as explanation.316 It is monological rather than
dialogical.317 The power to understand the other may never be
complete or realizable in an ideal sense, but, insofar as it exists, it
depends on fluidity, on the recipient's supplementing the spoken with
315. 1 THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF PEIRCE: SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS
24,30 (Nathan Houser & Christian Kloesel eds., 1992). See also Ricceur's concept of trace
in TEMPS ET RPcrr III: LE TEMPS RACONTt 177-83 (1985).
316. See Brion, The Ritual of the Judicial Decision, supra note 303, at 9-10 ("[T]he
opinion appears to be an after the fact rationalization of the Result that the court has
determined. That is, rather than explaining why the court decided as it did, it seems to be
an exercise in judging what the court did. In terms of a portrayal of the act of deciding, the
opinion is hollow.").
317. See Denis J. Brion, The Semiosis of Liberty, in REVOLUTIONS, INSTITUTIONS,
LAW: ELEVENTH ROUND TABLE ON LAW AND SEMIOTIcS (Joel Levine & Roberta
Kevelson eds., forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 11, on file with author) (explaining,
according to Bakhtin, "the process of dialogue, the relational event by which meaning
comes about-understanding the universe as a process of endless semiosis"). See also
Mitchel de S.-O.-'E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-)Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French
Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325, 1341-42 ("The French judicial decision, in its
paradigmatic form, possesses a univocal quality that denies the possibility of alternative
perspectives, approaches or outcomes.").
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his or her unmediated experience by injecting it into a space that has
been left open for that very purpose.
Death has been described as "the metaphor through which
history takes place. '318 The history of law, however, in one sense has
been "a history of the denial of history. '319 The horror of the
holocaust resides in part in its unknowable and unimaginable quality.
To the extent that the holocaust can be made knowable at all to those
who did not experience it first-hand, it is through its character of
absence, difference and unremitting otherness.320 Not only is a
judicial record, opinion or proceeding none of the above, not only
does the judicial proceeding concretize, crystallize, immobilize and
fix, in an effort to pin down and control, but in addition, the passage
of half a century between the events and the trial renders it yet more
reductionistic.
Indeed, Klaus Barbie, known to French Jews and others as the
butcher of Lyon, was prosecuted in connection with the deaths of
approximately one-thirtieth of the number of people for whose
murder he almost certainly was responsible, because, half a century
after the events, there were insufficient eyewitnesses and documents
to connect him in a legally binding way to anywhere near the number
of people he had harmed or the scope of crimes he had committed.
321
Similarly, Paul Touvier, a major figure in the viciously murderous
milice, was charged with the murder of a mere seven Jewish hostages
in a trial that had taken more than twenty years to reach the courts. 3 22
318. GOODRICH, supra note 303, at 38.
319. Id. at 39. It has been a denial of history'in that "[t]he positivized jurisprudence of
common law, the epistemology of doctrine, is tied by precedent to a knowledge that is
known in advance, to a prior determination of the forms, classifications, languages and
similitudes through which judgment will be repeated." Id. at 13.
320. See, e.g., Jonathan Rosen, Whistle-Stops, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1998, (Book
Review), at 8 (reviewing AHARON APPELFELD, THE IRON TRACKS (Jeffrey M. Green
trans., 1998)) (describing Appelfeld's effective rendition of the holocaust through
"excruciating silence, as if language itself were a casualty of the war."). Cf. DE MAN,
supra note 17, at 17 (discussing "the priority of imagination over perception"), 69
(describing language as alien to writers). For concentration camp inmates' sense of the
incommunicability of their experiences, see, for example, Yves Trotignon, Quelques
r~flexions sur les t~moignages 6crits du syst~me concentrationnaire nazi et la communaut6
juive, 162 REVUE D'HISTOIRE DE LA SHOAH 127 (1998), and Daniela Amsallem, Primo
Levi: Un Tdmoin dans les remous de l'histoire, in id. at 43. See also FRIEDLANDER, supra
note 108, at 89 (referring to an "inevitable paralysis of language" as marring holocaust
renditions). Paul Ricceur suggests that the depiction of historical horrors requires the
narrative of fiction because of fiction's uniquely "quasi-intuitive" character. See Ricceur,
supra note 315, at 274.
321. Approximately 400, rather than 12,000. See Binder, supra note 271, at 1325, 1327-
28.
322. It was also noteworthy that the twenty-year delay in prosecuting Touvier occurred
after he had twice been convicted in absentia immediately after the war, when he was in
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In Papon's case, reductionism also came from the state's politically
motivated ambivalence about trying him. The public prosecutor's
office, in keeping with high-level governmental directions regarding
accused Vichy collaborators, approached Papon's criminal
investigation in a purposely lackadaisical manner. Leila Sadat Wexler
notes that "Frangois Mitterrand... admitted that he ordered that the
prosecution of certain persons accused of crimes against humanity be
slowed," 323 and that "[ilt is no secret that all the cases pending against
former French collaborators have proceeded inordinately slowly. 324
As Robert Paxton put it after he testified at Papon's trial,
new archival research [after 1970] proved that Vichy France was
the only Western European country under Nazi occupation that
enacted its own measures against Jews. But this evidence wasn't
enough to persuade French leaders to bring Vichy officials to trial.
In the 1980's, they quietly blocked cases against Vichy officials
from proceeding. For example, President Frangois Mitterrand
delayed the prosecuting of Ren6 Bousquet, the police chief most
responsible for the official French assistance to the Nazis. Mr.
Mitterrand preferred to sidestep the issue, having himself (like so
many others) served the Vichy r6gime before joining the
Resistance.325
In addition, French news magazine l'Express has accused the
parquet of failing to identify and locate numerous victims who might
have figured in the charges against Papon.326 Instead of the usual,
thorough preliminary court investigation,3 27  the investigating
magistrate in Papon's case left the work to the civil plaintiffs' lawyer,
Serge Klarsfeld, a well-known French Nazi-hunter, whose resources,
however, were incomparably scarcer than those at the French judicial
branch's disposal. The parquet did not search for victims whom
Klarsfeld failed to locate, thus ensuring a reduced file for Papon and
allowing many of his alleged crimes to be traceless or, in the words of
hiding. See Wexler, supra 110, at 323; David Stout, Paul Touvier, War Criminal Is Dead at
81, N.Y. TIMEs, July 18, 1996, (Obituaries) at B-11.
323. Wexler, supra note 254, at 200 n.50. A high-level movement is underway in France
to reform the executive's power over criminal cases. Both former Minister of Justice
Robert Badinter and current Minister of Justice tlisabeth Guigou are championing
reform. See De L'independence du parquet, supra note 269 (decrying "[lja multiplicit des
affaires politico-fnancieres, les entraves rencontrdes par certains juges d'instruction dans
leurs investigations"); <http://www.amgot.org./libe 1029.htm> ("D'une part, la carriare des
parquetiers est girie par le pouvoir exdcutif D'autre par4 en raison de leurs liens avec la
chancellerie, ils en regoivent des instructions. Ggnjrales quand elles concernent la politique
pinale. Particulidres quand elles concernent des dossiers individuels.").
324. Wexler, supra note 254, at 200 n.50.
325. Paxton, Vichy On Trial, supra note 297, at A-21.
326. See Conan, supra note 260.
327. See WESTON, supra note 259, at 125-33.
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l'Express, to remain perfect crimes forever.3
28
Judicial banalization involves more, however, than the necessary
or even complicit reduction in the numbers of crimes which can be
imputed to the defendant in a legally cognizable manner after the
passage of time. The Peircean concept embedded in "trace," that no
term can be "absolutely incognizable," 329 implies that, where the
transmitted term otherwise would be "absolutely incognizable," the
recipient's distortion must be overwhelming in order to render the
meaning cognizable within the recipient's cognitive framework. This
is the process that occurs in judicial memorialization of the holocaust,
ultimately resulting in banalization.
Thus, those who testified against Papon helped achieve the
verdict of guilt, but Papon's conviction derived from preexisting legal
categories unable to assimilate the indirection essential to holocaust
truths, unable to receive its original truths. The permanence the
witnesses achieved for their narrative, by virtue of its judicial
molding, necessarily rested on historical distortion, deformation and
reductionism.
For many of the witnesses, holocaust survivors whose parents
were murdered when the witnesses were children, the Papon trial was
the first time they spoke of their experiences. In his chapter on
amnesia and silence, Lucien Lazare describes the "voluntary
amnesia" of French child survivors whose parents were caught by the
Germans and did not survive. Those who were children at the time in
particular chose silence to cloak what had become inexpressible:
"Silence permitted [them] to bear the unbearable. It became the
shelter, the protection for their refusal to accept the death of their
parents." 330
The civil plaintiffs who joined Papon's trial331 were determined to
speak in order to invest meaning into their families' deaths; to wrest
them, however belatedly, from the anonymity in which they died; and
perhaps also, as Lazare believes, because after half a century, "[t]he
silence has lasted too long, and has become unbearable in its turn. 3
32
328. See Conan, supra note 260.
329. See supra note 315 and surrounding text.
330. LAZARE, supra note 105, at 213.
331. See C. PR. PaN. Art. 85, supra note 257.
332. LAZARE, supra note 105, at 213. See also RICCEUR, supra note 315, at 211
("L'impossibilitd de passer de la pensde du passd comme mien A la pens6e du pass6
comme autre. L'identit6 de la rdflexion ne saurait rendre compte de l'alt6ritd de la
rdp6tition.") (Emphases in original); and id. at 150-51 ("La fonction narrative, prise dans
toute son ampleur,... se ddfinit t titre ultime par son ambition de refigurer la condition
historique et de l'61ever ainsi au rang de conscience historique.") (Emphases in original).
But see Bernhard Groffeld, Language, Writing and the Law, 5 EUR. REV. 383, 388-89
(1997) (asserting that narration need not be through language).
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The witnesses who testified at the Papon trial may have accomplished
a personal act of mourning, but their narrative became judicially
defined, inscribed and circumscribed.
The power of the unspoken to lead to understanding, to recreate
a sense of the past, is in its capacity to generate a dialectical
movement between the speaker and the recipient.333 Because by their
nature they select and explicate, rather than suggest, judicial
representations of the past are not equipped to do justice to the effort
to convey the past to posterity.334 When courts decide, they tell us of
the law, not of the lived.
IX. The Contemporary Relevance of Vichy
One of the greatest challenges for constitutional democracies
today is achieving inclusiveness without demanding unity, without
denying or repressing the other. This requires an acceptance that not
only are the values and discourses of diverse cultural communities
within a nation state divergent, they are also irreconcilable and,
ultimately, incommensurable. Such a task inevitably strains the
capacity of constitutional law to protect diverse constituencies whose
self-understandings increasingly are of differentiation and otherness.
Ultimately the modern objective of inclusiveness challenges the very
meaning of constitutional law, as the eighteenth-century foundational
ideals of universalism clash with the late twentieth century's
conception of value pluralism.
The challenge of accepting complexity, value pluralism and
internal contradiction means eschewing the urge to fuse the diverse
into a harmonious, unitary myth of national proportions. It means
acknowledging that pluralism will persist, whether recognized or
unrecognized. Conversely, it also means questioning accepted
categories that create artificial and logically untenable dichotomies,
such as democracy versus dictatorship, resistance versus collaboration,
and antisemitism versus antifascism.
I have tried to show how democracy's demise in France was
realized through a complex interplay of symbols, of categories
redefined and renewed, destructive of the past while simultaneously
constructed from the past. From the Third Republic's last, suicidal
333. It is precisely this power to transcend time through the narrative structure and
suggestive potentials of art which was Proust's achievement in his masterpiece. See
MARCEL PROUST, A LA RECHERCHE DU TEMPS PERDU (1919-1927).
334. Pierre Nora notes a similar problem in the transition from memory to any
historical account: "Memory situates remembrance in a sacred context. History ferrets it
out; it turns whatever it touches into prose." NORA, supra note 37, at 3. See also
GroBfeld, supra note 332, at 393 ("the step from speech to writing means the
disappearance of the human face").
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parliamentary debates to contemporary France's trials of accused
Vichy collaborators, France has sought, and seeks still, to erect and
project a unified and harmonious national identity, albeit one that
shifts with each new regime in power. Successive r6gimes have
adopted some truths and rejected others in formulating various
identity-affirming discourses.
Like a palimpsest that underlies and colors layer after layer of
superimposed texts, Vichy has continued for half a century to
penetrate and affect French society, but to date it has not gained
admission into the official history of France by most post-war public
figures.335 It is only by recognizing Vichy as an ineradicable and
integral moment in French history that Vichy's lessons for democracy
can be made viable.
The historical tendency to insist on a unified self-representation
plays out beyond the level of denying divergent cultural discourses. It
also operates at the level of legal and political theory, in ignoring
counterdemocratic strains that lurk within democracies and
undermine democratic principles at every level, including the
conceptual level.
A legacy of our century's cataclysms, of which Vichy was a part,
is the belated understanding that any coherent view of human society
must be able to incorporate profound incoherence. 336 Any attempt to
inject coherence into the past inevitably will reveal as much about the
interpreter as about the events interpreted. Nevertheless, if we are
guided and disciplined by Umberto Eco's ideal for textual
interpretation-that the best interpretations are those that can
accommodate the greatest number of events-we may embark on a
road to greater awareness.337 We may begin to seek possibilities for
coexistence without compatibility, for inclusiveness without identity
or even commensurability.
Vichy shows us that even nations like our own, constituted as
democracies, can be undermined from within, by and through the
very democratic processes designed to ensure self-perpetuation, for
the most important of all constitutions, the one written in the citizens'
minds,338 is ever renewable and ever destructible, recreated
continuously, invested with inevitably transitory meanings that
fluctuate with time and history, through the perpetual vagaries of
individual and collective perception and sentiment. Vichy shows us
335. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. De Gaulle is reputed to have said of
Sartre, who openly reviled him, "Sartre aussi c'est la France" ("Sartre too is France"), yet
never could bring himself to say the same about Vichy.
336. See Curran, supra note 181, at 24-32.
337. See UMBERTO ECO, THE LImITS OF INTERPRETATION 49-63 (1990).
338. See CASSIRER, supra note 36.
November 1998]
96 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50
what we have to lose when we allow our legal, political and social
narratives and categories to erase many of our truths; when we allow
unexamined dichotomies to become tenets of faith; and when we do
not observe the erosion of substantive democratic principles because
we erroneously assume them to be immutable, perpetual pillars of
our national life.
